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ABSTRACT 
The point of departure for this study was the wide-ranging furore in media publications regarding 
the pervasive decline in donor funding for civil society organisations in South Africa, as 
influenced by the recent global financial crisis, and the subsequent shutting down of a number 
of civil society organisations. The decision to embark on this study has its roots in the fact that 
civil society is an important feature in a democracy with regards to government responsiveness, 
accountability as well as citizen participation in democratic governance. In South Africa, 
particularly, this is important in light of the country’s fledgling democracy, and even more so, 
when considering the ruling party’s overwhelming political power resulting in a dominant party 
system.  
The aim of this study was to find out what accounts for the plummet in donor funding, and the 
overriding question guiding this study was: Has the global financial crisis influenced civil society 
in South Africa? The broader question asked was: What are the challenges facing civil society 
organisations in South Africa? This study aims to assist in the evaluation of the potential role 
that civil society has played and continues to play in South Africa’s young democracy and what 
the implications would be for democracy if civil society organisations were hampered in these 
roles and continued to close offices. 
This study is explorative in nature and relied on qualitative data obtained from in-depth 
interviews conducted with two prominent South African non-governmental organisations; 
namely the Institute for Democracy and the Treatment Action Campaign. A key informant was 
selected and interviewed from each organisation. The findings of the interviews were 
operationalised through the lenses of Andrew Heywood’s (2007) conceptual theoretical 
framework, which puts forward five resources that civil society organisations need in order to 
exert their influence. While acknowledging the importance of all five resources, this study pays 
particular attention to financial resources received through international donor funding, for 
without financial resources it is difficult for an organisation to survive. 
The findings of the interviews and the conclusions drawn underscored four realities: firstly that 
the decrease in funding is not limited to the organisations examined in this study, but civil 
society as a whole. The second reality rests on the fact that the global financial crisis has indeed 
influenced the Institute for Democracy and the Treatment Action Campaign in ways that are a 
cause for a concern, not only for the survival of the organisation, but also for the durability of 
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South Africa’s young and at times fragile democracy. The third reality points to other challenges 
that have influenced donor funding, such as South Africa’s middle income status, a shift in 
donor orientation and focus and donor-specific problems. The fourth reality that was pointed out 
thrust this study into the conclusion that financial resources are the essential life-blood of civil 
society organisations. In light of the role that civil society plays in a democracy, the findings in 
this study point to a concerning trend in South Africa. 
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OPSOMMING 
Die aanvangspunt van hierdie studie is die omvangrykende mediadekking aangaande die 
wydverspreide afname in donateursbefondsing vir burgerlike samelewingorganisasies in Suid-
Afrika.  Hierdie afname is beïnvloed deur die onlangse globale finansiële krisis en het tot gevolg 
die ontbinding van ŉ aantal burgerlike samelewingorganisasies. Die besluit om met hierdie 
studie te begin het sy oorsprong in die feit dat die burgerlike samelewing ŉ belangrike kenmerk 
van demokrasie is veral met betrekking tot regeringsresponsiwiteit, aanspreeklikheid sowel as 
die deelname van burgers aan ŉ demokratiese regering. In Suid-Afrika is dit belangrik, veral met 
die oog op die land se jong demokrasie en nog meer wanneer die heersende party se 
oorweldigende politiese mag in ag geneem word en dat dit tot ŉ dominante partystelsel lei.  
Die doel van hierdie studie is om vas te stel wat die oorsaak van die daling in skenkersfondse 
is. Die rigtinggewende vraag vir die studie was: het die wêreldwye finansiële krisis die burgerlike 
samelewing in Suid-Afrika beïnvloed? Die studie beoog om by te dra tot die evaluasie van die 
potensiële rol wat burgerlike samelewing in Suid-Afrika se jong demokrasie gespeel het, en 
steeds speel, en wat die implikasies vir demokrasie sou wees indien burgerlike 
samelewingorganisasies se rol bemoeilik word en verplig word om nog meer van hulle kantore 
te sluit. 
Die studie is ondersoekend van aard en het staatgemaak op kwalitatiewe data wat verkry is 
deur in-diepte onderhoude met twee vooraanstaande Suid-Afrikaanse nie-
regeringsorganisasies te voer naamlik die Instituut vir Demokrasie en die ‘Treatment Action 
Campaign’. ’n Gesaghebbende segsman uit elke organisasie is gekies vir die onderhoude. Die 
bevindings is geoperasionaliseer deur die lense van Andrew Heywood (2007) se konseptuele 
teoretiese raamwerk wat aanvoer dat daar vyf hulpbronne is wat burgerlike organisasies nodig 
het om hulle invloed te laat geld. Terwyl die waarde van al vyf hulpbronne erken word, skenk 
hierdie studie in die besonder aandag aan die finansiële hulpbronne wat van internasionale 
skenkersfondse ontvang word omdat burgerlike organisasies beswaarlik daarsonder kan 
oorleef. 
Die bevindinge van die onderhoude en die gevolgtrekkings wat gemaak is beaam vier realiteite: 
eerstens dat die daling in befondsing nie beperk is tot die organisasies wat aan die studie 
deelgeneem het nie, maar burgerlike samelewing as ŉ geheel. Die tweede realiteit berus by die 
feit dat die globale finansiële krisis inderdaad die Instituut van Demokrasie en die ‘Treatment 
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Action Campaign’ op kommerwekkende maniere beïnvloed het, nie net in terme van die 
organisasies se oorlewing nie, maar ook in terme van die behoud van Suid-Afrika se jong en 
soms brose demokrasie.  Die derde realiteit dui op ander uitdagings wat skenkersfondse 
beïnvloed het soos Suid-Afrika se middel inkomstestatus, ŉ fokusverskuiwing van 
skenkingsgeoriënteerdheid tot skenker-spesifieke probleme.  Die vierde realiteit wat uitgewys is 
dwing die studie om tot die gevolgtrekking te kom dat finansiële hulpbronne ŉ noodsaaklikheid 
vir die behoud van burgerlike gemeenskapsorganisasies is. In die lig van die rol wat burgerlike 
gemeenskap in demokrasie speel, is die bevindings van die studie kommerwekkend. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION  
1.1. Introduction: 
Zara Nicholson published an article in the Cape Times on 2 February 2012 regarding the 
Democracy Institute (Idasa), the Black Sash, and the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) losing 
millions in funding and consequently having to close down crucial projects and retrench staff. 
Idasa’s executive director Paul Graham commented on the fact that they were forced to 
retrench 70 staff members in 2012. The annual budget has been halved from R100 million to 
R50 million in the year 2012, Graham continued. In addition, the Idasa Cape Town office had to 
be closed down where the media department and political information and monitoring service 
were housed. The projects in the Cape Town office were completely locally based, thus it was 
impossible to get funding (Nicholson, 2012). 
With regard to the Black Sash, the article reports that the organisation has lost six major donors 
over the past five years, most of them large international church-based donors. The withdrawal 
of funds has meant the loss of approximately R24 million. According to National Director of 
Black Sash, Marcella Naidoo, the lack of funding for the organisation will lead to them not being 
able to do the substantive work that they are used to. In addition, the article highlights the fact 
that the TAC is also facing difficult financial times as seen with its R6.5 million grant from the 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria which is facing a crisis with donor funding 
shortfalls. This article makes a link between the lack of funding for these organisations as well 
as the global financial crisis. To quote the executive director at Idasa, ‘International funders 
have been withdrawing their funds to South Africa for a few years now. The global financial 
crisis was precarious but we were able to keep going because we had secured funding and we 
had reserves but that ran up last year and we had to cut staff sharply’ (quoted in Nicholson, 
2012). 
This article, as well as several others that followed in the media1 have reiterated the issues 
expressed in this article, thus highlighting the need to investigate the issue of international 
                                                          
1
 See also, Cape Argus: Barnes, 2011. ‘NGOs feel the pinch as funds dry up’; West Cape News: Luhanga, 2011. 
‘Bleak new year for NGOs’; IOL News: Ajam, 2009. ‘NGOs feel the pinch of recession’; IOL News: ‘Charities, NGOs 
funds ‘’drying up’’. 
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funding in light of the role that civil society has played and needs to play in deepening 
democracy in South Africa. 
1.2. The Global Financial Crisis 
The financial crisis in the late 2000s, known as the Global Financial Crisis, is regarded by many 
economists to be the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. It brought 
about the collapse of big financial institutions, the rescuing of banks by national governments 
and declines in stock markets around the globe. In many areas, the housing market also 
suffered, resulting in a number of evictions, foreclosures and long-lasting unemployment. It 
contributed to the failure of key businesses, downturn in consumer wealth estimated in trillions 
of United States (U.S.) dollars, and a considerable decline in economic activity, producing a 
severe global economic recession since the year 2008 (Naude, 2009:1). 
The global financial crisis was set off by a multifaceted interplay of valuation and liquidity 
problems in the United States banking system in 2008. The bursting of the U.S. housing bubble, 
which peaked in 2007, caused the values of securities tied to U.S. real estate pricing to plunge, 
wounding financial institutions around the world (Naude, 2009:2-3). Questions regarding bank 
solvency, declines in credit availability and damaged investor confidence had an impact on 
global stock markets, where securities suffered large losses during 2008 and early 2009. 
Economies worldwide lost pace during this time, as credit constricted and international trade 
decreased. Governments and central banks reacted with unparalleled fiscal stimulus, monetary 
policy development and institutional bailouts (Naude, 2009:2-3). 
As a developing country, South Africa has not been left untouched by this global financial crisis. 
Pertaining to developing countries, the Overseas Development Institute explained in 2008 that 
the effect of the global financial crisis on developing countries would centre around two aspects. 
Firstly, the financial problem could lead to spill-overs for stock markets (te Velde, 2008:3). 
Secondly, the wide-ranging economic recession could harmfully impact developing countries in 
six areas (te Velde, 2008:3-4): trade and trade prices would come under strain, remittances to 
developing countries would decrease and remittances per migrant would decline, foreign direct 
investment and equity investment would come under pressure, the commercial lending of banks 
may face difficulties, aid budgets would become strained as funding of these organisations is 
affected by the downturn, and the capital adequacy ratios of development finance institutions 
would come under pressure. At that time, the Overseas Development Institute further predicted 
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that as South Africa was highly dependent on foreign direct investment, it would be hard 
pressed to reduce interest rates, a position further exacerbated by a high current account deficit 
and pressure on its exchange and inflation rate (te Velde, 2008:4). 
It is noteworthy to mention that the South African Government's reaction to the global financial 
crisis was detailed in the 2009 Framework for South Africa's response to the international 
economic crisis (South African Government Information, 2009). Within this Framework, the 
broad tenets of Government's response were to: 
 ‘Put measures in place to protect low income earners, the unemployed and vulnerable 
groups 
 Strengthen the capacity of the economy to grow and create decent jobs 
 Maintain high levels of public sector infrastructure investment and encourage private 
sector investment and corporate social investment programmes 
 Put an economic and social stimulus package in place’ (South African Government 
Information, 2009:4-5). 
Economic data showed that South Africa had for the most part broken away from the recession 
in the third and fourth quarters of 2009 (South African Reserve Bank, 2010:1), had shown 
growth in real Gross Domestic Product (South African Reserve Bank, 2010:13) and confidence 
in the financial sector also increased (South African Reserve Bank, 2010:14). In addition, a 
major boost to the economy came during the International Federation of Football Association 
(FIFA) Soccer World Cup in South Africa in 2010. The construction of stadiums, improvements 
of airports and other infrastructure, as well as 300, 000 soccer tourists visiting South Africa 
came at an opportune moment. 
Nevertheless South Africa had not been left unaffected by the economic downturn. For instance, 
there was an abrupt decline in demand for export products and a drop in commodity prices, with 
global fund managers and portfolio investors cautious of investments in emerging markets such 
as South Africa (South African Government Information, 2009:2). Concerning job losses, in his 
2010 State of the Nation address, President Jacob Zuma stated that the consequences of the 
global financial crisis was that in the region of 900 000 jobs were lost in South Africa in the year 
2009 alone (Zuma, 2010:3). 
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It is important to bear in mind that although South Africa did not escape the negatives of the 
downturn in the Euromarket, the fast growing trade and investment relations with India and 
especially China softened recessionary impacts in this area. This is as far as the commodity 
booms are concerned. Resource and market-seeking opportunities have attracted these Asian 
nations to Africa. 
With that said, the global financial crisis has had a bearing on a number of other sectors in a 
number of ways. With regard to the civil society sector, the past three or four years have seen a 
number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) fall under strain, financially and being on 
the verge of collapse due to a lack of financial support (Inyathelo, 2011). There has been a loss 
in activists and leaders, to government and business, while many NGOs struggle to pay their 
employees. There is an alarming crisis in the civil society sector in South Africa. The timing of 
the crisis in the civil society sector and the global financial crisis seem to overlap and the key 
question to ask therefore is, what is the influence of the latter on the former? 
Unquestionably civil society organisations in South Africa performed a key role in the ending of 
apartheid and ushering in a democratic system in 1994. In addition, these organisations have 
offered the needed support for democratic governance, either by means of direct rendering of 
social services to the disadvantaged or developing public discourses through grounded primary 
research and shrewd analysis of social policy problems facing leaders in government and 
business. They have become a fundamental and central part of the country’s policy making and 
service delivery landscape (Aitchison, 2000:1). This can be seen in civil society’s attempt to hold 
government accountable to the services that it is not providing to the poor. This is also evident 
in the various local, national and international NGOs that have responded to the HIV and Aids 
crisis facing South Africa for instance. These NGOs are engaged in service delivery, including 
prevention, care and treatment programmes, human rights, together with paralegal advice and 
litigation on behalf of people living and affected by HIV/Aids, and in research and education, 
advocacy and lobbying. 
Moreover, on many occasions NGOs have come to the rescue either in terms of critiquing 
poorly conceived national policy initiatives, exposing incompetence in the public service and 
lack of understanding of the nature of the challenges facing our democracy. The most recent 
and noteworthy exemplar of this is the ‘Right to Know Campaign’ which is a coalition of more 
than 400 civil society organisations fighting for the right to know and rejecting the Protection of 
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Information Bill, also known as the Secrecy Bill that is currently before the South African 
Parliament.  
According to Rapoo (2010), despite civil society organisations’ achievements, and having 
shown their worth in supporting and underpinning South Africa’s democracy, many are facing 
financial constraints. This has rendered a large number of NGOs extremely vulnerable to 
collapse, with many not only losing their experienced staff and senior leadership – invariably to 
government and business where conditions of employment and remuneration are better. Many 
have been forced to introduce drastic cuts to their budgets, operational activities as well as staff, 
which in turn are threatening the capacity of many NGOs to render their services or carry out 
their projects. Some donors have decreased or are no longer able to provide operational 
financial support, which is crucial for sustaining NGOs (Rapoo, 2010). 
It is important to note, however that not all CSOs are the same with regards to their source of 
revenue. The key source of funding for some NGOs is not donor funding, for instance churches 
and trade unions. Churches receive financial support from tithes and offering from the 
congregation and trade unions depend almost solely on membership fees. However, for the 
purposes of this study, NGOs that rely on donor funding will be the focus. 
It is also important to note that in as much as the global financial crisis has been significant in 
the experiences of NGOs in South Africa; the reality is that NGOs have always battled with 
funding. The global financial crisis has exacerbated the problem. 
1.3. Literature Review: Civil society and democracy 
1.3.1. Civic Culture 
Almond and Verba (1963) wrote the pioneering book, Civic Culture. The book was considered 
pioneering as it was the first attempt to methodically gather and codify variables quantifying 
political participation across five different states. Based on cross-sectional surveys, the 
variables measured the characteristics utilised to assess the level of political participation of 
citizens in Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Mexico and the United States. According to John et al 
(2010), Civic Culture is a landmark which has made a profound contribution on scholars 
examining political behaviour. John et al (2010) continue to assert that the book set a high 
standard for future studies in this research area, possibly initiating the systematic comparative 
survey of political attitudes and prompting long-running research projects on a number of topics, 
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such as trust and political efficiency. Civic Culture was not merely a record of democracy and 
political participation; it embodied a specific theory of civic participation, determining the social 
and psychological fundamentals for an effective and stable democracy. While subject to critical 
analysis and varying degrees of modification over subsequent decades, Almond and Verba’s 
(1963) general idea of ‘political culture’ continues to be a strong force within political analyses 
(John et al, 2010). 
 
Through their work, Almond and Verba (1963) sought to produce a theory of ‘civic culture’ that 
would account for political involvement of citizens or lack thereof in democratic states. They 
investigated the link between citizen participation and attitudes regarding their political system, 
and maintained that a country’s political institutions ought to correspond with political culture for 
it to have a stable political system. The authors defined political culture as ‘attitudes toward the 
political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the self in the system’ (Almond and 
Verba, 1963:13). The political culture of a country, they argued, is the particular distribution of 
forms of orientation towards political objects among the citizens of the country. In this, the 
political culture may or may not be compatible with the structures of the political system.  
Almond and Verba (1963) maintained that political culture consists of cognitive, affective 
orientations towards the political system. Based on incompatible orientations towards political 
objects, the authors differentiate between three types of political culture, namely, parochial, 
subjective and participant culture. Parochial culture refers to individuals having no cognitive 
orientation with regard to the political system. The subjective culture is characterised by 
individual’s cognitive orientations toward the output aspects of the political system. Participant 
culture on the other end of the spectrum, is a culture where individuals have cognitive 
orientations toward both the input and output aspects of the political system. In essence, 
participant culture is a culture in which citizens develop orientations towards the political system 
in its entirety. This includes output and input, as well as citizens in the political system, thus 
embodying, a developed notion of their own political efficiency and competence as actors in the 
political system (Walter, 1965). 
Almond and Verba (1963) provide an explanation of how congruence and incongruity between 
the political system and its culture leads to the weakening or stabilisation of the system. By this 
the authors assert that the cultures aforementioned are congruent with traditional, authoritarian 
as well as democratic systems respectively.  The congruence is denoted by positive affective 
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and evaluative orientations in the applicable areas: there is a scale from alienation, through 
apathy, to allegiance. Thus, ‘civic culture’ they argue, is an allegiant participant political culture. 
As such, Almond and Verba (1963:6) defined civic culture as a ‘pluralistic culture based on 
communication and persuasions, a culture of consensus and diversity, a culture that permitted 
change but moderated it’. 
The purpose of Civic Culture was to measure the standards which constitute the civic culture of 
‘operating democratic systems’ (Almond and Verba, 1963:11). By so doing, the authors believe 
that the cultural standards required for a stable democracy will be readily disseminated to newly 
emerging democracies of that time. In order to limit the study to the attitudes of the individuals, 
in the survey questionnaire, Almond and Verba avoided questions about the government, and 
instead presented questions enquiring ‘about the individual’s perception about government in 
relation to himself’ (Almond and Verba, 1963:70). 
With the intention of creating an environment of comparability, Almond and Verba (1963) placed 
respondents into the three categories of political culture (parochial, subject and participant). 
They maintained in addition, that, these three types of political culture can intermix and are not 
mutually exclusive. Moreover, the authors asserted that political cultures are not homogenous, 
therefore they were of the opinion that the combination between all these orientations ‘lead to a 
balanced political culture’ (Almond and Verba, 1963:32). 
By gathering the data collected in the five nations regarding political culture, the authors were 
able to ‘validate inferences…and develop independent measures that can be used to explain 
other phenomena’2 (Almond and Verba, 1963:50). The authors hypothesised that a democratic 
system must have a political culture in place in which the citizens believe they possess the 
ability to influence government.  
At the time of writing Civic Culture (1963), Almond and Verba had witnessed what Huntington 
(1991) calls the ‘second wave of democracy’. As such, the authors witnessed the emergence of 
many new democracies. The authors recognised, however that there was more to democratic 
systems than mere structures and formal institutions. It was necessary that a political culture 
                                                          
2
 It is to be noted that the survey findings and analyses of Almond and Verba’s study are beyond the scope of this 
thesis. It is the theoretical claims, rather than the survey analysis that this study finds beneficial in the literature on 
civil society. 
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that supports democratic ideals emerge and this is the thread that binds this thesis to the 
authors’ theory to a certain degree.  
What is significant, therefore, is the fact that ‘civic culture’ requires a general belief in 
participation in civic duties, as well as acceptance of the authority of the state. A democratic 
system must have a political culture in which citizens believe they possess the ability to 
influence government. This is where CSOs come in, for they act as additional links between 
society and government, thus contributing towards a democracy. 
1.3.2. The role of civil society 
The literature is centred around the academic debate on the role of civil society in a democracy 
as well as the different schools of thought on the relationship between civil society and 
democracy. 
The concept of civil society can be traced back to Adam Smith, George Wilhelm, Friedrich 
Hegel and Karl Marx, among others. These scholars conceptualised the state and civil society 
as two distinct and sometimes disagreeing bodies, with the latter autonomous from the state 
and based on economical interactions through instruments of the market (Baker, 2002; 
Wanyande, 1996). The Italian scholar Antonio Gramsci characterised civil society as ‘the realm 
of culture and ideology, or more concretely, as the associational realm (made up of the church, 
trade unions, and so forth), through which the state under normal circumstances, perpetuates its 
hegemony or achieves consent’ (quoted in Baker, 2002:6). Contemporary discussions on civil 
society now focus on non-class-based forms of collective action tied to the judicial, associational 
and public institutions of society (Cohen and Arato, 1992). 
 
It is important to note that civil society is a highly contested concept. Social scientists have 
debated the merits and limitations of civil society since its early modern usage in the late 
seventeenth century in Western Europe (Cohen and Arato, 1992:84). Scottish moralists, for 
example, regard civil society as the foundation of ethics; a place where norms came from the 
people rather than from outside institutions such as the monarch or the church (Seligman, 
2002:14). Subsequent theorists from Hume, to Hegel to Marx have critiqued this idealistic 
conception of civil society each for different reasons. Hume, for an example, disputed the notion 
of universalistic social norms, while Hegel maintained that civil society should be entrenched in 
institutions of the state, together with corporations (Seligman, 2002:14). 
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Taking a wide-ranging understanding of the concept, civil society welcomes a variety of actors, 
including, amongst others, NGOs, trade unions, churches, media, research institutions and think 
tanks, social movements, women’s groups, environmental groups and human rights 
organisations  (de Jager, 2006:106). The disagreement with regard to which roles civil society is 
required to meet is manifest in its many and diverging definitions. 
The concept of civil society has surfaced in a breadth of literature spanning communitarianism, 
new social movements, social capital, associative democracy, and deliberative democracy. Its 
copious usage, according to Henriks (2002:3) has given civil society an unclear character as it is 
often used interchangeably with other concepts such as ‘public sphere’ and ‘community’. 
Naturally, this terminological swamp makes travelling through the territories of civil society a 
difficult endeavour. It should therefore come as no surprise that sourcing an agreed upon 
definition is near impossible. 
 
Civil society broadly refers to the formal and informal associations and networks in society, 
which exist outside the state. Some definitions limit civil society to the domain of voluntary 
association, encompassing everything from loose apolitical social networks to sporting clubs 
through to organised and politically motivated interest groups. Others go further and distinguish 
civil society from not just the state, but from the economy (Young, 2000:158). Civil society, as 
distinct from the state and the economy, ‘…include[s] all institutions and associational forms that 
require communicative interaction for their reproduction and that rely primarily on processes of 
social integration for coordinating action within their boundaries’ (Cohen and Arato, 1992:429). 
 
In contemporary discussions and according to de Jager (2006:107), there are three broad 
understandings of the roles of civil society. The first, which stemmed from the rise of anti-
communist movements in Eastern Europe, views civil society as a source of state opposition 
(Seligman, 2002: 13-33). This position grew out of the experiences in both Eastern Europe and 
Latin America over the past two decades or so where grassroots groups acquired wide public 
impetus to oust repressive regimes (Havel, Klaus and Pithart, 1996:12). The second broad 
understanding of civil society came out of North America as a reaction to liberal individualism. In 
this context, the concept refers to the communal and associational spaces of social life, which, it 
is argued, are necessary for a well-functioning democracy (Putman, 1993). Scholars such as 
Muchie (2004:7), have further argued for the strength of civil society and have stood firm on the 
premise that the state is established in partnership as well as cooperative arrangements. 
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Continuing this line of thought, Habib (2003:228) takes the halfway point on the matter by 
acknowledging the plurality of civil society’s social and political agendas, which in turn will be 
reflected in state-society relations. By inference, it is expected that some interactions between 
the state and civil society will be epitomised by cooperation, while others will be epitomised by 
tension and conflict. 
 
1.3.3. Civil society and democracy 
With regard to democracy, civil society is by and large regarded as a positive force for the 
deepening of democracy. However, the reasons for why this is the case, vary significantly 
across theories of politics. Classical liberals such as Locke and Hume broadly take the position 
that civil society is ‘good’ for democracy because it makes it possible for independent individuals 
to move freely between voluntary associations, consequently providing a counterbalance to the 
powers of the state (Scalet and Schmidtz, 2002:26). Modern liberals, however, are more 
sceptical of civil society’s potential for democracy. They caution against the anti-liberal, anti-
market and potentially anti-democratic tendencies of the more communitarian advocates of civil 
society (Henriks, 2002:5). 
 
However, communitarians such as Amitai Etzoni and Michael Sandel argue that civil society is 
positive for democracy because it provides a site where communities, not self-interested 
individuals or the state, co-determine their own destinies (Etzioni, 1995). Along similar lines, 
neo-Tocquevilleans argue that civil society is the site where citizens are ‘schooled’ in 
democracy. For example, Robert Putnam (1993:65) claims that civic virtues such as trust and 
reciprocity are fostered by the activities of largely apolitical associations, which cut across social 
cleavages. 
 
Prominent scholars that are acclaimed in the study of civil society and its relation to democracy 
are Samuel Huntington, Larry Diamond, Robert Putman, Linz and Lipset to mention but a few. 
Diamond and Putman for instance have placed emphasis on a collegial culture to make 
democracy work. They have argued for the strong relation between the independent, local-
based, citizen groups and democracy. The higher the number of associations in a country, the 
higher the likelihood that, democratic institutions will improve, as Diamond and Putman maintain 
(Diamond, 1996 and Putman, 1993). They assert, therefore that efforts should be made to fortify 
such groups to bring democratic transition where there is none and consolidate democracy 
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where there is already an existing one. Efforts to bring forth democracy through civil society and 
civic engagement is said to bring changes in three ways, (a) changes at the micro social level 
will produce macro-political results, (b) in a society, disposition and practices shaped in one 
association will have spill-over effects in other circumstances and (c) the same associational 
structures will operate in similar ways in different socio-historical contexts (Armony, 2004:7). 
The idea that a strong civil society fosters democracy, holds the state in check, and in turn 
contributes to development (Howell and Pearce 2001: 40), has influenced information of donor 
policies on good governance and greater cooperation with NGOs. 
 
Diamond (1996) has underscored civil society as key for the development and preservation of 
secure democracy in developing countries. Diamond (1992:6-12) has mentioned several 
functions of civil society in consolidating democracy and particularly for developing countries: 
check and balance the power of the state, ensure pluralism, increasing political participation, 
teach democratic norms, recruit and train new political leaders and resist authoritarian rules. For 
all these functions civil society requires a democratic environment where the market needs to be 
stable as well as the other state institutions to be well institutionalised. Diamond has pointed out 
conditions for civil society groups. They must have democratic goals as well as internal 
democracy, organisational institutionalisation, pluralism without fragmentation and so forth 
(Diamond, 1996:212, 1999). 
 
Moreover, Diamond maintains that civil society performs a fundamental role in checking, 
monitoring, and bringing under control the exercise of state power, and in holding the state 
accountable and responsive to the people (Diamond 1999: 239). Linz and Stepan (1996:17) on 
the other hand write about the necessary conditions under which democracy can survive and 
function, and among others, these two scholars call to attention the importance of a vibrant civil 
society and argue that conditions must exist for the development of a free and lively civil society. 
 
1.3.4. Civil Society in South Africa 
Civil society in South Africa historically is widely recognised for its contribution in ending 
apartheid. It is to be noted however that there are multiple factors besides domestic pressures 
that played a role in ending apartheid, and international factors such as political isolation, 
sanctions, and so forth cannot be overlooked. However the scope and focus of this research 
does not look beyond the domestic factors. In South Africa extensive mobilisation was a source 
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of pressure for democratic change. Therefore, its importance needs to be understood when 
looking at the various ways in which it can work for democracy today. As Habib (2005) explains, 
there is a need to reflect upon the characteristics of civil society that are most likely to assist the 
development and consolidation of democracy. 
 
Under apartheid, civil society was vibrant and strong and it was one sector that the apartheid 
government could not fully repress. As the 1970s drew near, anti-apartheid NGOs like the 
unions and the array of organisations associated with the anti-Black Consciousness Movement 
(BCM) began to make their presence felt (Marx, 1992). In the 1980s and the early 1990s, the 
apartheid movement, internally led by the United Democratic Front (UDF), sought to bring down 
the apartheid regime and replace it with a democratic government. At the same time, many 
other concerns were raised by membership organisations, including working conditions, 
environmental degradation, urban services, agricultural productivity, HIV/Aids awareness, 
liberation ideology, people’s education, school curriculum and so on. These revealed the variety 
of matters of interest to civil society organisations, communities and activists, who were deeply 
politicised but whose concerns extended beyond the issue of state power (Greenstein, 2003:3). 
The ability to speak out about a number of disparate local concerns into a global anti-apartheid 
movement was the strongest asset for civil society groups, because it allowed civil society to 
present a united front against the apartheid regime (Greenstein, 2003:3). 
 
According to Heinrich (2001) under the apartheid regime, four different types of NGOs existed. 
Organisations closely linked with and supporting the anti-apartheid movement; liberal NGOs 
advocating changes in apartheid policy from within the political system; NGOs focusing on 
social service delivery while trying to stay non-aligned with regard to the political arrangement; 
and lastly there were large welfare bodies co-operating with the apartheid regime on the racially 
segregated social services. The anti-apartheid NGOs were positively influenced by the struggle 
for non-racial democracy, placing a premium of importance on the inclusion of all relevant 
stakeholders. 
 
Presently, civil society fulfils the three possible state-society relations3: partnerships, 
adversarial, and a combination of both. Alliance partners sometimes make concessions to the 
                                                          
3
  It is to be noted that some civil society organisations, such as community-based organisations (CBOs) have no 
interaction with the government. 
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reality of limited capacity of the state to transform society and control the economy under 
conditions of globalisation (Habib, 2005:674). They frequently mention the need to involve 
popular forces in the process of governance and invoke the notion of partnerships with civil 
society and the private sector (Greenstein, 2003:4). However, organisations in civil society also 
act as the opposition in government because of the weak opposition in Parliament, and at times 
compensates for the lack of a strong political opposition. The significance of civil society is 
therefore two-fold in a democratic process, as seen in South Africa. 
 
It needs to be noted that in facilitating the deepening of democracy, it is indeed the very 
existence and plurality of civil society, and its diversity of state-civil society engagements, that is 
beneficial for democracy. 
 
1.4. Rationale of the study 
Civil society is a distinguishing feature of democratic regimes. Democratic governments are 
expected to be responsive to the wishes of the people, and civil society is one way in which 
people can make their wishes known. Like political parties, civil society facilitates participation 
and is therefore a second link between citizens and government in democratic states (Sadie, 
2007:217). As previously argued, civil society not only strengthens representation and broadens 
the scope of political participation; it also checks government power and promotes debate and 
discussion. In addition, along the lines of keeping government in check and accountable, 
Schlemmer (2005:8), highlights two varieties of accountability: vertical and horizontal 
accountability. Vertical accountability, government accountability to voters, is obviously 
weakened by the political comfort zone of easy electoral victories of the African National 
Congress (ANC). Horizontal accountability is the accountability of government to the 
independent monitoring and watchdog institutions that are part of a constitutional democracy. 
According to Fox (2000:1) civil society therefore influences horizontal accountability in two main 
ways: directly, by encouraging the creation and empowerment of institutional checks and 
balances, and indirectly, by strengthening the institutions of vertical accountability that underpin 
them, such as electoral democracy and an independent media. 
 
The decision to embark on this study therefore has its roots in the fact that civil society is an 
important feature in democracy in South Africa, even more so, seeing as though the ruling party, 
the ANC has overwhelming political power resulting in a dominant party system. This 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
14 
 
undeniably poses a potential threat to the competitiveness of the multiparty system, 
accountability and the authority of the Constitution (Sadie, 2007:9). Scholars such as Welsh 
(1994:205) have gone as far as to say that dominant-party systems damage democracy 
because it may limit the accountability and responsiveness that is created through the key threat 
of the ballot box. An extended period of power can therefore engender complacency, arrogance 
and even corruption in a dominant party system. It is clear therefore that in the absence of a 
strong opposition party, a robust civil society is not only necessary, but mandatory. 
 
Lastly, the relevance of the study is to assist in the evaluation of the role that civil society has 
played in shaping South Africa’s young democracy and what it will mean for democracy if civil 
society organisations are to breakdown and shutdown. This is of importance in any democracy; 
however it is particularly important in a democracy such as South Africa that is young, fragile, 
and where issues of consolidating its democracy are so critical, coupled with a dominant party 
system. In addition this study is significant in that it examines two prominent NGOs that have 
been significant historically as well as in the new dispensation. It is significant to consider what it 
means for the smaller and less prominent NGOs, if the ‘big guys’ are suffering. 
 
1.5. Problem statement 
In light of the role of civil society in deepening democracy, NGOs, as a type of civil society 
organisations may be beginning to experience the negative effects of the global financial crisis 
in South Africa. This research therefore seeks to explore the influence of the global financial 
crisis and other challenges on South Africa’s NGO’s, with a particular focus on the following 
NGOs: Idasa and the TAC.  
 
1.6. Research question and main proposition: 
The overarching question guiding this study is: what are the challenges facing civil society 
groups in South Africa, with a focus on the global financial crisis? Therefore, this study will be 
asking a secondary question: has the global financial crisis influenced democracy in South 
Africa? Civil society groups are an integral part of our democracy, thus what does the demise of 
civil society organisations, due to a lack of funding, mean for participatory, representative and 
accountable democracy?  
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1.7. Research design: 
The study is explorative in nature and relies on qualitative data with the design type being the 
use of case studies. Case studies according to Mouton (2004:149) are usually qualitative in 
nature and aim to provide an in-depth description of a small number of cases (less than fifty). 
The utilisation of case studies offers some strength in research. These strengths according to 
Mouton include high construct validity, in-depth insights as well as establishing connections and 
relationships with research subjects.   
 
The two case studies are Idasa and the TAC. These NGOs are selected because each 
illustrates a distinct mode of engagement with the South African state. These organisations 
have emerged as very strong and vociferous organisations attempting to change the social 
landscape and influence the state. The Black Sash, which was included in the article that 
highlighted the need to embark on this research, has been excluded as research has revealed 
that the Black Sash is not very active any longer; it was most active pre-1994. 
 
1.8. Research methodology: 
1.8.1. Data Collection 
The data was collected by means of in-depth individual interviewing of key informants in the two 
selected NGOs. The in-depth individual interview is one of the most frequently used methods of 
data gathering within the qualitative approach. It differs from most other interviews in that it is an 
open interview which allows the object of study to speak for it/him/herself rather than to provide 
a respondent with a battery of the interviewer’s own predetermined, hypothesis-based questions 
(Babbie and Mouton, 2008:289). According to Herbert and Irene Rubin (1995), qualitative 
interviewing design is characterised by being ‘flexible, iterative, and continuous, rather than 
prepared in advance and locked in stone’ (Rubin and Rubin, 1995:46). The study is therefore 
empirical. 
In essence, the qualitative data was acquired through individual in-depth interviews with the two 
NGOs, as well as reviewing secondary data, namely, academic journals, books, government 
publications, working papers, speeches, newspapers, NGO papers and relevant sources for the 
theoretical underpinnings of the study. The study thus, employs secondary data analysis as well 
as primary data analysis through interviews. 
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The literature examined in chapter one and two, as the desktop part of the study prepared the 
ground for the empirical part when knowledge was generated through interviews with key 
informants. 
 
1.8.2. Unit of analysis and variable selection 
The unit of analysis in this study is NGOs as a part of civil society organisations in South Africa; 
particularly looking at Idasa as well as the TAC. The dependent variable in this study is South 
Africa’s NGOs and the independent variable that is used is resources, the focus being on 
financial resources.  
Idasa is an independent public interest organisation that is committed to building sustainable 
democratic societies in partnership with African and international partners. It is a registered 
Section 21 company in South Africa. Idasa runs democracy and governance programs in more 
than 20 countries in Africa, its programs focusing on building democratic societies across the 
African continent.  Idasa’s work focuses not only on elections, but also pays particular attention 
to what happens between elections.  Whilst free and fair elections are important to any 
democratic state, Idasa targets its programs to build up the capacity of civil society, encourage 
the transparency and accountability of governments, and create active citizens (Idasa, 2012). 
The TAC is a leading advocacy group for people living with HIV/Aids. It was founded by the HIV-
positive activist Zackie Achmat in 1998. The TAC is rooted in the experiences, direct action 
tactics and anti-apartheid background of its founder. The TAC has been credited for compelling 
the reluctant government of former South African President Thabo Mbeki to begin making 
antiretroviral drugs available to South Africans. The TAC advocates for increased access to 
treatment, care and support services for people living with HIV, and for the carrying out of the 
country’s National Strategic Plan on HIV and Aids (TAC, 2012). 
Although there are similarities between Idasa and the TAC, the key difference between the two 
case studies is that Idasa does not receive any membership fees because it is a non-
membership NGO. The TAC does receive minute membership fees, but this does not form the 
basis of its income because the majority of the members are young, unemployed women, the 
great majority of whom do not pay their membership fees. 
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1.8.3. Conceptualisation and operationalisation of civil society and democracy 
It is important to get an understanding and clarification about the different concepts that will be 
used in this study, moreover, defining key concepts will help draw meaningful conclusions about 
them.  
Civil society: Civil society is a highly contested term and there is no scholarly consensus on its 
definition. Nonetheless, in this study, civil society will be defined as the formal and informal 
associations and networks in society, which exist outside the state, for example, NGOs, trade 
unions, churches, media, research institutions and think tanks, women’s groups, environmental 
groups and human rights organisations. This definition does not include markets and it is of 
importance to note that civil society is different to society, that is the general populace, and also 
differs from political society, which includes political parties. 
In addition, the distinction between civic society and civil society will be made. Civic society 
refers the ‘local state’ where citizens participate in for instance local health boards, schools, 
community councils, planning partnerships and all the other mechanisms ultimately under the 
direction of the state. Civil society on the other hand refers to ‘voluntary action’ undertaken by 
citizens not under the direction of any authority exercising the power of the state (Keane, 
2008:2). 
Civil society can be measured in terms of Heywood’s framework; how interest groups exert 
influence. According to Heywood (2007:304), the success of interest group influence is a 
complex issue. Not only is their efficiency often determined by a number of factors beyond their 
control, but their successes or effectiveness is also tied to their strategies, tactics and roles. 
Similarly, Heywood adds, the nature of the group and the resources at its disposal are crucial 
determining factors of its political strategy. The resources include the following:  
1. public sympathy for the group and its goals 
2. the size of its membership or activist base 
3. its financial strength and organisational capabilities 
4. its ability to use sanctions that some way inconvenience or disrupt governance 
5. personal or institutional links it may have to political parties or governance bodies. 
 
Public sympathy can therefore be understood as those outside of the organisation 
understanding the organisation’s circumstances as their own. In other words, it is the case 
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whereby the public views the cause or interest of the organisation as worthy and reasonable. 
This is a resource that Heywood (2007) deems necessary for CSO’s to exert their influence. 
With regards to the second resource, size of membership, Heywood understands the size of a 
group’s membership to be instrumental in exerting influence. ‘There is size in numbers’ would 
be an appropriate reference in underscoring the importance of this resource. The third resource, 
financial resources are deemed important by Heywood. Adequate financial resources refer to 
the state where an organisation is in a position of financial adequacy; meaning that the 
organisation has enough money to meet all its requirements. For the day-to-day running of an 
organisation, the costs of programmes and so forth, financial resources prove to be a resource 
that is important. Pertaining to the fourth resource, litigation and lobbying are regarded as some 
of the avenues to explore in an attempt to use sanctions that in some way inconvenience or 
disrupt governance. Lastly, personal or institutional links groups may have to political parties or 
governance bodies: Heywood deems engagement in political society, through links to political 
parties or representation in parliament, can offer distinct advantages and potential influence for 
CSOs. 
Other factors unique to South Africa such as the loss of anti-apartheid activists to government 
and business are explored. 
The operationalisation of civil society is centred on these resources with a particular focus on 
the financial resources, through international as well as domestic donor funding. 
Democracy: Although democracy is a highly contested concept with no scholarly consensus, for 
the purposes of this study, at the most rudimentary level, the term can simply be understood as 
a system of ‘government of the people, by the people, and for the people’ (Lincoln, 1863)4. Its 
tenets include, but are not limited to: 
i. A political system for choosing and replacing the government through free and fair 
elections. 
ii. The active participation of the individuals, as citizens, in politics and civil life. 
iii. Protection of the human rights of all citizens. 
iv. A rule of law, in which the laws and procedures apply equally to all citizens. 
                                                          
4
 The Gettysburg Address is a speech by former U.S. President Abraham Lincoln (1863). 
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Whilst some scholars understand democracy in procedural terms5, as electoral competition and 
decision-making, others view it in terms of substantive elements such as the distribution of 
power and resources within society6. Nevertheless, the central question to ask is; how do 
citizens exercise control and scrutiny over political institutions? Therefore, this study chooses to 
understand democracy through Dahl’s (1971) concept of ‘polyarchy’. While there is no scholarly 
consensus on the concept of democracy, (Gallie, 1956) asserts that Dahl’s (1971) conception of 
polyarchy is gaining recognition. The concept was initially coined in Dahl and Lindblom’s book 
(1953), but was developed most fully in Dahl (1971). Polyarchy is defined as the set of 
institutional arrangements that permit public opposition and establishes the right to participate in 
politics (Dahl, 1971). In these two respects: public contestation and inclusiveness, polyarchy 
fortifies democracy (Coppedge and Reinicke, 1990).  
In essence, the democratic ideal for Dahl is polyarchy and the scale or criteria of polyarchy 
measures the degree to which national political systems meet the minimum requirements for 
political democracy, where real-world ‘democracies’ rather than abstract ideals are the standard 
(Dahl, 1971). 
As formulated in Polyarchy (Dahl 1971: 3), the following minimum requirements for political 
democracy are presented: 7 
1. Freedom to form and join organisations 
2. Freedom of expression 
3. The right to vote 
4. Eligibility for public office 
5. The right of political leaders to compete for support 
6. Alternative sources of information 
7. Free and fair elections 
8. Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of 
preference.  
                                                          
5
 See Fukuyama, 1992; Schumpeter, 1942; Przeworski, 1991; Huntington, 1989; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, 
Linz and Stepan, 1996. 
6
 See Diamond, 1992; Schmitter, 1991; Merkel, 2004. 
7
 Dahl (1971) offers these guarantees as necessary, (though not sufficient) conditions for democracy. 
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The term polyarchy is useful for steering around the avenues and significant tenets of 
participatory and representative democracy in terms of civil society’s active involvement in 
democracy, which forms the central point of this study. 
1.8.4. Limitations and delimitations of the study 
This study is explorative and the main shortcoming of explorative studies is that they seldom 
provide satisfactory answers to research questions, though they can hint at the answers and 
can give insight into the research methods that could provide definitive answers. The reason 
exploratory studies are seldom definitive in themselves has to do with representativeness 
(Babbie and Mouton, 2008:80). Representativeness means ‘that quality of a sample of having 
the same distribution of characteristics as the population from which it was selected. By 
implication descriptions and explanations derived from an analysis of the sample may be 
assumed to represent similar ones in the population’ (Babbie and Mouton, 2008:647). In 
addition the use of case studies offers its limitations, such as a lack of generalisability of results 
as well as non-standardisation of measurement. Also the data collection and analysis can be 
very time-consuming (Mouton, 2004:150). Nevertheless, this research is still worthwhile. As 
outlined by Du Plooy (2001) and Yin (1994), the main advantage of a case study research lies in 
the specific details and holistic understanding researchers gain from a particular case. It can 
thus be regarded as a robust research method particularly when a holistic, in-depth study is 
required. Case studies can be a practical and applied method when a large sample population 
is difficult to obtain. Case studies present data of real-life situations and they provide better 
insights into the detailed occurrences of the subjects of interest (Yin, 2004). In addition, Du 
Plooy (2001) and Yin (1994) assert that case studies can achieve maximum understanding 
when used in combination with theory. In this study theory plays a critical role in defining the 
research question and research aims. Theory forms the groundwork for the study. 
 
This study analyses the same cases over the same period, 2008 to 2012. In particular the 
beginning of the global financial crisis and when its consequences were experienced and have 
possibly influenced the civil society groups in South Africa, with a particular focus on Idasa and 
the TAC.  
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1.9. Chapter outline 
 
Figure 1: Outline of the Study 
Chapter 2: This chapter presents the theories of group politics and provides an overview of civil 
society in South Africa and its contributions to deepening democracy. 
Chapter 3: This chapter reports on the findings from the interviews with the key informant from 
Idasa. In addition, Heywood’s (2007) criteria are applied to this case. 
Chapter 4: This chapter reports on the findings from the interviews with the key informant from 
the TAC. In addition, Heywood’s (2007) criteria are applied to this case. 
Chapter 5: This chapter provides an evaluation and summary of the key findings that address 
the research question posed in chapter one and draws conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
OVERVIEW OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO 
DEEPENING DEMOCRACY 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter starts by examining civil society and theories of group politics. This is done by 
launching a discussion of two key theories of group politics so as to establish the foundation of 
the overview of civil society.  This chapter then provides the history of the South African civil 
society, dating back to apartheid times and the influence of the civil society sector towards 
ending the discriminatory system. Thirdly, an analysis will be made of civil society organisations 
that have emerged post-apartheid, with a particular focus on those organisations that have 
contributed in bolstering democracy in South Africa by making use of the wide array of modes of 
engagement available at their disposal. Fourthly, this chapter looks into the current state of 
affairs of civil society in South Africa. Lastly, an investigation is done of the political tool, 
generally known as ‘democracy assistance’ used by the global North in the South. Particular 
attention is placed on the boom and decline in donor funding of democracy assistance in South 
Africa. 
2.2. Civil society: Conceptualisation and theory 
2.2.1. Civil Society Defined 
Civil society is a highly contested term and there is no scholarly consensus on its definition. 
Nonetheless, as stated in the preceding chapter, in this study (as borrowed from de Jager, 
2006) civil society is defined as the formal and informal associations and networks in society, 
which exist outside the state, for example, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), trade 
unions, churches, media, research institutions and think tanks, women’s groups, environmental 
groups and human rights organisations. This definition does not include markets, because 
markets refer to the economic society. It is of importance to note that civil society is different to 
society that is the general populace and political society, which includes political parties and 
where most of the political agenda is set.  
Pertaining to NGOs, which are the focus of this study, it is important to clarify its meaning. The 
Oxford Dictionary of Politics defines an NGO as an ‘organisation which is not established by a 
governmental entity or international agreement’ (Oxford, 1999:370). It is also important to note 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
23 
 
two crucial matters in this regard: the first is that civil society is a broad term and that NGO’s 
form part of civil society. The second matter to note is that NGOs are recognised by some 
scholars such as Heywood (2007) and Sadie (2007) as interest groups. These terms are used 
interchangeably in this study. What is of significance is the fact that the term NGO and interest 
group point to the same thing. For example, the Oxford Dictionary of Politics (2009:264) defines 
interest groups as ‘organisations seeking to advance a particular sectional interest or cause, 
while not seeking to form a government or part of a government’. Sadie (2007:218) defines 
interest groups as ‘any group of people with shared attitudes and goals that try either 
spontaneously or consciously to protect or promote their interests by influencing the 
governmental decision-making process in order to realise those goals’.  
2.2.2. Theories of group politics: Pluralism and Corporatism 
The study of organised groups has been integrated into wider analyses of the distribution of 
power and the nature of the state. Two of the leading approaches with regard to the distribution 
of power in modern political systems are pluralism and corporatism (Sadie, 2007:219). A 
discussion on group politics is necessary for it brings to light civil society’s wide variations in 
form and character. In addition, it is important in that it underscores the various roles of CSOs in 
their relationship to the state.  
 
According to Dryzek and Dunleavy (2009:35), pluralism is a belief in many (plural) ways of life, 
many approaches to knowledge and numerous centres of power in society, committed to 
modest, healthy competition. The conditions are believed to be best achieved under liberal 
democracy. From an intellectual stance, pluralism is opposed to any form of ‘monism’12 in 
political and social thinking. 
 
As a normative theory, pluralism places emphasis on the beneficial outcomes of social and 
cultural diversity, of having many different institutions, values, groups and ways of life. It also 
promotes constitutional methods of embracing different perspectives on public policy matters. 
As an explanatory theory of politics, pluralism shows how policy is made in interactions across 
diverse actors and institutions. Thus liberal democracies are described as polyarchies with 
multiple centres of power, meaning government by the many, and not the few. This effect is 
                                                          
12
 Those belief systems that conform to a single philosophical idea or over-arching value, a single theory of history 
or evolutionary trajectory, a single culture or way of  life, a single religion or sacred book, or single centre of 
government. 
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realised primarily by the interest group process, competitive elections that can only be won by 
organising alliances of minority views, as well as representative government (Dryzek and 
Dunleavy, 2009:35). 
 
Heywood (2007:219) echoes Dryzek and Dunleavy in his explanation of pluralism, for he 
maintains that pluralist theories put forward the most positive representation of group politics, in 
that fundamentally they argue that power is widely and evenly dispersed in society. Decisions 
are made by means of an intricate process of bargaining and interaction that makes sure that 
the viewpoints and interests of a large number of groups are taken into consideration. 
 
Pluralists accentuate the ability of groups to both defend the individual from government and 
uphold democratic responsiveness (Sadie, 2007:219 and Heywood, 2007:297). In addition, 
pluralists place particular importance on the role of groups in liberal democracies, stating the 
outcome of many political conflicts provides wider avenues for political participation and ensures 
a wider distribution of power as stated above. Pluralism can therefore be defined as wide-
ranging participation in the political process by means of competition between independent 
groups and competing viewpoints. Although groups are not always successful in influencing 
decisions, each group, whatever it demands, has equal access to the political resources 
required for success (Sadie, 2007:219). In terms of civil society, this translates into a variety of 
relationships between the state and civil society; conflictual, collaborative, a variety of both 
collaborative and conflictual or a non-engaging relationship. 
 
The second theory of group politics, corporatism, differs from pluralism in that it attempts to 
locate the implications of the closer links that have developed in industrialised societies between 
groups and states (Heywood, 2007:299; Sadie, 2007:219). 
 
Corporatism is a social theory that points out the incorporation of certain of society’s groups into 
the decision-making process. The state benefits from the cooperation and expertise of groups 
such as business and labour in the implementation of policy decisions (Sadie, 2007:219). 
Concomitantly, the groups gain from having to share in political power (Schmitter, 1974 and 
Lehmbruch, 1979 in Sadie, 2007:219). The emphasis is on the functional representation of 
certain groups in the policy-making process. In turn for giving certain groups easier access to 
this process, the state gains greater social control (Panitch, 1980:173 in Sadie, 2007:219). 
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Critics of corporatism have argued that corporatism perpetually privileges economic or 
functional groups, because it produces a form of tripartism that binds government to business 
and organised labour. However, it may leave consumer or promotional groups out in the cold, 
and institutionalised access is likely to be restricted to so-called ‘peak’ associations that speak 
on behalf of a range of organisations and groups. Secondly, in contrast to pluralism, corporatism 
depicts groups as hierarchically ordered and dictated by leaders who are not directly 
answerable to members. Indeed, it is argued that the price that group leaders pay for privileged 
access to government is a willingness to deliver the compliance of their members. From this 
point of view, ‘government by consultation’ may merely be a pretence covering up the fact that 
corporatism acts as a mechanism of social control. Thirdly, a concern that has been articulated 
is about the threat that corporatism poses for representative democracy. While pluralism 
suggests that group politics adds to the representative process, it is argued that corporatism 
generates the image of decisions being made outside the reach of democratic control and 
through a process of bargaining in no way subject to public scrutiny. Finally, corporatism has 
been linked to the problem of government ‘overload’, in which government may effectively be 
‘captured’ by consulted groups and thus be unable to resist their demand (Heywood, 2007:299-
300). 
 
Therefore, the variety of relationships between the state and civil society differ quite 
significantly, and can be distinguished into three sets. There are a set of informal community 
based organisations (CBOs), mainly in marginalised communities, who have no relationship 
with the state on the one hand. On the other end of the spectrum, there are a variety of more 
formal CSOs, which oppose the government. Though these organisations also engage with the 
state, their relations with the government tend to take on an adversarial tone. Finally, the third 
group is a set of more formal NGOs, which have joined in partnerships with the state. These 
organisations have more collegiate interactions with the state. Nevertheless, CSOs are not 
restricted in the three categories mentioned for there are no permanent friends or enemies for 
CSOs, but permanent interest. It is that interest therefore that dictates the relationship with the 
state in a given time. 
As argued by Sadie (2007:219), in liberal democracies, South Africa being no exception, one 
cannot argue that either pluralism or corporatism prevails. Often elements of both can be traced, 
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depending on the policy area and the issue. One issue may reflect corporatist tendencies, while 
pluralism is evident in another.  
 
2.3. Civil society in South Africa 
 
2.3.1. Civil society in Apartheid South Africa 
According to Habib (2003:3), there are two distinct phases in the evolution of contemporary civil 
society in South Africa. Before Habib identifies these, however, he maintains that it may be 
useful to note that contemporary civil society is distinguished by the fact that it not only mirrors 
the demographic realities of South African society, but also goes beyond the racialised form of 
the adversarial-collaborative dichotomy that characterised civil society relations with the state in 
earlier times. In any case, the first phase, the diverse racial profile of contemporary civil society 
has its roots in the 1980s when there was a growth in associational life in this country. Indeed, 
the distinctive characteristic of this period is not only the longitudinal growth of the sector, but 
the formal emergence, or at least the coming out in the political realm of a significant part of it, 
namely black civil society actors who had up until then been either banned or prohibited from 
working in the public sphere (Habib, 2003:3). 
 
The second phase as argued by Habib dates back to the early 1990s when the nature and 
operations of a considerable part of the civil society, once again anti-apartheid civil society 
actors, changed as a result of new opportunities and challenges. Both phases of course 
coincide with important moments in the evolution of the political system: the first with the 
liberalisation phase, and the second with the democratisation phase of the transition13 
(Schmitter and O’Donell, 1986). Civil society has therefore influenced and been shaped by the 
political transition in South Africa. 
 
According to Habib, before liberalisation in the early 1980s, the overriding element in civil 
society was organisations and institutions that were either pro-apartheid and/or pro-business. 
Agencies critical of the state and the socio-economic system were either actively suppressed or 
marginalised from the formal political process. The major political contest within civil society 
                                                          
13
 This follows O’Donnell and Schmitter’s four-volume study on the subject. It has become customary in the 
literature to separate democratic transitions into these two distinct phases. Liberalisation refers to the moment 
when authoritarian leaders open up the political system, whereas democratisation is the time in which 
representative political systems become institutionalised.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
27 
 
seemed to be between pro-apartheid institutions like the Broederbond and N.G. Kerk, and 
liberal oriented organisations such as the Institute of Race Relations and the National Union of 
South African Students (NUSAS) (Habib, 2003:4). It is to be noted however that some of the 
leaders of NUSAS were relatively radical and anti-business from very early on. Nevertheless, 
the majority of the organisation tended to stay largely liberal in orientation until at least the late 
1970s and early 1980s. To be sure, as the 1970s drew nearer, anti-apartheid civil society 
organisations like the unions and the wide range of organisations linked with the Black 
Consciousness Movement (BCM) began to make their presence felt (Marx, 1992).  
 
In the 1980s the anti-apartheid elements within civil society re-emerged after much repression 
from the state, and within a few years became the major element within the sector. Two events 
buttressed this growth in anti-apartheid civil society organisations. The first was the liberalisation 
of the political system given by the P.W. Botha regime in the early 1980s. This included reform 
of the more crude aspects of Grand Apartheid14, the attempted political co-optation of some 
sections of the disenfranchised communities, and allowing the emergence of some civic activity 
within, and representation of, the black population (Louw, 2004:131; Habib, 2003:86). 
 
In any case, the reform of the political system in the early 1980s did in fact allow the re-
emergence of anti-apartheid civil society. The Soweto uprising on 16 June 197615 and the more 
wide-ranging union action during the 1970s gave rise to a struggle between reformers and 
Conservatists within the core of the state (Habib, 2003:4). The formers wanted to alter 
apartheid, and make it better suited to the modernising requirements of the economy, and 
appoint some constituents of the black population by giving them a ‘share’ in the system. The 
latter wanted a recommitment to the traditional plan of ‘Grand Apartheid’ (Louw, 2004:87). The 
triumph of P.W. Botha and his reformist alliance in the leadership succession debate of the 
National Party (NP) and thereby the South African State in the late 1970s created the 
                                                          
14
 Grand Apartheid refers to a form of apartheid, which involved comprehensive racial segregation and measures 
such as the removal of black people from white areas and the establishment of black homelands. 
15 High school student-led protests in Soweto township, outside Johannesburg. South African students from 
numerous schools began to protest in the streets of Soweto, in response to the introduction of Afrikaans as the 
medium of instruction in local schools as well as a general lack of funding and resources in ‘Black schools’. Police 
responded with teargas and live bullets. The official death toll was 23, but it could have been higher than 200 
because the incident triggered widespread violence throughout South Africa, which claimed more lives. 
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opportunity for the spread of the reformist project (Sparks, 1990). A chain of institutional reforms 
followed; a major component of which included the recognition and legalisation of independent 
black unions and the founding of a political space that allowed the re-emergence of anti-
apartheid civil society. In addition, the state presented the rationale for mobilising this sector by 
offering a reform that tried to include some, and marginalise other elements of the Black 
community. Anti-apartheid civil society was therefore allowed by and given the rationale for 
mobilisation by the state’s liberalisation initiative (Fine, 1992:78; Louw, 2004:87). 
 
Certainly, not this entire scenario was positive. In fact, very soon into the reform program the 
state began to actively repress elements within the anti-apartheid camp. But despite this 
repression, which became relatively severe under the state of emergency, the anti-apartheid 
civil society retained its popular legitimacy. This enabled it to re-emerge very quickly when De 
Klerk took over the leadership and replaced P.W. Botha as President, and reintroduced and 
even extended, the state’s liberalisation initiative. The ultimate result was that by the 1990s the 
anti-apartheid camp had become the dominant element in the civil society sphere (Habib, 
2003:5). 
 
The second development facilitating the re-emergence of anti-apartheid civil society according 
to Hearn (1998), was the increasing availability of resources to non-profit actors in South Africa. 
Two types of resources are crucial in this regard. The first, human resources, increasingly 
became available in the early 1980s as university students and graduates politicised by the 
activities of the 1970s, and political prisoners, many of whom were released in the early 1980s, 
came together in a myriad of ways to not only organise community and political activities but to 
also establish non-profit institutions to support these mass struggles. The second, fiscal 
resources initially emerged from private foundations and foreign governments who were moved 
to act largely due to the fact that the 16 June 1976 revolt and its consequences made its way to 
the television screens in the advanced industrialised world. The increasing tempo of struggle 
within the country, however, also gradually compelled local actors, particularly corporates and 
churches to begin to back anti-apartheid non-profit activity in South Africa (Stacey and 
Aksartova, 2001). This rising availability of resources, both from foreign and domestic sources, 
then, set-up the second building block that facilitated the re-emergence and expansion of anti-
apartheid civil society in South Africa. 
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A point that needs to be underscored in the history of the emergence of contemporary civil 
society is that, despite the fact that the anti-apartheid civil society was born within the womb of 
the state’s reform program, state-civil society relations tended to take an adversarial form 
throughout the 1980s. This is because the liberalisation initiative was not democratic. Indeed, 
like all liberalisation initiatives in transitional societies, it must be conceptualised in relative 
terms. Thus, anti-apartheid civil society maintained its distance from, and was treated with 
wariness by, what was still an apartheid state. The legal environment, including the tax regime, 
while allowing anti-apartheid NGOs and Community Based Organisations (CBOs) to emerge, 
was nonetheless still antagonistic to their operations. Similarly, the political and security 
environment remained repressive and became even more so after the State of Emergencies 
were announced in 1985 and 1986. This antagonistic environment, then, made sure that state-
civil society relations took an adversarial form in the first decade of the anti-apartheid civil 
society organisations. This was to change only in the middle of the second decade when South 
Africa entered the democratisation phase of its political transition (Fine, 1992:78-79; Kabemba, 
2005:2). 
 
2.3.2. Civil society in the transition to democracy in South Africa 
The rise of civil society in South Africa is connected with the anti-apartheid struggle whose 
primary goal was to remove power from a racially prejudiced, oppressive, and illegitimate 
minority regime; and a number of studies16 have investigated this phenomenon. This is not to 
say that there were no CSOs prior to this, or that CSOs were only limited to those in opposition 
to apartheid. Afrikaans churches and trade unions were very active as well. The Rand 
Revolt/Rebellion of 1922 bears testimony to this reality.17 
 
The rise of civil society, or what O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986:27-28, 48-56) term the 
‘resurrection of civil society’ and which they define as generalised politicisation and popular 
activation, became increasingly important during this phase in challenging the authoritarian 
regime of South Africa. Therefore, it is of particular importance to pay some attention to the 
position and role of civil society in South Africa during the liberalisation phase of transition, 
specifically, with regard to the political dispensation and the resistance to the regime by mass 
mobilisation.  
                                                          
16
 See Friedman, 1991; Noyoo, 2000; O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986. 
17
 See Alexander, 1999 
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The significance of civil society in a transition to democracy in terms of O'Donnell and 
Schmitter's analysis (1986:48, 50), is that civil society necessitates the breaking down of the 
normative and intellectual base of a regime (Adam and Moodley, 1993:31). Challenges from 
below, which give effect to perpetual conflicts in the socio-political realm of authoritarian 
regimes, have often contributed to or determined the pace of transition. This makes a reversion 
to authoritarian rule at the peak of popular mobilisation arduous. Those resisting change 
(hardliners) begin to realise that a return to repression will be exceptionally costly (O'Donnell 
and Schmitter, 1986:27; Stepan, 1990:46). Huntington (1991:108-109) also maintains that some 
form of mass mobilisation intensifies the pressure on the authoritarian incumbents, and raises 
the costs of repression (Gillespie, 1990:57). 
 
Of particular importance in the liberalisation phase is the criticism that began to emerge from the 
government's traditional religious support base, namely the Dutch Reformed Churches. In 1986 
the Dutch Reformed Church (NGK) to which two-thirds of Afrikaners and ninety per cent of 
cabinet members belonged, adopted a document called, ‘Church and Society,’ in which 
apartheid was declared a mistake, racism condemned as a sin, the withholding of political rights 
regarded as an affront to human dignity, and the authorities asked to pay ‘on-going and 
sympathetic attention’ to regulations which people found offensive. By an overwhelming 
majority, the NGK voted in favour of opening the church to all races (Guise, 1993:57). This 
constituted an important step in the ‘corrosion of the normative and intellectual basis of the 
regime’ (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:48, 50; Adam and Moodley, 1993:31). 
Trade unions, in turn, affirmed their role and place within civil society after changes were made 
to the laws governing labour and thus positioned themselves as important players in the 
process of democratisation. In a comparative study of Southern Europe and Latin America, 
Valenzuela (1989) asserts that labour movements occupied a special place during the transition 
from authoritarianism, particularly because the organised network of the labour movement gives 
it greater capacity for effective and extensive mass mobilisation at critical moments than other 
social groups. The labour movement in South Africa occupied a similar place as that of its 
counterparts in the two countries mentioned above. Valenzuela (1989:446-467) posits that 
South African trade unions possessed ‘a widespread base and the ability to interfere with the 
economy’, and therefore he regards it as the antagonism that posed the greatest threat to the 
apartheid regime. 
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In South Africa, economic growth and industrialisation led to a rise in the number of semi-skilled 
workers to the point where they provided an organisational basis for trade unions. The growth of 
trade unions during this phase was facilitated by the labour relations reforms, which resulted 
from the Wiehahn recommendations of 1977-197918 (Webster, 1991:50). These labour law 
reforms for the first time, allowed the formal recognition of trade unions for blacks within the 
official industrial relations system in South Africa. This provided an important boost to civil 
society. Trade unions had a strong base at the lowest structures with strong shop-floor 
structures that could be used, as argued by Valenzuela, to mobilise the labour force against the 
state. Furthermore, trade unions developed close links with civil organisations in the black 
townships (Webster, 1991:54-55).  
The unions focussed on important industries with large workforces. They met with particular 
success at multinational corporations that were susceptible to international pressure and 
especially the metal, textile, and chemical industries. These were soon connected into a trade 
union centre, which grew through mergers and further organisation in 1979 into a national trade 
union body, namely the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU). With 45 000 
members (Karis and Gerhart, 1997:217; Marx, 1992:195,198; Friedman, 1987:180-187), it 
emerged as the main union federation encouraging transformation of the state, but upheld a 
vigorous non-racial position (Marx, 1992:195). This constituted an important first strategic step 
in opposition to the government's new labour policy that emerged after the Wiehann 
Commission's report (Cooper, 1996:63-64).  
Union membership doubled between 1979 and 1982, but the period between 1982 and 1985 
experienced a slower, yet still substantial, growth in membership (Macun, 1983:48- 53; Marx, 
1992:196). This was consequently also accompanied by an increase in strike action, 
demonstrations, stay-aways and mass actions to win union demands during this period 
(Cooper, 1996:65-66). In November 1984 FOSATU also formed an alliance with community 
organisations in certain areas so as to organise a successful two day stay-away in support of a 
wide set of student and community demands (Friedman, 1987:447); yet it tried not to form 
alliances with political movements (Marx, 1992:196-197). 
                                                          
18
 Growing labour militancy and increasing township protests culminating in the Soweto Uprising of 1976, drove 
the state into reforming labour law. The finding of the Wiehahn Commission of enquiry, led to labour law reforms 
consenting to, the formal recognition of black trade unions within the official industrial relations system for the 
first time in South African history.  
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FOSATU made the strategic decision that its affiliated unions would apply for registration in 
terms of the new labour legislation, albeit on a non-racial basis. They could also sign in 
members in spite of the law, which denied union membership to migrants and foreign workers. 
FOSATU's decision to apply for registration thus opened up new possibilities. Furthermore, 
official legality, that is the right to exist and bargain as a union, would bring a number of 
benefits, such as the right to organise and recruit in factories, to sign recognition agreements 
and to oppose victimisation of union members (Cooper, 1996:64- 65). The negotiation of 
recognition agreements, which set out the rights and duties of shop stewards and trade unions 
in the workplace, was an important step in establishing the ‘rule of law’ on the shop floor; 
thereby contributing towards a culture of democracy (Cooper, 1996:65). 
In addition, unions also provided practical ‘education’ in democratic principles in the structures 
and processes of the relevant organisations. FOSATU, for example, provided educational 
programmes to teach ‘democratic organisational procedures’ (Marx, 1992:195). A further 
consequence of the legalisation of trade unions was the creation of super-federations, such as 
the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), which became a powerful union on the 
South African political landscape.  
After the suppression of the UDF, COSATU, was drawn into the forefront of resistance to 
authoritarian rule and the late 1980s saw successful mass action campaigns against the 
Separate Amenities Act, and the Labour Relations Amendment Act, and many protest actions 
(Innes, 1992:339-343). 
From the above follows that trade unions became increasingly important in South Africa's 
transition to democracy. Apart from its usual function of looking after the interests of the 
workers, their role had even wider ramifications. Economic and political factors were closely 
intertwined in the trade union movement of South Africa even at shop-floor level (Marx, 
1992:194). Thus, the trade union movement became an important factor in mobilising the 
masses, putting pressure on the government, educating the people and recruiting political 
leaders. At the same time, it provided much needed opportunities for coordinating and 
consolidating similar interests, thereby reducing the number of possible players in any future 
political settlement. 
With regard to students, parents, teachers and civic associations, seething discontent persisted 
through the 1980s. Consequently, school and consumer boycotts, strikes and stay- aways, 
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challenged the attempt at co-option, encouraging the rise of civil associations as well as student 
and youth movements, which sought to mobilise dissent (Lawrence, 1994:4). Most of the civil 
associations were aligned to the UDF, although their establishment seemed to have been the 
outcome of a fairly spontaneous reaction to repression. 
In addition, numerous local and foreign interest groups and NGOs such as the South African 
Institute for Race Relations, the Institute for Democracy (Idasa), the Urban Foundation and the 
Black Sash were also operating in South Africa. They were often directly involved in political 
issues, did research and provided assistance to those affected by apartheid policies and the 
struggle. Their work as well as their presence in civil society is still felt today. This will be 
discussed at length in the third chapter of this study. 
Lastly, a number of features of civil society are important in a discussion on the role of civil 
society in South Africa's transition to democracy. Firstly, on the one hand, a section of civil 
society triumphed in opposing and pressurising the authorities and made demands on them, but 
on the other hand, a section of civil society gave important support to the government. 
Secondly, in addition to the demands made on the authorities, civil society channelled and even 
expressed some of the demands coming from the marginalised section of political society, 
thereby exerting influence over both the state and the masses. Thirdly, it played an important 
role in the mobilisation of the masses and offered much needed moral and material support to 
the masses during times of political unrest. Fourthly, many organisations within civil society 
belonged to international organisations that provided both moral and material support to them, 
as well as being influential in the mobilisation of the international community against South 
Africa's political dispensation. Fifthly, many of the organisations of civil society had constitutions 
that laid down the rules in terms of which they could function, as well as the powers and roles of 
their officials and members, in that way providing indispensable experience that could be of use 
in negotiations and a future democratic South Africa. Sixthly, important research was conducted 
by civil society organisations and political alternatives were devised for South Africa.  
2.3.3. Civil society in the democratic era 
The existence of a strong independent civil society is one of the hallmarks of a consolidated 
democratic regime as argued in chapter one, and arguably the most important factor in 
democratic consolidation according to Linz and Stepan (1996). South Africa has made leaps 
and strides regarding the development of independent organisations and associations that 
comprise civil society since the transition to democracy in 1994. 
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The first few years of the post-apartheid period were directed by the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP), which aimed to deal with the injustices of apartheid. It sought 
after the creating a ‘developmental state’; a viable, globally-competitive economy coupled with 
welfare state elements. The RDP was supported strongly by a wide coalition of social forces; 
this commitment arose from the inclusive participatory process which helped to shape it 
(Ranchod, 2007:3) However, according to Ranchod, the programme was not well thought 
through; the state capacity to meet the objectives of welfare and popular demand and at the 
same time create a competitive economy was overestimated. 
 
In addition, RDP, a national agenda for social development  that was originally outlined by the 
country’s trade unions, but later adopted by the alliance that was about to run the country. 
However, the plan was deeply flawed. It conceptualised the state as the only leader or arbitrator 
of the transition to democracy, of the RDP, and in so doing it all but suffocated the voice of civil 
society (Forde, 2011:237). This consecutively made people spectators in their own lives, as Jay 
Naidoo, would later admit. Jay Naidoo was the Minister tasked with the RDP. ‘What followed 
was a decade of state-led development’, he says, during which the political space also 
narrowed to such an extent that factionalism set in across the ANC and fear started to saturate 
society (Quoted in Forde, 2011:237). 
 
As a result, in 1996 the ANC-led government’s macro-economic strategy changed into Growth 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR). While GEAR was a very well thought out policy 
strategy, its evolution was completely opposite to that of the RDP; there was little, if any, initial 
civil society participation. Government made it clear that GEAR was non-negotiable. GEAR was 
a typical example of a technocratic approach to policy-making which severely limits democratic 
citizen participation. Swilling and Russell (2002:8) posit that ‘GEAR defined central roles for the 
for-profit sector in economic growth and service delivery and for the non-profit sector in poverty 
alleviation, without the CSOs playing a role in the decision’. 
 
In 1997 the government introduced the Non-profit Organisations Act which defined Non- 
Profit Organisations (NPOs) as ‘A trust, company or other association of persons established for 
a public purpose and the income and property of which are not distributable to its members or 
office-bearers, except as reasonable compensation for services rendered’ (RSA, 1997). Current 
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functions envisaged by the government are watchdog and service delivery roles (Swilling and 
Russell, 2002:5). However, Friedman argues for the service delivery role (Friedman, 2002:14). 
 
In line with its ‘developmental state philosophy’19, the ANC-led government wanted the state to 
be the driving force behind the economy and the transformation of society. In this scenario, it 
envisaged civil society as a partner in making this a reality. Civil society is now largely perceived 
by the ANC-led government as an extension of its delivery capacity, and its role as an 
independent mechanism to challenge, contradict and influence policy has been largely 
overlooked. Some analysts have put it more starkly and asserted that CSOs are becoming 
‘delivery intermediaries between the framers of social policy and those for whom it is intended’ 
(Friedman, 2002:14).  
 
The new dispensation has led to the formation of many new CSOs opposed to what they see as 
further entrenchment of poverty and inequality amongst South Africans. This is because of 
government policy, especially its macro-economic policies which are largely based on the tenets 
of the Washington Consensus which calls for, inter alia, economic and trade liberalisation, 
limited state intervention in the economy and rationalisation of the public service. They have 
been actively engaging the state through various modes; whether they have had any impact will 
be discussed shortly (Ranchod, 2007:5). 
 
Fakir (2004:7) lays a contextual basis for the emergence of these CSOs. He argues that ‘the 
liberalisation of markets and strict fiscal discipline assisted in addressing development priorities 
in the early years of transition, but soon reached their limitations, particularly in the area of 
poverty eradication and the availability, distribution and accessibility of public goods and 
services, as the social and economic legacies of apartheid continued to affect the ability of both 
state and society to meet the goals set out in the RDP.’  
 
                                                          
19
 It is to be noted, however that South Africa is not a pure developmental state, but rather a welfare or Third way 
state. As de Jager asserts, although the ANC sees South Africa as a developmental state, the state lacks the 
efficiency of such states in South East Asia (de Jager, 2012:162). de Jager continues to argue that it might be more 
accurate to observe a trend towards South Africa becoming a welfare state, as in Scandinavia. But she notes that in 
welfare states, all citizens benefit from social grants, whereas in South Africa only approximately 15 million people 
out of a population of 50 million benefit from old age, child and disability grants. In South Africa, taxpayers are 
excluded from such grants; in welfare states, all taxpayers are also recipients of state benefits for example health 
insurance. 
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According to Greenberg and Ndlovu (2004), there are two types of CSOs; those that try to fit 
into programmes initiated by government and those that mobilise to confront government in 
order to affect change. They argue that many of the biggest and strongest civil society 
organisations orient upwards, justifying and elaborating the actions and ideologies of the 
dominant power. Others orient to the grassroots (Kihato and Rapoo, 1999). However, this is a 
rather crude classification and many organisations, such as the TAC, straddle both roles. How 
CSOs engage the state and attempt to affect change, as well as how successful they have 
been, will now be discussed in the subsequent paragraphs. 
 
2.4. Methods of influence of civil society in South Africa 
2.4.1. Political strategies / resources utilised 
According to Heywood (2007:304), the success of interest group influence is a complex issue. 
Not only is their efficiency often determined by a number of factors beyond their control, but 
their successes or effectiveness is also tied to their strategies, tactics and roles. Similarly, 
Heywood adds, the nature of the group and the resources at its disposal are crucial determining 
factors of its political strategy. The resources include the following:  
1. public sympathy for the group and its goals 
2. the size of its membership or activist base 
3. its financial strength and organisational capabilities 
4. its ability to use sanctions that some way inconvenience or disrupt governance 
5. personal or institutional links it may have to political parties or governance bodies. 
 
Kihato and Rapoo (1999:34) posit that formal engagement with the state incorporates the 
methods included in the legislative processes as well as other constitutional mechanisms (such 
as the Commission on Gender Equality, and the Human Rights Commission) and statutory 
mechanisms (such as NEDLAC) through which policy development can occur.  
 
Formal methods include the following: First, by contributing to green and white papers, in which 
CSOs make written submissions and comments to the relevant ministries. Some government 
departments hold workshops where stakeholders are invited to make verbal submissions or 
express their opinions on the proposed new legislation. 
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Second, by submissions to portfolio committees: the committees provide a forum where 
ordinary citizens or organisations can make formal representations to government on new laws 
or policy during the parliamentary process. The committees are, therefore, key structures to 
utilise for advocacy (Kihato and Rapoo, 1999). COSATU is one CSO which often takes up the 
challenge to make submissions via the formal route. One such example is when the call for 
submissions on the Green Paper on Further Education and Training came, COSATU took pains 
to stress redress of the economy so as to ensure that the previously marginalized were afforded 
better access to education and training opportunities. Third, by means of forums and 
government commissions, especially at local government level. These include ward committees, 
where citizens and councillors are supposed to interact at ward level in planning for local 
development (Kihato and Rapoo, 1999). 
 
Kihato and Rapoo (1999:35) also identified several informal methods of interaction, including: 
negotiations (can be formal). These include activities such as behind the scenes interactions 
with policy-makers and unofficial discussions between government officials and CSOs; petitions. 
These can be used to demonstrate how much popular support an issue has. An example of this 
is the ‘Million Faces’ petition, which is part of the Control Arms Campaign, a joint initiative by 
Amnesty International, Oxfam International and the International Action Network on Small Arms. 
Over 800 000 people in 160 countries have already given their photographs to the Million Faces 
Petition, which is the world’s largest photo petition, calling on leaders to back stricter controls on 
the arms trade. It represents the million people who have been killed by arms since the last UN 
conference on small arms in 2001 (ISS, 2006). 
 
Lobbying is another method of interaction used by CSOs. This is used to persuade individuals 
or groups with decision-making power to support an organisation’s position; and general public 
policy debates (for instance in the media) and mobilising pressure groups. These can include 
debates in community halls, civic associations, newspaper articles, and radio stations. A good 
example of the employment of informal methods was the 2001 Resources and Prevention of 
Child Abuse and Neglect (RAPCAN) campaign aimed at preventing the closure of the Child 
Protection Unit (CPU). For six weeks, RAPCAN campaigned to convince policy-makers in the 
policing sector to withdraw the decision. It and others used: television to publicise the issues; 
other electronic media to keep stakeholders informed; networking with other organisations to 
raise appropriate questions to the South African Police Service (SAPS); lobbying of the 
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chairperson of the CPU; and submissions to the National Council of Provinces and the SAPS 
(Ranchod, 2007:7). 
 
2.4.2. Resource: Democracy Aid 
Seeing as though financial resources are the focal point of this study, the discussion that will 
follow pertains to this resource. This section will be looking at aid for the purposes of democracy 
promotion in South Africa. This discussion will examine the boom and decline in this funding 
over the years. 
 
In the last two decades or so, and particularly in the last decade, an extensive global public 
policy network has developed quickly to promote democracy worldwide, especially in those 
countries that became more democratic during what Huntington (1991) calls the ‘Third Wave’ of 
democratisation.  
  
More than forty countries experienced transitions from some form of authoritarian rule to more 
democratic systems between the years 1974 and 1999 (Sisk, 1999/2000). The democracy 
promotion policy network responded to, and helped in influencing this wave of regime change. 
Therefore, the ‘Third Wave’ of transitions to democracy has been characterised by a mutual 
embrace between internal forces within countries demanding more access to political power and 
the external international forces that have worked to facilitate and improve open elections and 
multiparty politics. This combination of demand for more democracy and international promotion 
of participatory governance explains the growth in new democracies around the world 
notwithstanding some setbacks and failures in particular instances. The network of actors 
organised in support of democracy endorsement includes the governments of major states and 
their aid agencies, international organisations, international financial institutions, multilateral 
donors, NGOs with global programs, region and country-specific NGOs, and philanthropic 
organisations (Sisk, 1999/2000). 
 
During the 1990s the global North has gradually used a new tool, political aid, to influence its 
relations with the global South. This is generally known as 'democracy assistance'. This has 
been aimed at governmental structures such as parliament, the judiciary and local government, 
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as well as CSOs, with the purpose of bolstering the institutions and culture of liberal democracy 
(Hearn, 2000:815). A number of scholars have explored this phenomenon.20 
Foreign intervention has long been a factor in South African politics, however, the type of 
international involvement in the 1990s changed considerably from that of the previous years. 
Direct engagement took the place of pressure through isolation, giving foreign powers potential 
influence over domestic South African politics (Landsberg, 1994:276). 
Although 'democracy' frequently entered the foreign policy making discourse of the North in the 
post-war period, it was not the dominant form in which the North related to the South. The main 
form was the development of strategic partnerships with authoritarian regimes. The new 
industry grew out of a re-evaluation of Western foreign policy towards the South, specifically 
within the US (Hearn, 2000:815).  
With the US defeat in Vietnam, the Nicaraguan revolution and other nationalist triumphs in the 
South, US foreign policy in relation to the Third World had reached ‘crisis-point’ by the late 
1970s according to Hearn (2000:815). It had been ineffective at preventing popular anti-US 
regimes taking power in South East Asia, Central America and Southern Africa and its ability to 
influence occurrences abroad seemed very limited. By the early 1980s, a new agreement 
started to take form among policy-makers concerning the strategy of 'democracy promotion'. 
This involved two important elements that will be briefly explained in the subsequent paragraphs 
(Hearn, 2000:815). 
First was the acknowledgement that coercive political arrangements had failed to handle the 
social movements that had opposed and defied authoritarian rule and that formal liberal 
democracies were better able to take in social rebellion and conflict. It is noteworthy to 
understand that the grounds for resorting to liberal democracy were that it was believed to be a 
better guarantor of stability. The objective stayed the same: social stability, it was basically that 
the means to achieve the end had altered. It is about building political structures that most 
successfully maintain the international system. It has no more to do with radical change than its 
predecessor, authoritarianism does. As Samuel Huntington (1996:51), one of the leading 
advocates for formal democracy, explicitly asserts: ‘The maintenance of democratic politics and 
the reconstruction of the social order are fundamentally incompatible’.  
                                                          
20
 See Barkan 1994; Diamond 1995a; Mark Robinson 1995, 1996a, 1996b; Carothers 1997. 
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The second element is that, where previous foreign policy had placed attention almost 
completely on the strength of the client state and its governmental system, the new democracy 
strategy started to become aware and acknowledge the vital role of civil society. It was from 
within civil society that opposition to authoritarian rule had appeared and therefore it was 
important ‘to penetrate civil society and from therein assure control over popular mobilisation’ 
(Robinson, 1996:69). 
This is an important part of democracy assistance. Aid is aimed at a nation’s most influential, 
modern, advocacy-orientated CSOs, for an example: women's organisations, human rights 
groups, national or sectoral NGO for a, business associations, private policy institutions, youth 
and student organisations, and professional media associations (Hearn, 2000:816).  
According to Carothers (1999), since its inception in the early 1980s, democracy assistance has 
sustained its ascension. In the 1990s as stated by Hearn (2000:817), this was propelled by 
three key developments: the academic and donor concern with ‘governance’ as the source of 
underdevelopment, the application of political conditionality, in other words, making aid 
conditional on political reforms, and the shifting balance of power in North-South relations. An 
accepted view developed during the 1980s that Africa's underdevelopment was brought on by a 
failure of the state and that ‘governance’ had to be remodelled, from the bottom up. Forming 
civil society developed into the road to restructuring the state (Landell-Mills, 1992; Beckman, 
1993; Williams and Young, 1994:84). Making aid dependent on such reform has been a position 
of strong disagreements between the governments of a number of sub-Saharan African states 
and donors (Gibson, 1999). No such coercion was necessary in South Africa. As international 
opposition to apartheid from Western states, mixed with native opponents, a wide-ranging 
agreement was established over the form that a new liberal democracy would take. With the 
decease of nationalist and socialist ideologies, such foreign, explicitly political, interference was 
not seen with the same degree of scepticism any longer. The latter has allowed the North to 
intervene in civil societies of the South with a remarkable level of recognised legitimacy (Hearn, 
2000:817).  
South Africa has had a long history of Western support to civil society. The politics of apartheid, 
specifically of the late 1970s and 1980s, produced, in the words of Aitkinson et al (1996:4), ‘a 
vast array of more or less popular, more or less institutionalised organisations and initiatives in 
broad opposition to the apartheid state.’ These comprised of trade unions, CBOs, sector-based 
mobilised movements of youth, students and women, as well as business, professional and 
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religious associations. It is these types of CSOs (although they were almost never described as 
such) that donors financed. This support started with Denmark in the mid-1960s and in the 
1970s it was followed by Norway and Sweden (Jakobsen, 1996). It ended in the mid-1980s with 
the imposition of sanctions by Western governments and the international isolation of the 
apartheid state. The Nordic countries at this point were joined by the European Union and the 
US, who individually offered $340 million over a nine year period to CSOs, before the end of 
apartheid and the 1994 elections21 (USAID, 1995; Olen, 1998:350). Even with such great 
involvement, a complete account of foreign assistance to civil society in this period is still to be 
written, owing to the secret and clandestine nature of that support (Hearn, 2000:817).  
2.4.2.1. Foreign donors to South Africa 
The biggest overall foreign donor to South Africa is the US. It provided in the region of $530 
million from 1994 to 1999. The EU is the second biggest foreign donor, providing an EU 
Programme for Reconstruction and Development (EUPRD) of nearly $420 million between 1994 
and 1999. Between the two of them and no-one else, almost $1 billion of global aid was 
sponsored to South Africa's transition to democracy. Other key foreign donors to South Africa 
are the Netherlands, the Nordic countries, Germany and the United Kingdom, providing 
between $15 million and $45 million yearly since 1994. Canada is comparatively, a smaller 
bilateral donor, providing under $10 million per annum (Hearn, 2000:819).  
The largest actor in the international donor community world-wide, the World Bank, plays a 
marginal role as a lending institution. Even so, it has a considerable presence in South Africa by 
offering itself as a ‘knowledge bank’ which has offered the government with ‘lessons of 
international experience’ on all facets of policy22 (Michie and Padayachee, 1997). 
2.4.2.2. The decline in donor funding 
Funding from the developed world into South Africa has been gradually shrinking over the last 
few years. This rising funding decline is brought about by both internal and external 
circumstances that have resulted in the shutting down of several NGOs across the country, 
many of which have been the pillars of South Africa’s civil society and deepening democracy.  
                                                          
21
 With its support for the liberation movement, the Soviet Union was also an important 'donor', and must be 
included in discussions about foreign aid in this time. 
22
 For more on the Bank's influence in South Africa see Michie, J. and Padayachee V. (1997) (eds). The Political 
Economy of South Africa's Transition, London: Harcourt Brace. 
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These include the closure of Idasa (Cape Town office); the Wolpe Memorial Trust down-scaling 
its operations, and only focusing on the Annual Memorial Lecture; Noah (Centre helping 
HIV/Aids orphans) has been forced to cut back its support for orphans and in fact has closed 
down 67 out of the 90 centres across the country. The Black Sash has also faced serious 
financial troubles having to retrench staff and shut down projects. Also, Cape Town Rape Crisis 
has been adversely affected by the lack of funding for NGOs. As of July 2012, a lack of funding 
has meant that retrenchment notices were served from the board of trustees to the 
organisation’s entire staff, with the exception of director Kathleen Dey as said in the Daily 
Maverick, Mail and Guardian and well as West Cape News to mention but a few newspapers 
that have printed on the matter. 
NGO’s, which cover 30 percent of the civil services in South Africa, are crucial to meeting the 
development needs of civil society in the country. NGOs are a vital presence in areas such as 
public health, education and in safeguarding governmental transparency. The effect made by 
NGOs is extensively felt, particularly in the area of advocacy and in the work done in poor 
communities relating to access to education and human rights23.  
Externally, the fact that South Africa is more and more considered a middle income country has 
made an impact upon the decision of donors to invest. This, together with the insufficient 
funding by the South African government, has put pressure on the capacity of NGOs to meet 
the needs of the communities which they serve.  
Another key factor what many have called a ‘funding crisis’ is the effects that the economic 
recession has had on donors. In 2009, The Southern African NGO Networks’ executive director, 
David Barnard, has been cited several times in print media, stating: ‘Funders are not able to 
assist the organisations anymore because they themselves aren't coping. It is going to have a 
major impact on welfare organisations, either they will close down or their staff will be forced to 
leave the NGO sector.’ In addition, one of the largest funding channels in South Africa, the 
Lottery, has brought about more uncertainty for NGOs reliant on its payments.  
                                                          
23
 This decline has been the buzz-word in CSO discussions and has been stated and affirmed time and gain in print-
media. See the following links: http://westcapenews.com/?p=4645 ; http://blacksash.org.za.www59.cpt1.host-
h.net/index.php/media-and-publications/black-sash-in-the-media/1155-idasa-black-sash-face-funding-crisis-2-feb-
2012-sundaytribunecoza-sunday-tribune ; http://mg.co.za/article/2011-11-01-cape-town-rape-crisis-trust-faces-
closure ; http://dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-07-23-the-great-ngo-funding-crisis ; 
http://www.bigissue.org.za/uncategorized/the-big-issue-feels-pinch-of-sa-ngo-funding-crisis ; 
http://www.ngopulse.org/article/emerging-funding-crisis-south-african-civil-society ; 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/charities-ngos-funds-drying-up-1.423572   
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Internally, increasing operational expenses, the rising burdensome specifications that need to 
be followed on behalf of the donors and in terms of the business plan have to a great degree 
lessened the level of flexibility that NGOs have.24 
These developments are a concern in light of the need for a vigorous civil society in South 
Africa. The ability for NGOs to lobby for efficient governance is a key function within the political 
setting of South Africa in present-day. Also, the scarcity of capacity in the area of health care 
and education is significantly assuaged by the work of many NGOs within these disciples. The 
view that South Africa is a ‘middle income’ country needs to be looked at in light of the 
considerable disparities in the quality of life between the rich and the poor in the country. 
2.5. Conclusion 
In South Africa, the political pressure civil society was able to exert through mass mobilisation 
put pressure on the Apartheid state to adopt measures of political liberalisation and to consider 
negotiations as a possibility to bringing an end to the pervasive political strife. In addition, civil 
society, contributed to the development of the rudimentary, yet crucial prerequisites for 
democratic pluralism. Swilling's (1990:156) view stands firm on the premise that civil society is 
the key source of democratic values and a uniting point for democratic forces. Thus, the 
presence of a vibrant civil society and the appropriate structural conditions such as political 
culture, economic development and international involvement, provided a favourable 
environment for political liberalisation and the corrosion of the apartheid system. 
 
In the democratic system that South Africa has since 1994 adopted, elected officials are meant 
to represent the interests of their constituents in government, so elections are a needed, though 
not sufficient for the functioning of a well-functioning democracy. A vibrant civil society provides 
another avenue for popular will and demands to be articulated, particularly between elections 
and outside of political parties. Civil society organisations provide avenues for those voices and 
matters that may not have been given precedence by political parties, to be put on the public 
agenda. Numerous modes of engagement are used by civil society organisations in their 
interaction with government and spaces of civil society engagement have widened post-
apartheid. These modes of engagement will be discussed more elaborately in the third and 
fourth chapter. 
                                                          
24
 Some would argue that foreign donors along with their financial support bring their own agenda and self 
interests (See Carothers, 2009). However, CSOs losing donor funding is still a cause for concern. It is for this reason 
therefore that fundraising and ways to ensure self-sufficiency are avenues that CSOs need to explore. 
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South Africa has a vibrant and strong civil society, which arguably is one of the most important 
factors in democratic consolidation according to Linz and Stepan (1996). South Africa’s civil 
society is plural in nature, embodying a wide array of interests, and working well in keeping the 
government accountable, which is a necessary condition for the democratic regime to survive 
and become consolidated. This is one area in which South Africa has always been strong, even 
before the democratic transition was affected. Given the fact that the parliamentary opposition is 
significantly weak, the existence of a strong civil society is important in assuming that role of 
keeping a check on the ruling party, in particular, within a dominant party system. As 
Breytenbach (2006:183) puts it, the media and other social groupings, together with the judiciary 
(in particular the Constitutional Court), provide essential checks and balances in South Africa’s 
society and ‘may indeed have become substitutes for small opposition parties’. It is for this 
reason therefore, that the closing down of NGOs in such large numbers makes this study 
worthwhile. The buzz in the media on the issue bears testament to this fact. The role of CSOs is 
huge and it would be a great misfortune for South Africa’s young and at times fragile democracy 
if these CSOs ceased to exist. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
CASE STUDY I 
INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY (IDASA) 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter is designated to do three tasks, namely: to examine the Institute for Democracy 
(Idasa); discuss the findings of the interview that was conducted with the organisation and lastly 
operationalise these findings through the lenses of Heywood’s conceptual theoretical 
framework. These three tasks will be tackled as follows: this chapter starts by providing an 
overview of the organisation, the historical context under which it was established, the 
programmes that they administer as well as their contribution to civil society and the deepening 
of democracy in South Africa. The second part briefly describes the principles that Heywood 
lays down in his framework. The third part of the chapter presents the findings of the interview 
conducted and analyses the qualitative information by using Heywood’s framework. In other 
words, this part will apply Idasa’s modus operandi, as revealed in the interviews, to Heywood’s 
framework and reveal the challenges faced by Idasa. It is against this point that this chapter will 
make inferences and draw its conclusions. 
3.2. Idasa: The organisation  
 
3.2.1. Historical context 
Idasa was founded in 1986 by Alex Boriane and Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, former members of 
Parliament who came to the conclusion that extra-parliamentary action was needed in order to 
bring an end to the apartheid system (Idasa, 2012).   
When the organisation was established, it was committed to ‘promote a non-racial democratic 
South Africa’ (Idasa memorandum quoted in Kabemba and Friedman, 2001:6). Its stated goal 
was ‘to mobilise white opinion to understand and accept the current dynamics in South African 
politics and the realities of the society, and thereafter work towards a non-racial nation in which 
all will be free to exercise their democratic rights and enjoy the benefits and protection of full 
citizenship’ (Idasa memorandum quoted in Kabemba and Friedman, 2001:6). This implied a 
belief that white people could be persuaded, rather than coerced, to give up power, a viewpoint 
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which Idasa quickly noted, incited ‘bitter attacks from the apartheid government and right-wing 
whites and strong suspicion from the black left’ (Idasa, 1989:2). As Boraine later stated, its main 
objective was to stimulate and promote negotiation between the white authorities and black 
resistance consortiums, ‘the major emphasis in all that we set out to do, was on negotiation 
politics… in contrast to the politics of exclusion, of repression and resistance’ (Boraine, 
1994:205-212). 
 
According to Widmann (1997:10), Idasa was an important expression of white extra-
parliamentary resistance, representing the splitting of white solidarity; it was sensitive to the 
imputation that it was a channel or intermediary for compromise rather than in conflict with the 
white minority. Therefore, Idasa’s 1989 annual report brought to light its strength and its ability 
to place itself in the centre of political forces and factions (Idasa, 1989). For the most part Idasa 
was successful in upholding credibility among anti-apartheid forces. It was a more critical voice 
than the parliamentary opposition, trying to compel the apartheid government to conform to ‘the 
basics of democracy, human values and dignity’ (Graham, quoted in Kabembe and Friedman, 
2001:7). Idasa’s work at that point in time, included arranging and coordinating meetings, 
conferences (national as well as international) and secret negotiations, which was increasingly, 
consistent with resistance tactics (Kabemba and Friedman, 2001:7). 
Idasa’s most acclaimed action in earlier times, many would agree, was the July 1987 
conference it arranged in Dakar, Senegal. A group of 61 people, mostly white Afrikaners, went 
to meet the African National Congress (ANC) which was banned at the time and branded by the 
apartheid regime as a ‘terrorist’ movement (Levy, 2007:7). This initiative was consistent with the 
organisation’s claim to: ‘stem from a need for contact and communication between those people 
of goodwill who have been kept apart for so long that they have lost touch with each other’s 
humanity. It seeks to counter the distrust that exists throughout South Africa and to persuade 
whites not to cling to apartheid because of fear of an alternative’ (Idasa, 1987). This was the first 
open and public meeting between members of the banned ANC and members of the South 
Africa’s white political establishment (Len, 2007:8). 
The Dakar conference was backed financially by Danielle Mitterand of France-Liberté 
Foundation and the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung (FNS), and was made possible by Senegalese 
president Abdou Diouf’s agreement to consent to the meeting to happen openly in his country 
(Widmann, 1997). Aside from easing hostility to the ANC and consequently laying the 
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groundwork for negotiation, the conference assisted in promoting Idasa’s reputation 
intercontinentally and therefore increased its sources of funding. In 1989, it followed by 
organising with the FNS another meeting between ANC representatives and their counterparts 
(Kabembe and Friedman, 2001:9). 
As Boraine (1989:3) states, Idasa’s plan of pursuing ‘the creation of a negotiation climate which 
will lead to a new democratic, non-racial, South Africa’ was an outcome of its own strategic 
choices. In 1988 all Idasa staff members gathered to talk about the projects and events it 
believed it ought to support during 1989. Idasa is certain that its endeavours in the late 1980s 
had a distinct influence in South Africa. Meanwhile by 1989, the anticipation for Nelson 
Mandela’s release from prison and of a negotiated agreement was elevated, and Graham 
believes that Idasa was able to yield ‘bonding or bridging social capital’. By this, Graham means 
that it brought people of diverse backgrounds and standpoints together to brood over South 
Africa’s future and therefore to bridge some of the divisions between them (Graham, quoted in 
Kabembe and Friedman, 2001:8). Additionally and more specifically, Idasa offered a means for 
middle-class whites who did not agree with the system of apartheid but did not want to be 
involved in the liberation movement. For the first time, these whites started to visit black 
townships: the rifts were starting to fall way. Idasa continued keeping negotiation in the public 
attention by organising conferences within South Africa25 as well as overseas, the latter to cater 
for the still banished resistance leadership (Kabembe and Friedman, 2001:8). 
Once negotiations started in early 1990, Idasa continued with its commitment to facilitating and 
engaging with the white right wing in an attempt to bring them to the negotiating table (Kabembe 
and Friedman, 2001:12). With the negotiations in progress, and in light of its belief that the path 
on the road to democracy was irrevocable, Idasa started to modify its programme, staff, and 
structure to adapt to South Africa’s future demands. But also there was considerable continuity 
in terms of the original work and programmes that they administered. Idasa’s workshops and 
conferences continued in 1999, and the focal point continued to be on the obstacles to a 
negotiated future. In 1990 the organisation concentrated on the media, the military, and 
particularly on reducing growing white fear regarding the future. It sought to perform ‘an 
interpretative and facilitative role against the background of contending aspirations and fears’ 
(Idasa, 1990). Idasa’s commitment to negotiation and reconciliation at the grass roots level 
                                                          
25
 These national conferences included ‘Options for the future’, a culmination of several regional conferences 
focusing on the 1988 ANC constitutional guidelines, and ‘Peace and security’, which attracted considerable 
attention. 
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intensified significantly. However by 1991, the focus shifted to economic justice, education, 
human rights, media, and grass-roots participation. In addition, Idasa also set up the Training 
Centre for Democracy in Johannesburg to teach other civil society organisations (CSOs) to put 
democracy into practise. Its aim was to make sure that democracy was instituted not by those in 
power alone, but by the participation of active citizens (Kabembe and Friedman, 2001:9; Idasa, 
2012). 
In 1993, those campaigning for change and the abolishment of the apartheid system at the 
negotiation table agreed that minority rule would be traded in for a government elected by a 
universal suffrage on 27 April 1994. Idasa’s focus during this time period was determined and 
influenced by the election which was the conclusion of the negotiations for which it had worked. 
This meant more funding and staff, training domestic observers, party election agents and voter 
educators. Voter education however, along with other organisations promoting democracy, such 
as the Institute for Multiparty Democracy, was a priority for Idasa which saw this as part of 
buttressing the institutional capability needed to maintain a well rooted democracy (Graham, 
cited in Idasa, 1994).  
3.2.2. Idasa in the present day: contributions to the deepening of democracy 
After 1994, the focus of Idasa’s work shifted to the creation of a democratic culture in South 
Africa, based on active citizenship. Idasa sees itself as an independent public interest 
organisation, whose core value is promoting sustainable democracy in South Africa by building 
partnerships with African and international partners (Idasa, 2012). 
In 1995 Idasa’s programmes fell in three areas: governance, security, and public education 
(Idasa, 1995). A considerable amount of governance effort was devoted to preparing for the 
local elections. The Local Government Information Centre (Logic) was established to provide 
citizens access to information on elections (Idasa, 1995). Idasa’s current activities occur in two 
democracy centres, each with its own council. The Cape Town centre housed five 
programmes26: the Budget Information Service (BIS); the Political Information and Monitoring 
Service (Pims); Democracy Radio; the Transformation and Equity Programme (TEP), the 
Southern African Migration Project (Samp); and the public opinion service (POS). The Pretoria 
office houses three centres: Curriculum Development and Citizenship Education (CDCE); the 
                                                          
26
 As media headlines have stated, as of 2012 this office has been closed down. The interview report in the next 
section of the chapter attests to this fact. 
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Community Safety Unit (CSU); and Logic. According to Idasa (2012), there is also a KwaZulu 
Natal democracy project. 
What is noteworthy about this organisation is that, rather than defining democracy as a specific 
set of norms and procedures, Idasa maintains that democracy is better understood as a 
principle that informs the development of political institutions, norms and procedures (Idasa, 
2012). Idasa considers capacity building to be critical in the achievement of its mission and 
primary objectives. The objectives being: representation of voters; community and public 
participation; delivery of state services and constitutional obligations; and appropriately 
articulated and organised citizen demands; enforcement of laws, regulations, by-laws and the 
constitution, and informed compliance and consent by citizens (Idasa, 2012). The Political 
Governance Programme (PGP), the Community and Citizen Empowerment Programme and the 
School for Democracy are specialised components of Idasa. States in Transition Observatory 
(SITO) is a research and advocacy unit within Idasa’s Political Governance Programme that 
provides information on and analysis of political developments in countries in transition or crisis 
(Idasa, 2012). 
Today, Idasa is an acclaimed public interest organisation that is also recognised in Africa. It 
maintains international links with many similar organisations through the world movement for 
democracy. Idasa runs democracy and governance programs in more than twenty countries in 
Africa, its programs focus on building democratic societies across the African continent.  Idasa’s 
work focuses not only on elections, but also pays particular attention to what happens between 
elections.  Whilst free and fair elections are important to any democratic state, Idasa targets its 
programs to build up the capacity of civil society, encourage the transparency and accountability 
of governments, and create active citizens (Verwey, 2012). 
 
3. 3. Interview Report and analysis:  
Civil society can be measured in terms of Heywood’s framework; how interest groups exert 
influence. According to Heywood (2007:304), the success of interest group influence is a 
complex issue. Not only is their efficiency often determined by a number of factors beyond their 
control, but their success or effectiveness is also tied to their strategies, tactics and roles. 
Similarly, Heywood adds, the nature of the group and the resources at their disposal are crucial 
determining factors of its political strategy.  
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The resources include the following: 
1. Public sympathy for the group and its goals 
2. The size of its membership or activist base 
3. Its financial strength and organisational capabilities 
4. Its ability to use sanctions that in some way inconvenience or disrupt governance 
5. Personal or institutional links it may have to political parties or governance bodies 
 
Idasa will be operationalised through the lenses of Heywood’s framework, that is, resources that 
interest groups possess and make use of. The focus is placed on the financial resources, which 
they may receive from international and or domestic donor funders. Before an analysis can be 
made of Heywood’s framework in relation to Idasa’s political strategy, it is at this point that this 
study will report on the findings of the interview. 
 
An interview was conducted on 27 August 2012 with Mr Len Verwey.27 The informant that was 
interviewed was selected because of his knowledge and expertise in the area of donor funding 
and would therefore provide information on the topic that is most reliable. The questions asked 
and information collected during the interview were divided into five themes (Heywood’s 
resources as mentioned above). Refer to appendix A for the full transcript of the interview. 
 
The success of a civil society organisation in achieving its aims will depend on a number of 
factors, the most of which are the resources that Heywood argues for. It is of importance to 
note, however that the success of a CSO is not limited to these resources alone and that there 
are a number of other factors that can contribute to the effectiveness and success of such an 
organisation. In addition, according to Sadie (2007:220), the methods utilised are determined by 
a number of dynamics including the internal structure and nature of the group, the political 
culture, and the subject-matter with which the group is concerned. The analysis of the interview 
with Idasa will be analysed with reference to Heywood’s resources that interest groups have at 
their disposal to exert their influence. 
                                                          
27
 Len Verwey manages the Budget Unit of Idasa’s Political Information and Monitoring Service in their Cape Town 
office. His research has included work on budgeting and socio-economic rights, the role of Parliament in the 
budget, political economic debates in South Africa and their budgetary implications, and the challenges of 
budgeting at sub-national level in South Africa. He has coordinated Idasa’s responses to the South African Budget 
and Medium-Term Budget Policy Statement in recent years. 
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Table 1 summarises the extent to which Idasa has fulfilled the utilisation of the resources 
interest groups have at their disposal. 
HEYWOOD’S FIVE 
RESOURCES OF INFLUENCE 
IDASA’S AVAILABILITY & ACCESS TO 
RESOURCES (Utilised/Not utilised/Partially 
Utilised/On the decline/Not Applicable) 
1. Public sympathy for the group and its 
goals 
On the decline 
2. The size of its membership or activist 
base 
Not applicable 
3. Its financial strength and 
organisational capabilities 
On the decline 
4. Its ability to use sanctions that in 
some way inconvenience or disrupt 
governance 
Available and Utilised 
5. Personal or institutional links it may 
have to political parties or 
governance bodies 
Available and Partially utilised 
Table 1: Idasa’s access to Heywood’s resources 
3.3.1. Resource 1: Public sympathy for the group and its goals 
Public sympathy for the group and its goals being the first resource, it appears that Idasa lacks 
this resource quite significantly in recent times. Public sympathy for Idasa has decreased over 
the years, and this is manifest in the fact that one of its major challenges in the present-day as 
stated by the interviewee is that of convincing both local and international donors that the 
organisation’s work is still relevant, worthwhile and crucial for the country today. 
The toil of winning hundreds if not thousands of people into your cause is one strategy that 
Heywood advocates for. There is strength in numbers, the saying goes, which means that 
people tend to take you seriously when they realise who else supports your work. ‘Sympathy’, 
as defined by Adam Smith (1759) is the effect that is produced when we imagine another 
person’s circumstances as our own, and find their reaction to the circumstances to be 
reasonable. In so doing, we respond by experiencing a smaller-scale version of their feelings, 
even though we do not share the circumstances that incited their response. Smith refers to this 
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also as ‘fellow-feeling'. Pertaining to ‘public sympathy’, the principle outlined by Smith can be 
transferrable. Public sympathy can therefore be understood as those outside of the organisation 
understanding the organisation’s circumstances as their own. In other words, I would say that it 
is the case whereby the public views the cause or interest of the organisation as worthy and 
reasonable. 
As the interviewee testified, in the last five or six years Idasa has had the challenge of 
convincing donors and the government of their continued relevance. South Africa’s democracy 
is functioning; the country has held four free and fair elections, the rule of law is protected and 
South Africa has a Constitution that is internationally acclaimed to mention, but a few of the 
successes in its young democracy. To be succinct, democracy is enduring and stable. 
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that some donors might see South Africa as heading in the 
right direction and focusing on other countries that are lagging behind in terms of the quality of 
democracy (if a democracy exists at all) as well as looking at socio-economic development. The 
fact that the interviewee mentions, out of all the challenges the organisation faces, the challenge 
of having to convince both funders and the South African government of their continued 
relevance reveals that it is a great challenge and a threat to its survival. The fact that the 
organisation is also faced with the task of convincing people of their viewpoint, which holds that 
a strong civil society presence is needed to enable citizens to make their voices heard, shows 
the gravity of the situation and reveals also that while the organisation has been successfully 
funded in previous years, today sympathy from the public has decreased quite drastically and 
has to be fought for severely. 
In addition, perhaps the decline in public sympathy for Idasa is a case of ‘mission 
accomplished’. The organisation’s original and main mission was that of facilitating a negotiated 
transition in 1994, and seeing as though this has been achieved, the question to ask is 
whethere this could be the reason for the decline in public sympathy? The reason may be 
unclear, however, the issue of declining donor funding continues to be a difficulty for many 
NGOs. CSO’s such as the Institute for Security Studies, the Black Sash, and many others are 
going though similar financial struggles.  
3.3.2. Resource 2: The size of a group’s membership and activist base 
The second question asked related to Heywood’s second resource, the size of membership or 
activist base. Heywood sees the membership base of a civil society organisation as being 
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instrumental in its exertion of influence and determines how strong and successful it is. 
According to Hague and Harrop (2004:175), this is a matter of density28 and pure numbers. 
These authors continue to add that the highest penetrations are generally accomplished when, 
as with professional bodies, membership is a state of practice. 
However, not all CSOs have a membership base. In the case of Idasa, Heywood’s second 
resource is not at all applicable. As Len Verwey, the interviewee states: ‘I think we work at a 
slightly higher level in the sense that we’re not a grass-roots NGO, we tend to work more with 
policy-makers and other stake-holders at that level, and with a mass based movement’. 
Nevertheless, the fact that Idasa is a non-membership NGO does not reduce their influence and 
the advancement of their interests and goals. Idasa exerts its influence through its policy 
expertise and specialist knowledge as its staff consists of mainly researchers and experts in the 
field.  
3.3.3. Resource 3: The financial strength and organisational capabilities 
Financial strength seems to be a resource that Idasa lacks quite significantly in recent times. 
While the organisational capabilities of Idasa are strong (as its history and current stature 
testifies), they are nevertheless weakened by financial insufficiency. 
The work of NGOs is by nature unprofitable. Traditionally, NGOs rely on the goodwill and 
generosity of others to cover the costs of their activities through grants and donations. Today, 
unfortunately, NGOs find that such traditional funding sources are often insufficient to meet 
growing needs and rising costs; Idasa is no exception. 
What explains this phenomenon must be considered in light of two dynamics: the global 
financial crisis as well as donor focus shifting to countries that are in greater need. In terms of 
the global financial recession, donors have less money at their disposal, therefore they have to 
scale-back funding and be more careful about where and how they spend their money. The 
second reason is due to South Africa’s own economic development. Donors now see South 
Africa as a middle income country and are shifting their focus to North Africa and more 
impoverished nations within the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). 
                                                          
28
 According to Hague and Harrop (2004:175), density of membership refers to ‘the proportion of those eligible to 
join a group who actually do so’. An encompassing membership in this sense means that it provides CSOs with 
more influence and authority with the government. 
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Financial resources are important for an NGO. It is the premise of this study that interest groups 
that are well funded are more likely to be effective in the attainment of their goals and 
advancement of their interests. Groups with greater financial resources at their disposal can 
employ professional lobbyists to try and exert influence on public policy. It is important to note 
that financial resources are an imperative, not just for the running of programmes that the 
organisation is involved with, but also for the operation costs of an organisation. Certainly, this is 
not meant to trivialise other factors, as they too matter in the day-to-day running of an 
organisation, for instance human resources in the form of good quality staff, a strong 
management structure, volunteers, and so on. However the argument made in this study is that, 
without adequate financial backing, these other factors seem less significant and suffer 
significantly, because they are also reliant on finances to put their plans into action.  
Adequate financial resources refer to the state where an organisation is in a position of financial 
adequacy; meaning that the organisation has enough money to meet all its requirements. Let us 
assume an NGO has to pay electricity bills of R10 000 and rent of R5 000 and employee 
salaries of R25 000 then its net cash requirement per month is R40 000. If the net revenue of 
the organisation reaches R40 000 per month then they can be considered to be in a position of 
financial adequacy. That is they have enough funds to meet all their financial requirements. 
However, what we are seeing in today’s NGO’s and in South Africa, particularly those NGOSs 
discussed in this study, is that an NGO’s expenses are beyond their net revenue. What this 
means is that major projects and or services are delayed or terminated, staff members are 
downsized, NGO branches are closed down, or NGOs close down altogether. This yields 
grounds for serious concern.  
Idasa has had a significant cut in funding, so much that the Cape Town Democracy Centre has 
been closed. In addition, more than half of their staff members have been retrenched as Verwey 
attested. The overriding question that this study sought to answer is whether the global financial 
crisis has had a bearing on donor assistance to CSOs in South Africa. Based on Verwey’s 
testimony, ‘it has had a huge influence’. Verwey continues to maintain that in the past two or 
three years, there has been a substantial decrease in funding for Idasa, so much that the 
organisation was forced to retrench half its staff and close down the Cape Town office as stated 
above. Verwey provides two reasons29 for the decrease in donor funding for CSOs in the 
country: ‘it’s the global financial crisis, which has made less money available and it’s also a 
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 Verwey’s response is consistent with the literature on the subject of donor funding for South Africa’s NGOs. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
55 
 
change in focus of that funding. South Africa becoming a middle-income country, this kind of 
factor in a time of resource scarcity has meant that it’s more difficult for ODA funders to 
convince their own citizens that they should send money to South Africa’. What this means 
therefore is that donors are faced with the difficult task of either offering assistance to South 
Africa, which has made strides over the last 18 years of its democracy, or to Sudan or Somalia 
for example where conditions are far worse in terms of poverty, social and political order. 
However, the pulling out of funding that is instrumental for the deepening of South Africa’s 
young and fragile democracy is a cause for concern. As seen in the work that Idasa has since 
its inception carried out, and the unfinished process of maturation of South Africa’s democracy 
means that it would be a pity if the country lost the voice of CSOs like Idasa which has been 
instrumental in the advocating of active citizenship, social justice and the bolstering of 
democratic values and institutions. 
Moreover, what makes Idasa’s situation trickier and more difficult is the fact that they do not 
have other channels of receiving funding. In other words, they do not have the option of, for 
instance, getting assistance from big corporations, or the option of raising funds in the form of 
providing services commercially. As Verwey maintains, ‘sometimes people ask us ‘but why don’t 
you then put more effort on trying to get corporate social responsibility funding’? ‘‘Why don’t you 
get funding from the big companies’’? And the answer is actually, we probably would consider 
that, but South African large companies are not willing to fund governance type work in South 
Africa, because they are too scared of being perceived as being anti-ANC, anti-government. So 
they are happy to fund building houses, but they will not fund governance type work at this 
point. So that kind of avenue is also closed to organisations such as ours’. In addition, Idasa is 
essentially an institute that comments and tries to influence policy, therefore the work that they 
do cannot be provided commercially. This means that they are fully reliant on donor funding. 
Therefore, financial resources in the form of donor funding make up a critical element of the 
efficiency of an organisation such as Idasa and that the shrinking in funding is threatening the 
future of not just Idasa, but many NGOs in civil society. The global recession, which has made 
money scarcer, coupled with a change in focus on the side of international funders, has made 
the survival of Idasa disheartening especially given the role that Idasa has placed in South 
Africa, both historically and at present.   
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3.3.4. Resource 4: the ability to use sanctions that in some way inconvenience or disrupt 
governance 
This question relates to Heywood’s fourth resource, the ability of interest groups to use 
sanctions that in some way inconvenience or disrupt governance. Lobbying30 and litigation31 are 
a way in which NGO’s can exert their influence. The fourth resource that interest groups have at 
their disposal will be analysed by looking at the lobbying and litigation strategies of Idasa for 
these two strategies do indeed inconvenience governance.  
 
It has been found, according to Sadie (2007:220) that the most effective lobbying techniques 
involve direct personal communication with decision-makers. This includes deputations to 
politicians and the personal presentation of research results and testimonies at legislative 
hearings. Activities involving non-personal communication between decision-makers and 
interest groups such as letters and public relations campaigns are rated less effective.  
 
At Idasa we see that lobbying and litigation is at the core of its modes of influence. For instance, 
as stated by the interviewee, a few years ago the organisation engaged in direct lobbying. In 
2004, Idasa campaigned for the leading political parties, including the ANC, to reveal their 
private funding sources (in terms of the Promotion of Access to Information Act of 2000). Idasa 
asserted that private donations ‘ought to be regulated by way of specific legislation in the 
interest of greater openness and transparency’ (Venter and Landsberg, 2011 quoted in the 
Cape Times, 2005). This motion was challenged by most parties in question. The democratic 
Alliance, the official opposition party, particularly contended that corporations could be refused 
government contracts if they were known to have donated money to opposition parties (Cape 
Time, 2005 cited in Venter and Landsberg, 2011). Additionally, prospective donors disinclined to 
have their political connections publicised could be reluctant to donate to any further (Cape 
Time, 2005 cited in Venter and Landsberg, 2011). 
The court case was dismissed by the high court following the political parties in question 
agreeing to legislate on the issue. Then Secretary-general, Kgalema Motlanthe, in a sworn 
written statement stated that ‘a parliamentary process is currently under way to pass 
appropriate legislation’ (Cape Time, 2005 cited in Venter and Landsberg, 2011). However, 
                                                          
30
 Lobbing according to the Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics (2009) refers to attempts to exert influence on the 
formation or implementation of public policy. 
31
 Litigation on the other hand refers to the process of bringing or contesting legal actions in court. 
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several years after the ANC made a public commitment to do so, it has made no developments 
in improving legislation to regulate private funding to political parties, albeit the party’s 
commitment to transparency in party funding was expressed in its 2007 Polokwane resolutions 
(Venter and Landsberg, 2011). 
According to Venter and Landsberg (2011), the disinclination to legislate on political party 
funding goes to the centre of the private funding discussion in South Africa, while political 
parties endeavour to safeguard the identity of their sponsors, they are consequently fostering 
the jeopardy posed to South Africa’s democracy by debauching the validity of disclosed funding. 
Venter and Landsbergis continue to assert that in order to foster and deepen the institutional 
underpinning of democracy and, for instance, avert donor generosity from being inappropriately 
reciprocated by government. Several institutions in South Africa, such as the Independent 
Electoral Commission and the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa agree that 
some form of disclosure or registration of funding is warranted. 
Litigation is a very useful strategy for CSOs seeking to change policy or legislation or to force 
the state to comply. And the Constitution provides for the public to act as friends of the court or 
‘amicus curiae’, meaning that any party or individual may provide information and arguments to 
the court, even though the party may not be directly involved in the case. A typical example is in 
the TAC case for anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs) where Idasa was able to act as ‘amicus curiae’ by 
providing expert evidence (Ranchod, 2007:16). However, litigation is costly endeavour, thus 
without financial backing, this resource cannot be utilised. 
3.3.5. Resource 5: personal or institutional links groups may have to political parties or 
governance bodies 
Robinson and Friedman (2005:24) argue that engagement in political society, through links to 
political parties or representation in parliament, can offer distinct advantages and potential 
influence for interest groups. Robinson and Friedman continue to assert that key CSOs in South 
Africa have maintained close relationships with the ruling ANC and this has in some cases 
worked to their advantage, for it widened opportunities for policy dialogue. A good example of 
this is the corporatist relationship that COSATU has with the ANC. 
Critics would argue that working closely with government forecloses other options predicated on 
a more active watchdog role in which CSOs assume a more independent stance working on 
behalf of citizens. A further issue is whether co-operation with government diminishes or 
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enhances citizen voice (Robinson and Friedman, 2005:24). What surfaced in the interview 
shows that this is Idasa’s view on the matter to a certain degree. 
It appears that Idasa does not have or wish to have any formal institutional links with political 
parties as this would bring into question its credibility. Verwey stated that the organisation 
certainly has links with government, and, he affirmed that the slogan at the organisation is that 
of ‘no permanent friends; no permanent enemies’. There have been periods and instances 
where the organisation has been in successful partnerships with government in specific 
projects. Then again, there have been instances where a certain level of antagonism has 
existed between Idasa and the government. Pluralist scholars who comment on the different 
relationships between the state and civil society would be spot on, for indeed, depending on the 
issue, state-civil-society relations can take many different forms at different times: conflictual, 
collaborative, or a variety of both. 
3.4. Conclusion: 
In sum, pressure groups are confronted by a wide range of ‘points of access’. Their choice of 
targets and methods, however, depend on two factors. First, how effective is a particular 
strategy likely to be? Second, what resources are available to achieve these aims? Idasa has 
had at its disposal high levels of public sympathy as seen in their ability to secure donor funding 
during the latter years of apartheid, during the transition to democracy, and post-apartheid. In 
addition, it has made use of strategies that inconvenience governance bodies as demonstrated 
in the 2004 court case with South Africa’s major political parties, and their role in the TAC’s case 
regarding the provision of ARV drugs. However, two resources that are interlinked are failing 
and weakening the organisation’s potential. These are the funding that has decreased 
fundamentally, which is essentially linked to their lack of public sympathy which has 
consequently taken a slump. Given the structure of Idasa, the fact that the organisation does not 
have a base of support or membership, fortunately does not take away from their efficiency and 
potential role in civil society because they work at a slightly higher level, in that they are not a 
grass-roots NGO. 
What we are seeing however is that in spite of the organisation’s utilisation of Heywood’s 
resources or modes of engagement, their survival, which translates into their influence, is 
jeopardized. This, as maintained by Verwey as well as the media, is owing to the fact that South 
Africa is now considered a middle income country and funding is being directed to countries that 
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are in greater need. The second reason is because the world is experiencing or has 
experienced a global recession which has made funds scarcer. 
It is for these reasons therefore that this study stands firm on the premise that financial 
resources are incredibly crucial for an NGO. Other resources matter, however they take a back 
seat because without money nobody and certainly, no organisation can survive. Money does in 
deed make the world go round. 
Civil society is a distinguishing feature of democratic regimes. Democratic governments are 
expected to be responsive to the wishes of the people, and civil society is one way in which 
people can make their wishes known. CSOs facilitate participation and are therefore a second 
link between citizens and government in democratic states. Civil society not only strengthens 
representation and broadens the scope of political participation; it also checks government 
power and promotes debate and discussion. With the demise of such important advocates and 
protectors of South Africa’s democracy, it could mean that democracy becomes a system in 
theory and not in practice. It could mean that democracy is merely what happens at elections 
every five years and more ominously, this scenario could translate into a ‘democracy without the 
people’. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
CASE STUDY II 
THE TREATMENT ACTON CAMPAIGN (TAC) 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter is designated to do three tasks, namely: to examine the Treatment Action 
Campaign (TAC); discuss the findings of the interview that was conducted with the organisation 
and lastly operationalise these findings through the lenses of Heywood’s conceptual theoretical 
framework. These three tasks will be tackled as follows: This chapter starts by providing an 
overview of the organisation, the historical context under which it was established, the 
programmes that they administer as well as their contribution to civil society and the deepening 
of democracy in South Africa. The second part very briefly describes the principles that 
Heywood lays down in his framework. The third part of the chapter presents the findings of the 
interview conducted, followed by an analysis of the qualitative information by using Heywood’s 
conceptual theoretical framework. In other words, this part will apply the TAC’s modus operandi, 
as revealed in the interviews, to Heywood’s framework and reveal the challenges faced by the 
TAC. It is at this point that this chapter will make inferences and draw its conclusions. 
4.2. The TAC: the organisation 
4.2.1. Historical context 
On 10 December 1998, International Human Rights day, the TAC was born as a group of 
approximately 15 people protested at the staircase in front of the St. George’s Cathedral in 
Cape Town. This group included people infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), 
a medical student, a 66-year-old grandmother, a former human rights commissioner and a 
selection of others, determined to draw attention to the suffering and death caused by the 
epidemic. This group of protesters were demanding medical treatment for people living with 
HIV. By-passers were surprised, as few were aware of the fact that HIV could be treated, and 
the treatment was in fact freely available in Western countries. By the end of the day, the group 
had collected over 1000 signatures; calling on the government to devise a treatment plan for 
people living with HIV in South Africa (TAC, 2012). 
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The launch of the TAC opened a new chapter on the politics of HIV and Aids (Acquired Immune 
Deficiency Syndrome). South Africans were disgruntled by the discourse of doom. They were 
unsettled by popular discourse of how Aids was going to kill millions of people, ruin the 
economy and devastate the health services, and how there was apparently nothing that could 
be done to stop it. Although anti-Aids medication had altered the manifestation of the epidemic 
in developed countries, most South Africans did not know they existed. In addition, it appears 
that even health workers and HIV/Aids activists seemed to accept that these drugs were 
unattainable to the developing world, sentencing the developing world’s HIV infected population 
to a premature death (TAC, 2012). 
However, on 30 November 1998, when well-known gay rights and Aids activist Simon Nkoli32 
joined the list of South Africans to die of Aids-related illnesses, his colleague and comrade, 
leader of the TAC, Zackie Achmat decided to take action (TAC, 2012). 
Achmat spoke at Simon Nkoli’s memorial service and announced that a protest would be held 
on 10 December 1998 to launch a new campaign, under the backing of the National Association 
of People With Aids (Napwa), to fight for access to HIV treatment. Initially conceived as a 
Napwa project, the TAC has grown into an influential independent force in South African politics. 
In just two years, the organisation was able to spread the message that people with HIV/Aids 
could be treated and that poor people have a right to health care. The message has been loud 
and persistent, and neither the pharmaceutical industry nor the government has been able to 
ignore it, as future events would demonstrate (TAC, 2012). 
4.2.2. TAC’s work: HIV/Aids activism intensified 
In the words of Friedman (2007:3), ‘the fight for a comprehensive government response to HIV 
and Aids is one of the more significant sagas of post-apartheid South Africa’. The TAC is 
justifiably regarded as the clearest evidence that civil society action can change policy in the 
new democratic South Africa. 
For further detail on the TAC’s efforts, see Friedman and Mottiar, 2005; Jones, 2005; Mbali, 
2005. The TAC, supported by key international non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
associates and influential South African civil society public figures, was able to compel the 
government into agreeing, in late 2003, to the dispensing by the public health system of anti-
                                                          
32
 One of South Africa's most prominent gay and HIV/Aids activists. Nkoli was one of the first South African activists 
to publicly acknowledge his HIV-positive status. 
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retroviral (ARV) medication to people living with virus. Since this policy change, the TAC has 
been engaged in a crusade to hold the government to its promise to combat HIV/Aids. At that 
time it had received the antagonism of then Minister of Health and some provincial health 
departments, but in the same token, it has constructed co-operative relationships with some 
provinces and key figures in public health decision-making (Friedman, 2006:15). 
The TAC met with two main obstacles in its struggle for universal access to prevention, 
treatment and care for those with HIV/Aids. The first was the international pharmaceutical 
companies, which kept the price of patented medication high. The second obstacle was the 
African National Congress (ANC) government’s denialism under President Mbeki. The TAC took 
both of these parties to court in 2001 (Friedman, 2006:16). 
In April 2001, the government and the TAC initially joined forces against the Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association (PMA), which was trying to prohibit the parallel importation of generic 
drugs. Although the South African market represented 0.6 percent of the international market, 
the 39 major pharmaceutical companies that included the PMA feared that the case would 
damage the international companies in the long run, and dropped the case (Friedman, 
2006:16). 
But in September of the same year, the partnership between the state and the TAC had ended, 
as the TAC and the Department of Health (DoH) confronted each other in court over the 
affordability of providing the drug Nevirapine to prevent mother-to-child transmission (MTCT) of 
HIV. Despite the Western Province finding the money to provide the potentially life-saving drug, 
it was deemed unaffordable to extend treatment for the whole country (Smout, 2011). The 
strategic and critical engagement with the government that followed was significant, for it 
allowed the TAC to pragmatically counteract the government’s changing position. Rather than 
being regarded as an anti-ANC activist group, the TAC ensured it based its criticisms of the 
government’s actions, or lack thereof in the language of the South African Constitution (Smout, 
2011). 
Under Section 27 of the Constitution ‘everyone has the right to have access to healthcare 
services’ (RSA Constitution, 1996). The TAC asserted that it was the legal obligation for the 
government to overcome the expensive costs of treatment and be transparent about the means 
that it employs. By articulating its criticisms in the language of the Constitution, the TAC utilised 
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the most important and valued legal document in South Africa to criticise its chief author 
(Smout, 2011). In so doing, the TAC maintained the character and tone of the dispute within the 
framework of human rights and presented a link to the earlier anti-apartheid struggles that many 
TAC members had also been a part of. It also adapted political songs from anti-apartheid 
struggles as well as engaging in acts of civil disobedience, prompted by its leader, Achmat 
(Friedman, 2006). 
It is this important relationship between the government, the TAC and international human rights 
organisations that marks the TAC’s significant position in contemporary South Africa. In 
campaigning for healthcare as a socio-economic right, the TAC was concurrently defending and 
extending political rights, such as freedom of speech and the right to peaceful demonstration 
which were won in the fight against the apartheid system (Smout, 2011). It is for this reason that 
the TAC is not branded as an anti-ANC activist group, in spite of relentlessly going against 
former President Mbeki’s Aids denialism33 (Smout, 2011). 
4.2.3. The TAC’s contribution to democracy 
The TAC can therefore be said to participate in democratic governance in two ways: it has 
played a crucial role in forcing the government to heed the concerns of an important social 
constituency, people living with HIV, a number which fell well over five million. These gains have 
been won not for the affluent or people likely to gain access to government, most TAC members 
are unemployed black women aged 14-24. It has, therefore, given a voice to people who would 
not otherwise be heard (Friedman, 2006:16). 
The TAC has also participated in the effort to ensure that government policy, adopted in 
response to citizen demands and the ethos of the Constitution, is put into practice. While the 
                                                          
33
 Aids denialism refers to the promotion of one or more of the following pseudo-scientific views: (1) HIV does not 
cause Aids, (2) the risks of antiretroviral drugs outweigh their benefits and (3) there is not a large Aids epidemic in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Former President Mbeki began openly questioning the viral aetiology of Aids as well as the 
benefit and effectiveness of proven treatment, particularly Azathioprine, calling it ‘toxic’. Mbeki had been in 
communication with several notorious AIDS denialists and later established a Presidential Aids Advisory Panel, 
requesting the expertise of unorthodox scientists and denialists. Then Minister of Health, Manto Tshabalala-
Msimang became his ally in his consequent disputes with HIV/Aids activists and the scientific establishment. 
Against the counsel of South African and international physicians and public health specialists, the Mbeki 
government refused to provide a mother-to-child transmission prevention plan until it was compelled to do so in a 
court case brought by the TAC in the Constitutional Court. For a comprehensive explanation of AIDS denialism in 
South Africa, see Nattrass, 2007. 
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attempt to hold government to its promises is often conflictual, there are also examples of co-
operation (Friedman, 2006:16). Once again, as in Idasa’s case, elements of pluralism can be 
traced in the relationship between the TAC and the government depending on the issue at 
hand. 
 
The TAC is therefore a vehicle for citizen engagement in policy-making and implementation, 
important features of participatory democracy (Heywood, 2005) and its campaign has 
functioned within the rules and norms of constitutional democracy. The TAC’s role has been to 
mobilise its constituency to make use of the rights conferred by the democratic system, so as to 
participate in public decisions. In this way, the TAC is a vehicle for participatory democratic 
governance, regarded not as participation in formal forums, but as a process in which citizens 
use democratic rights to make their views voiced about how they are to be governed (Friedman, 
2006). 
 
Moreover, the TAC has demonstrated that the most effective means of participatory governance 
is in the rights enshrined in the Constitution and the democratic framework and institutions 
which uphold them. 
 
4.3. Interview Report and Analysis: 
The same principles applied in the interview with Idasa remain the same in terms of the manner 
in which the questions were structured thematically. However, the TAC was unavailable to meet 
for a one-on-one interview. Therefore, interview questions were forwarded via email to a key 
informant in the organisation, Catherine Tomlinson34. 
The key informant that was interviewed was selected because she holds a senior position at the 
TAC and is one of the most knowledgeable researchers on the subject of donor funding and 
would thus provide information on the topic that is most reliable. Tomlinson’s expertise and 
experience within the organisation means that her contribution to this study is critical and 
invaluable. The questions asked and information collected during the interview was divided into 
five themes (Heywood’s resources as mentioned in the preceding chapters). Table 1 
                                                          
34
 Catherine Tomlinson is a senior researcher at the TAC, where she has worked for four years in the organisation’s 
Policy, Communication and Research Department. Tomlinson is particularly interested in intellectual property and 
medicine access and is at present working on TAC’s campaign to amend the Patents Act 57 of 1978. 
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summarises the extent to which the TAC has fulfilled the utilisation of the resources interest 
groups have at their disposal. 
HEYWOOD’S FIVE 
RESOURCES OF INFLUENCE 
TAC’S AVAILABILITY & ACCESS TO 
RESOURCES (Available/Utilised/Not 
utilised/Partially utilised/Not Applicable) 
1. Public sympathy for the group and its 
goals 
Available and Utilised.  
2. The size of its membership or activist 
base 
On the decline 
3. Its financial strength and 
organisational capabilities 
On the decline 
4. Its ability to use sanctions that in 
some way inconvenience or disrupt 
governance 
Available and Utilised 
5. Personal or institutional links it may 
have to political parties or 
governance bodies 
Available and Partially Utilised 
Table 2: The TAC’S access to Heywood’s resources 
4.3.1. Resource 1: Public sympathy for the group and its goals 
South Africa has been one of the countries most severely hit by the HIV/Aids epidemic. The 
estimated overall HIV prevalence rate is around 10,6 percent according to Statistics South 
Africa (2011). The total number of people living with HIV is estimated at approximately 5,38 
million mid-year 2011. An estimated 16,6 percent of the adult population aged 15-49 years in 
South Africa is HIV positive (Stats SA, 2011). 
The HIV/Aids rights movement in South Africa is centred around the TAC and this organisation 
gained recognition domestically and internationally. The TAC is seen by many as an exemplar 
for CSOs around the world, a ‘champion’ of demands for social equity and the rights promised 
by democratic citizenship. The TAC has successfully developed a human rights framework that 
has not only attracted a solid constituency domestically, but also resonates with global HIV/Aids 
rights struggles, which are focused on the issue of treatment access and more recently with 
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broader, global socio-economic rights struggles. In essence, TAC has gained mainstream 
respectability (Friedman, 2006).  
The organisation’s leader Zackie Achmat has been nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize; was 
included in Time magazine's list of ‘Heroes’ (2003) and was described by The New Yorker 
magazine as South Africa's ‘most important dissident since Nelson Mandela’ (Power, 2003). In 
addition, Vanity Fair profiled Achmat in its ‘Special Africa Issue’ (June 2007) as one of a few 
activists, business and entertainment figures, and a number of government officials embodying 
the ‘Spirit of Africa’ (Richards, 2007). 
As Jacobs and Johnson (2007) point out, framing the fight against HIV/Aids as a human rights 
issue has enabled links between the TAC and international advocacy networks that are 
sympathetic to its cause and also facilitated in the provision of a receptive international political 
location for its message. These authors continue to add that the human rights framework offers 
a shared pool of meaning that served to bridge homosexual and HIV/Aids advocacy struggles in 
the industrialised countries with HIV/Aids struggles in Africa. The TAC's focus on the right to 
treatment, a powerful influence of the HIV/Aids movement since the early days of the epidemic 
in the United States, deeply resonated with groups such as Act Up and the Health Gap 
Coalition, but also with CSOs generally, who are not normally connected with HIV/Aids or health 
matters. For example, the prominent, and mainly mainstream, international NGO Civicus: World 
Alliance for Citizen Participation, included the TAC as the perfect ‘case study’ in an activist 
manual on ‘how to run a local campaign linked to an international movement’  (Civicus, cited in 
Jacobs and Johnson, 2007).  
In contrast to Idasa, it is clear that the TAC enjoys a great degree of public sympathy, not just in 
the initial years of its work, but even today. Those outside the organisation deem the work that 
they do as worthy, relevant, and much needed. The elevated public sympathy for the TAC is 
reinforced by the fact that its campaign was embedded within the framework of human rights, a 
Constitutional right not only recognised in South Africa’s constitution, but elsewhere in the world. 
Nowhere in the world are HIV statistics so high, nowhere in the post-democratic South Africa 
has an NGO been so resilient and influential in changing public opinion and discourse, it is no 
wonder public sympathy for the TAC is high. However, in these difficult financial times, this 
issue becomes more complex, as funds are scarcer. 
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Nevertheless, to echo the interviewee’s statement: ‘The number of challenges facing the public 
sector makes it difficult to have one campaign strategy goal. TAC has many on-going 
campaigns and goals at the same time. This makes it difficult for the public, government etc. to 
understand what TAC does’. Moreover, the interviewee’s acknowledgment of the fact that with 
over 1.5 million people receiving ARV treatment from the public sector and comprehensive 
services being made available, could account for the decline in membership. Could it be that 
public sympathy for the TAC is on the decline, since ARV treatment is freely available in South 
Africa, thus demonstrating that the main goal of the TAC has been achieved? These are 
pertinent questions to be considered, and this study argues that these could be developments 
worthy to be noted and monitored in the future with regards to public sympathy for the TAC. 
4.3.2. Resource 2: The size of a group’s membership and activist base 
Heywood sees the membership base of a civil society organisation as being instrumental in its 
exertion of influence and determines how strong and successful it is. In the interview, Tomlinson 
(2012) stated that the TAC has around 10 000 members. She continued to add that with the 
availability of ARV medication in the public health sector, there has been a decline in 
membership. 
It is important to bear in mind the clarification that Mvinjelwa (2004) makes concerning the 
membership or activist base: the TAC is in many ways a conventional membership NGO, 
although significant characteristics of its internal structure are unconventional. There appears to 
be no definite distinction between TAC members who usually do not pay fees, but fill in 
membership forms, and its ‘supporters’, ‘volunteers’ or ‘activists’ (Mvinjelwa, 2004 cited in 
Friedman and Mottiar, 2004). Indeed, Berold (2004) maintains that ‘volunteers’ and members in 
essence point to the same thing (Berold, 2004 cited in Friedman and Mottiar, 2004). The 
primary way of becoming a TAC member is to join a TAC branch and officials and activists 
usually seem far more comfortable calculating the number of branches than members (for 
example, one activist put the membership at almost four times its actual size) (Friedman and 
Mottiar, 2004:6). And, while certain branches do charge a small membership fee, this does not 
seem to be the norm. Therefore, it may be more accurate to describe people active in the TAC 
as ‘participants’ rather than drawing a clear distinction between members and supporters 
(Friedman and Mottiar, 2004:6). In essence, the TAC membership is a source of mobilisation, 
for example in marches and petitions, as opposed to a source of revenue. 
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Membership in early 2004 was said to be approximately 8 000, this had increased to 9 500 by 
the middle of the same year, although the TAC admits that some people listed as members had 
died (Geffen, 2004 cited in Friedman and Mottiar, 2004), this however, is a small proportion of 
the five million people estimated to have been be living with HIV/Aids in 2005. The fact that the 
TAC draws some of its membership from people living with the virus and that some members 
lose their lives is, in the view of its leadership, one reason for its limited size (Achmat, 2004 
cited in Friedman and Mottiar, 2004). In addition, Mongose, a TAC activist, states also that the 
stigma of being known as HIV positive is a deterrent to membership: ‘some people who are not 
HIV positive will avoid hanging around with me or joining TAC because they are afraid that they 
will automatically be assumed by their community to be HIV positive’ (Mongose, 2003 cited in 
Friedman and Mottiar, 2004). 
In addition, the TAC activists highlight that the numbers of individuals taking part in its marches, 
which in 2004 they estimate to have been between 8 000 and 15 000, indicate an ability to 
mobilise people well beyond its membership (Geffen, 2004). The TAC officials insist that its 
strength is not based on numbers, a view firmly supported by activists in other CSOs as well, 
who assert that influence is derived from resources other than the size of membership (Desai, 
2004). But TAC leaders acknowledge that the size of its base does constrain it to a certain 
degree, by ensuring that it cannot undertake some campaigns and cannot win issues by 
organised strength alone (Mthathi, 2004 cited in Friedman and Mottiar, 2004). This compels the 
TAC to make use of other resources at its disposal, rather than relying solely on one resource. 
Therefore, the fact that the TAC’s size of membership is on the decline, does not mean that its 
activist base is stifled. As stated by Geffen (2004) in the preceding paragraphs, the TAC has 
been able to mobilise people well beyond its membership base. This means, that the size of 
membership or activist base declining, in the case of the TAC does not take away from its 
efficiency. Strength in this context does not rest in numbers, but in the ability to mobilise and 
gather together individuals into ones cause, irrespective of their affiliation with the organisation. 
Additionally, it must be noted that not all CSOs have a membership base, because CSOs differ 
in function, form and objectives. 
In addition, as Tomlinson, the interviewee attests, there has been a decline in membership with 
the wide availability of ARVs in the public sector. Therefore, the decline in membership for the 
TAC could be a result of a case of ‘mission accomplished’. 
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4.3.3. Resource 3: The financial strength and organisational capabilities 
The time of expanding financial resources to combat HIV/Aids is over, according to the World 
Bank (2009). The World Bank continues to maintain that the global economic crisis has shrunk 
resources available for foreign aid at exactly the time when more resources are needed. 
There is a rising backlash against HIV/Aids-related funding on the grounds that too many 
resources have been assigned to the Aids response, particularly to ARV drugs (Nattrass and 
Gonsalves, 2009). However, as Nattass and Gonsalves (2009:2) state, ‘even before the global 
economic crisis, and at the height of the long boom which underpinned the increase in global 
funding for Aids, a backlash was evident’. The general premise was that HIV/Aids activism had 
earned an ‘unfair’ amount of resources; this activism was squandering these resources on 
socially questionable expenditure and that the money should rather be assigned to other 
purposes (Garrett, 2007). The heart of the backlash, nevertheless, came from those arguing 
that HIV/Aids-related funding had undermined health systems in developing countries (England, 
2007a; 2007b, 2008). This is a problematic, especially for the HIV/Aids crusade which made the 
availability of ART treatment possible in developing countries. In the South Africa context 
particularly, the lessons learned from the fight against HIV/Aids, notably, the significance of 
community mobilisation and including health-care ‘consumers’ in decision-making, are 
beginning to drown the new discourse of ‘country ownership’35 (Nattrass and Gonsalves, 2009). 
Financial strength seems to be a resource that the TAC lacks in recent times, just as it is for 
other HIV/Aids NGOs and most of the NGO sector in South Africa. While the organisational 
capabilities of the TAC are strong (as its local and international stature testifies), they are 
nevertheless weakened by financial inadequacy. 
On January 2012, the TAC issued a statement in a newsletter where they appealed to donors 
and reiterated the fact that they were facing a grave financial crisis (TAC, 2012). This statement 
continued to state that the TAC depends on a five year grant from the Global Fund For Aids, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM)36 for a large proportion of its work. The TAC is one of the 
                                                          
35
 Country ownership encompasses joint responsibility and mutual accountability with donors and other partners, 
specifically when external economic and technical resources are required to fully meet the health-sector needs of 
host countries. 
36
 The GFATM was created in 2002 to increase resources to fight HIV/Aids, tuberculosis and malaria, and to direct 
those resources to areas of greatest need. GFATM is a public-private partnership and international financing 
institution with the function of attracting and distributing supplementary financial resources to prevent and treat 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. This partnership is between governments, civil society, the private sector as 
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sub-recipients of what is called the Round Six grant. In July 2011, the organisation was meant 
to receive a R6,5 million grant. More than seven months late, the GFATM grant was finally 
released to the TAC (Plus News, 2012). 
Tomlinson (interviewee) stated four on-going challenges that the TAC is experiencing, one of 
them, in her own words is ‘dwindling funding for HIV’. When Tomlinson was asked about the 
importance of financial resources in the day-to-day running of the TAC, she maintained: 
‘financial resources are necessary to run any organisation. The scale of TAC’s campaign also 
requires financial resources. TAC almost had to shut down last year (2011) because of the 
delays in receiving money from the GFATM. We have now received this funding and able to pay 
for staff and programmes’. 
The key question in these circumstances is what accounts for the delays, or the possibility of a 
discontinuation in funding? The answer to this question in the case of the TAC is slightly more 
intricate and multifaceted than what one sees in Idasa’s case in the previous chapter. It should 
be noted, moreover that an explanation on the reasons behind the decline or delay in funding 
for the TAC will be examined by looking at specifically the grants that the organisation receives 
from GFATM, their largest donor, and the donor that the TAC in its aforementioned newsletter, 
labelled as the main contributor to its financial crisis.  
There are several, interrelated dynamics that can be attributed to delays in the organisation’s 
primary source of funding, the GFATM. The first dynamic has its roots in the global financial 
crisis. With many large international donor countries struggling with the difficulties of the 
economic recession and debt crisis, this has made money less available to them and 
consequently less available to those in need. A second reason which accounts for the delays in 
donor funding is, according to the TAC, because the GFATM systems are extremely complex 
and that the Fund is not pleased that the DoH has met its criteria. The TAC also understands 
that the plan to amalgamate Round Six, Round Nine and Round Ten grants into a single flow 
has added to the delays. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
well as communities affected with the aforementioned diseases. The GFATM depends on charitable financial 
donations from all sectors of society: governments, the private sector, social enterprises, philanthropic 
foundations and individuals. GFATM for example, signs a legal grant agreement with a ‘Principal Recipient’. The 
principal recipient receives GFATM financing directly, and utilises it to implement prevention, care and treatment 
programmes or transfers it to other organisations (‘Sub-Recipients’) who provide those services. In South Africa, 
the primary recipient of funding is the National Department of Health and the sub-recipients are CSOs in the 
country, such as the TAC, Soul City, and South Africa Business Coalition on HIV/Aids (SABCOHA) to mention a few. 
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Another factor that plays itself out in the TAC’s funding problems is owing to South Africa’s 
economic position, which is sound and regarded as middle-income. South Africa has the 
heaviest burden of HIV, but the country is financially sound, has good fiscal policies and 
healthcare is receiving more in the national budget. According to treasury data, total spending 
on HIV was R16.9-billion for 2010/11, of which R5-billion was from donors. But as donor funding 
is scaled back, South Africa will still be able to pay for its antiretroviral programme, unlike many 
poorer nations (Deghaye and Whiteside, 2012). Although South Africa’s economic position as a 
possible explanation for donor decline is not confirmed in the interview with the TAC, literature 
does confirm this, and so does South Africa’s Minister of health. 
According to the Minister of Health, Dr Aaron Motsoaledi, in South Africa ‘we can’t say we are 
rich, but we have started that programme of being self-sufficient for a long time. And I’m quite 
confident that you are not going to be hearing about any province or any area not getting ARVs 
because of this Global Fund money. There will be problems in other programmes, but not in 
ARVs. We have tried to be self-sufficient for a long time, especially with the buying of ARVs. We 
use very little donor money with the purchase of ARVs. The donors are helping us to run 
programmes of prevention, to fund NGOs… but the ARVs… most of the monies is ours’ 
(Motsoaledi quoted in Thom, 2012).   
South Africa utilises less than 10 percent of donor money to purchase ARV drugs. However, 
some countries are less fortunate. In Zimbabwe, for instance, funding scarcities threaten to 
disturb treatment for more than 112 000 patients who will already be taking ARVs by the year 
2014 (Bodibe, 2012). In addition, Mozambique anticipates facing shortages of first-line ARV 
drugs by the end of 2013. Many developing nations rely on donor funding for up to 90 percent of 
their HIV/Aids programmes. However, South Africa is the only African country that is able to 
fund the majority of its ARV treatment in the public healthcare sector, and further, it is the only 
African country that donates to the GFATM (Bodibe, 2012). Therefore, this is one reason which 
could account for the decline in funding geared towards South Africa’s HIV/Aids programmes 
and the TAC’s donor decline, because the GFATM is the source, from which both the South 
African government (primary recipient) and the TAC (secondary recipient) receive their funding. 
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It is against this backdrop that the TAC has embarked on ‘Given-Gain’37 fundraising drive to 
raise funds from individuals across South Africa. As Tomlinson (2012) affirms: ‘TAC’s funding is 
largely and historically received from international funders. Given the insecurity of continuing to 
rely on these funders, TAC has begun to seek more funding nationally. A national fundraising 
office is now active, and they have set up a number of initiatives including using Given-Gain’. 
Therefore, financial resources in the form of donor funding, particularly those that are received 
from the GFATM make up a critical element of the efficiency of an organisation such as the TAC 
and that the shrinking in funding is threatening the future of not just the organisation, but 
HIV/Aids programmes that save the lives of many.  
The international response to HIV/Aids is decreasing and commitments uncertain because of 
the global economic crisis, internal issues with the largest donor institution, possible donor 
fatigue and these kinds of issues have played a part in the decrease of the TAC funding. What 
this means for an organisation that has, and continues to be a mouth-piece for a marginalised 
sector of society, brings their existence and future at the hands of others and moreover 
disempowers an organisation that is relevant, needed, and that is crucial for the democratic 
counterbalance of this vital section in society. Financial resources are the lifeline of the TAC, as 
they are for any organisation. The decline, delay, or removing of financial resources is removing 
the spark of life in a sector needed in South Africa. 
4.3.4. Resource 4: the ability to use sanctions that in some way inconvenience or disrupt 
governance 
In the words of Tomlinson, ‘the TAC has used a number of strategies to achieve its goals, 
including: lobbying, picketing marching, legal action and civil disobedience’. Indeed, the TAC 
adopted a numbers of strategies and modes of influence in its HIV/Aids campaign and activism. 
It has combined civil disobedience and others kinds of mass mobilisation, as well engagement 
with formal institutions (including the courts and public health officials). The TAC has succeeded 
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 Given-Gain was founded in July 2001. It is a web-based platform serving the non-profit sector with online 
publishing, fundraising, database management and communication tools. In the past decade, the organisation has 
grown to serve over 400 organisations, processing over R300 million in donations to over 2 300 projects from over 
45 000 donors. In Southern Africa, Given-Gain is supported by the Given-Gain Foundation South Africa (GGFSA), 
whose primary role is to provide training, support and advisory services to Given-Gain clients. Since its launch in 
2010, GGFSA has served a number of key organisations and supported some of the most successful web based, 
social networked, fundraising campaigns in South Africa. 
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in altering public policy, overcoming official unwillingness to introduce large-scale public 
provision of ARV medication to HIV-positive patients (Ranchod, 2007:12). 
According to Heywood (2003:4), it has been argued that there is hardly a Chapter Nine 
institution (those institutions mandated in Chapter Nine of the South African Constitution to 
protect the rights of citizens, such as the South African Human Rights Commission) or statutory 
body that has not been used by the TAC (Heywood, 2003:4). Its campaigns have included 
appeals to the Human Rights Commission, the Public Protector, the Competition Commission, 
the Gender Commission and the Auditor General. The TAC has also made use of the courtroom 
when it partnered with the government in dealing with copyright laws preventing the use of 
generic HIV drugs. The TAC achieved a second court victory when it forced the then minister of 
health, Dr. Mantho Tshabalala-Msimang, to provide ARV treatment for the prevention of MTCT 
of HIV (Ballard et al, 2005). 
The use of lobbying and litigation by the TAC can be traced to its 1998 to 2003 treatment 
access campaign as well as subsequent policy creation. In a sense, the fourth resource for 
exerting influence has been considered implicitly in the historical context of the TAC’s inception 
and inextricably with other resources. 
Nevertheless, with regard to lobbying, the TAC came into conflict with the South African 
government and international pharmaceutical companies to provide broader access to HIV 
drugs for people living with HIV as stated earlier. By the end of 1998, the TAC had already 
commenced a campaign for the Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission of HIV (PMTCT). In 
this campaign, the TAC compelled the government to provide access to Azathioprine (AZT). 
Some government officials argued that the drug was too expensive, while others openly rejected 
the efficiency of the treatment (Heywood, 2003).  
For the following five years, the TAC demonstrated and marched all over South Africa in protest 
of the government and pharmaceutical companies. The case was later presented to the Court in 
2002. 
Reiterating the anti-dompas (pass law) defiance campaigns of the apartheid epoch, the TAC 
started the ‘Christopher Moraka Defiance Campaign against Patent Abuse’ in 2000 (Robins 
2004). This civil disobedience campaign aimed to bring to light the profiteering on patented 
medication by unlawfully bringing in generic medication from Thailand (Robins 2004).  
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In public, the TAC stated its objectives of defying pharmaceutical patents at a conference in July 
2000, while also pleading to other organisations and individuals to take part in their campaign. 
This brought great international attention, strengthening the uproar against pharmaceutical 
company, Pfizer. After Achmat purchased 5 000 capsules of fluconazole in Thailand, the TAC 
revealed the profiteering and patent exploitation by Pfizer. For example, a 200 mg capsule of 
fluconazole38 cost R28.57 in the South African public healthcare sector and R80.24 in the 
private sector, while in Thailand, one capsule cost R1.78. It became evident that Pfizer had 
raised prices of brand medications. This discrepancy in pricing, along with Pfizer’s reluctance to 
disclose their investment and pricing policies, left Pfizer with a tainted reputation (Bloom 2000). 
Not long after, and in March 2001, Pfizer finally lowered medication prices. The public pressure 
built up through TAC’s protests in the form of demonstrations throughout Cape Town and 
Durban, forced the company to reduce the prices of their products (Thomas and Dorono 2004). 
In government clinics, Pfizer made its drugs freely available (Robins 2004).  
Though the TAC won a victory against Pfizer, the fight against pharmaceutical giants was not 
over. While TAC was also confronting the South African government in its PMTCT campaign, it 
was working alongside the government in a court case instigated by pharmaceutical companies. 
In March 2001, thirty-nine pharmaceutical companies, represented through the PMA, brought 
the South African government to court (OXFAM Policy Report, 2001). The PMA claimed that 
certain amendments to the 1997 Medicines and Related Substances Act were unconstitutional. 
The proposed amendments would enable the government to make drugs more affordable in 
South Africa by decreasing the prices of the PMA’s drugs (TAC Diary 2008). The law allowed 
less expensive generic drugs to be imported or made in South Africa. Though the TAC was not 
initially involved in the case, the organisation incorporated itself into the court case as a ‘friend 
of the court’, or amicus curiae, to present testimony relevant to the government’s case.  
In addition, as stated by Tomlinson in the interview: ‘The work of TAC and partners has also 
resulted in the adoption of a comprehensive policy to respond to HIV in South Africa. This was 
done through working with government and SANAC (South African National Aids Council)’. 
Indeed, the TAC has made use of a number of strategies to inconvenience governance, and 
even beyond 2003. Presently, there are a number matters of which the organisation is lobbying 
for. The most recent, as stated in the interview, is the complaint lodged by the organisation with 
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 Treatment for Cryptococcal meningitis, a medical condition common among HIV patients. 
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the Public Protector against KwaZulu-Natal Member of the Executive Council (MEC) for health 
and KwaZulu-Natal DoH for its use of the Tara Klamp (TK), an unsafe male circumcision 
device39.   
4.3.5. Resource 5: personal or institutional links groups may have to political parties or 
governance bodies 
According Tomlinson, in earlier times, while South Africa had a denialist government, the TAC’s 
relationship with government was extremely conflictual. However today, the organisation has 
improved its relationships with government and often works to support its initiatives. This is 
owing to the fact that nowadays, the leadership of the DoH has displayed the political will to 
manage HIV, and basing interventions on scientific support. However, Tomlinson adds that: ‘the 
TAC has retained its independence and continues to challenge government’. Once again, this 
points to the plural and corporatist relationship that exists between the state and CSOs in the 
South African democratic context. Thus, the TAC is able to balance its role of conflict and co-
operation in its relationship with the government. 
4.4. Conclusion 
In conclusion, to echo Tomlinson’s words, in South Africa today there is a more extensive arena 
for NGOs to exist and campaign, in contrast to earlier times. The right to strike and demonstrate 
for instance is now defended in the laws that govern the country. Examples are plenty of the 
TAC’s use of sanctions that in some inconvenience and disrupt governance, and this can be 
traced to the TAC’s overall treatment access campaign that prompted its launch and shaped its 
subsequent work. Lobbying, litigation, defiance campaigns, demonstrations and so forth, are 
among the organisation’s many strategies in this regard. This is one resource that the TAC has 
made great use of, more so than many other CSOs in the country. 
In addition, the TAC enjoys a great degree of public sympathy, not just in the initial years of its 
work, but even today. The TAC’s links with international advocacy groups has enabled this. 
                                                          
39
 The complaint asks the Public Protector to investigate the procurement and continuing use of the Tara Klamp 
(TK) to perform medical circumcisions on adolescent and adult men in KwaZulu-Natal. According to the TAC, the TK 
is a dangerous instrument. For this reason, it has not been approved by the World Health Organisation, because it 
failed in the only clinical trial conducted to test its safety. The TAC has continued to ask the KwaZulu-Natal 
government to stop the use of the TK since the organisation has first learned of its use in 2010. The TAC has also 
asked the National Department of Health to intervene. The TAC’s complaint is supported by the South African 
Medical Association and the Southern African HIV Clinicians Society. 
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Moreover, the framing of the fight against HIV/Aids as a human rights issue has enabled links 
between the TAC and international advocacy networks that are sympathetic to its cause and 
also assisted in the provision of a receptive international political cite for its message. Indeed, 
those outside the organisation deem the work that the TAC does do as relevant. Nowhere in the 
world are HIV statistics so high, and nowhere in the post-democratic South Africa has an NGO 
been so resilient and influential in changing public opinion and discourse, it comes as no 
surprise that public sympathy for the TAC is high. However, in these uncertain financial times, 
this issue becomes more intricate, as funds are scarcer. 
Pertaining to size of membership, the fact that the TAC’s size of membership is on the decline, 
does not mean that its activist base is stifled, as the TAC has been able to mobilise people well 
beyond its membership base. This means, therefore that the size of membership or activist 
base declining, in the case of the TAC, does not take away from its efficiency.  
What we are seeing however, is that in spite of the TAC’s well utilisation of Heywood’s modes of 
engagement, their survival, which translates into their influence, is endangered. This is owing to 
financial strength, which appears to be a resource that the TAC lacks in recent times quite 
significantly, just as it is the case for other HIV/Aids NGOs and the rest of the NGO sector in 
South Africa. This occurrence is owing to the fact that the global financial crisis has made funds 
scarcer and thus caution and parsimony on spending results on the side of the donors. Also, 
South Africa’s position as a middle income country has conceivably forced donors to fund 
developing countries that have weaker economies, that is to say, economies that are unable to 
provide treatment to HIV infected individuals in their country. As the minister of the DoH, Dr 
Motsoaledi has affirmed, South Africa is capable of providing ARV treatment for HIV positive 
South Africans and the country is well on its way to ‘self-sufficiency’, a position that he 
advocates for strongly. 
However, the TAC’s situation, with regard to financial resources is more intricate than what 
meets the eye. There is interplay of the above mentioned factors along with specific donor-
specific problems, as shown in the GFATM circumstances. It is in light of this, that the survival 
of the TAC has been placed at stake and the organisation has resorted to alternative fundraising 
initiatives. 
Civil society has a vital role to ensure that democratic rights are upheld. Civil society and 
communities have the power to shape and inform these laws and policies in South Africa. 
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Government is required to carry out public consultations on new laws and policies before they 
are adopted.  Additionally, while adopting good laws and policies is important, this in itself is not 
enough. An active civil society is necessary in ensuring that these policies are implemented. 
The TAC has demonstrated with its lobbying tactics, and its constitutional court case that the 
role that civil society must and can play an instrumental role in ensuring that the government 
upholds the legal rights of its citizens. With the demise of such important advocates and 
protectors of South Africa’s democracy and Constitution, it would mean that democracy is a 
system whereby citizens are passive spectators in their own lives. This is a cause for great 
concern, particularly for an NGO such as the TAC, which advocates on behalf of a marginalised 
social constituency. Active citizenship and participation, as displayed by the TAC’s actions, 
fortifies and deepens the quality of democratic governance by constantly bringing overlooked 
and diverse needs, concerns, and perspectives into the decision-making process. It is because 
of the role that CSOs have in deepening democracy, that this study highlights the problem of 
donor funding, because the work of the TAC is indispensable and moreover stifled without 
sufficient financial backing, even in the presence of a myriad of other resources mentioned in 
this study.  
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CHAPTER 5 
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION OF STUDY 
5.1. Introduction 
Having read numerous media publications reporting the closure of key CSOs in South Africa, 
and the rising ramifications of the global financial crisis, this stimulated an interest in exploring 
this phenomenon. This study sought to understand and explore the nature of the influence of 
the global financial crisis on South Africa’s CSOs with a focus on non-governmental 
organisations in particular, and the prospects for deepening democracy. The research question 
guiding this study was: what are the challenges facing civil society groups in South Africa, with a 
focus on the global financial crisis? In addition, this study asked a narrower question: has the 
global financial crisis influenced democracy in South Africa? This chapter is designated to 
summarise and assemble the different aspects and findings of the study. This will be done as 
follows: The first part outlines the progression of this research study, by concisely reviewing the 
rationale, aims, purpose, research question and design of the study, as well as the conceptual 
theoretical framework utilised. The second part of this chapter evaluates this study and the 
findings of the two case studies. The third part discusses possible implications of the study as 
well as that of democracy in South Africa and indicates possible areas for future research on the 
subject. 
5.2. Overview of the study 
Chapter one served as an introduction to the research study. It presented an overview of the 
global financial crisis which began in 2008. The global financial crisis was brought about by an 
interplay of valuation and liquidity problems in the U.S. banking system in 2008. The bursting of 
the U.S. housing bubble, which peaked in 2007, caused the values of securities tied to U.S. real 
estate pricing to plummet, bringing devastation to financial institutions globally. Difficulties in 
bank solvency, declines in credit availability and wounded investor confidence had an impact on 
global stock markets, where securities suffered large losses during 2008 and early 2009. 
Economies worldwide lost pace during this period, as credit constricted and international trade 
tapered. Governments and national banks acted in response to this occurrence with 
unparalleled fiscal stimulus, monetary policy development and institutional bailouts (Naude, 
2009:2-3). As a developing country, South Africa was affected by the economic recession. 
Several sectors were influenced by the economic crisis, and the civil society sector is one. 
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Pertaining to the civil society sector, the past three or four years have seen a number of NGOs 
fall under strain, financially and being on the verge of collapse due to a lack of financial support. 
In this chapter two sets of literature were reviewed: first the pioneering literature of Almond and 
Verba (1963) on civic culture as well as extensive literature on the role of civil society; civil 
society and democracy; and more specifically civil society in South Africa. The literature 
reviewed, as the desktop part of the study, prepared the ground for the empirical part. 
In addition, this chapter identified the problem statement: in light of the role of civil society in 
deepening democracy. NGOs, as a type of civil society organisations may be beginning to 
experience the negative effects of the global financial crisis in South Africa. This research 
therefore sought to explore the influence of the global financial crisis and other challenges on 
South Africa’s NGO’s, with a particular focus on Idasa as well as the TAC. 
 
The rationale of this study has its roots in the fact that civil society is an important feature in 
democracy. This study holds that in South Africa, civil society is even more important, seeing as 
though the ruling party, the ANC has overwhelming political power resulting in a dominant party 
system. In the absence of a strong opposition party, a robust civil society is not only necessary, 
but mandatory. Thus, the relevance of the study has been to assist in the evaluation of the role 
that civil society has played in shaping South Africa’s young democracy and what it will mean 
for democracy if key CSOs are to shut down. 
 
Further, the first chapter established the research method and research design of the study. The 
study was explorative in nature and relied on qualitative data with the design type being the use 
of case studies. The study was explorative in nature, allowing for the systematic investigation of 
relationships among the variables of the study. In addition, the research design was chosen to 
consist of a data-gathering method using primary data obtained by means of in-depth interviews 
with key informants from the two case studies (NGOs): Idasa and the TAC. 
 
This chapter also contained the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the key concepts 
and variables of the study. The dependent variable (civil society) was conceptualised. This 
study conceptualised civil society as formal and informal associations and networks in society, 
which exist outside the state, for example, NGOs, trade unions, churches, media, research 
institutions and think tanks, women’s groups, environmental groups and human rights 
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organisations. This definition does not include markets and it is of importance to note that civil 
society is different to society, that is the general populace, and it differs from political society, 
which includes political parties. Further, the dependent variable was operationalised in terms of 
Heywood’s (2007) framework which argues for five resources CSOs need in order to exert their 
influence, namely: 
1. public sympathy for the group and its goals 
2. the size of its membership or activist base 
3. its financial strength and organisational capabilities 
4. its ability to use sanctions that some way inconvenience or disrupt governance 
5. personal or institutional links it may have to political parties or governance bodies. 
 
Another important matter to consider is the importance of civil society for democracy. Scholars 
such as Huntington, Diamond, Putman, Linz and Lipset for example consider civil society as key 
for the development and preservation of secure democracy in developing countries. Civil society 
has a vital role in ensuring that democratic prerequisites and rights are upheld by the 
government by holding those in government accountable and responsive to their constituents. 
Chapter two served to build a foundation for the study, and provide a historical account of civil 
society in South Africa. In essence, this chapter provided a detailed overview of civil society in 
South Africa and its contributions to deepening democracy. This chapter started by presenting 
theories of group politics, namely pluralism and corporatism, with the aim of underscoring the 
various roles of CSOs in their relationship to the state. The evolution of civil society in South 
Africa was explained, by looking at civil society during apartheid, during the transition to 
democracy and in the democratic era. Further, chapter two put forward methods of influence, 
strategies and resources that civil society in South Africa have at their disposal and that they 
employ. This chapter outlined the five resources that CSOs can use to exert their influence, with 
a focus on financial resources. This was looked at through democracy aid to South Africa; the 
boom years as well as the current years where there has been a decline. 
 
This chapter found that pluralism places emphasis on the beneficial effects of social and cultural 
diversity of having many different institutions, values, groups and ways of life. Pluralism also 
encourages constitutional methods of incorporating different perspectives on public policy 
matters. Corporatism on the other hand, accentuates the incorporation of certain groups in 
society into the decision-making process for a mutually beneficial outcome. The CSOs gain from 
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having to share in political power, and the state benefits from the cooperation and expertise of 
groups such as business and labour in the execution of policy decisions.   
In this chapter it was discovered that the presence of a vibrant civil society and the appropriate 
structural conditions such as political culture, economic development and international 
involvement, provided a conducive environment for political liberalisation and the corrosion of 
the apartheid system. In addition, chapter two found that in the democratic South Africa, a 
vibrant civil society provides an avenue for popular will and demands to be expressed. CSOs 
provide avenues for those matters that may not have been given precedence by political parties, 
to be put on the public agenda. Numerous modes of engagement are used by CSOs in their 
interaction with government and spaces of civil society engagement have broadened post-
apartheid. This chapter also found that a pluralist relationship between civil society and 
government exists, and the form that this pluralist relationship takes, is contingent on the issue 
at hand. 
Chapters three and four contained the main analysis of the study and built on Heywood’s 
framework on CSO resources. These two chapters served to report the findings of the interview 
conducted with key informants at Idasa and the TAC. The first case-study, Idasa was examined 
in chapter three and in chapter four, the TAC. These two chapters examined Idasa and the TAC 
by looking at each organisation’s historical context, its present-day programmes and operations 
as well as its contributions to democracy. In addition, this chapter reported the findings of the 
interview and provided an analysis of the findings through the lenses of Heywood’s framework, 
essentially a summary of the extent to which Idasa and the TAC has fulfilled the utilisation of the 
resources that it has available was presented. 
 
For Idasa, the study found the following: Public sympathy for Idasa and its goals is on the 
decline, though it was high in the initial years of democracy in South Africa, it has decreased in 
recent times. With regards to the size of membership and activist base, this study found that 
Idasa is a non-membership NGO. However, the fact that this organisation is a non-membership 
NGO does not reduce its influence and the advancement of its interests and goals. Pertaining to 
financial strength, this appears to be a resource that Idasa lacks significantly, particularly in 
recent times; so much that the organisation has been forced to close-down its Cape Town office 
and retrench its staff members. Idasa has made use of lobbying and litigation. However, in the 
absence of financial strength, litigation avenues are weakened, because litigation is costly 
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endeavour. Finally, with regards to personal or institutional links with political parties, this study 
discovered that Idasa does not have or wish to have any formal institutional links with political 
parties, as this, the organisation believes would bring into question its credibility.  
For the TAC the study found the following: The study also uncovered that the TAC, as with 
Idasa, exhibited pluralistic tendencies in its interactions with the government. This is evident in 
the lobbying and litigation strategies employed by the TAC, but also in the partnerships that 
have also been cultivated between the government and the organisation. With regards to 
financial resources: as Idasa struggles with financial resources, so does the TAC. This is 
attributed to the global recession which has made funding for NGOs less. This study found that 
one of the organisation’s largest donors (GFATM) delayed a grant by several months which 
placed the organisation in what they call a ‘funding crisis’. Reasons for this delay in funding are 
complex, however, internal donor problems were revealed as one of the causes for the delay 
among other issues. Pertaining to membership, the TAC has seen its membership size 
decrease, however this has not stifled the activist base, for the TAC has been able to mobilise 
individuals beyond their activist base. Additionally, with the rollout of ARV treatment in South 
Africa, membership has decreased. Finally, regarding public sympathy for the organisation and 
its goals, the TAC has seen high levels of public sympathy. The elevated public sympathy for 
the TAC is bolstered by the fact that its major campaign (access to treatment for individuals 
living with HIV/Aids) was embedded within the framework of human rights.  
 
5.3. Evaluation of the study  
This section finalises the thesis with an evaluation of the research study. It consists of three 
main parts: one that focuses on answering the research questions, the second discusses 
implications and recommendations for future research, and the third reports the key findings of 
the interviews conducted. Before proceeding, it is important to note a few matters first. The 
majority of the articles and studies presented in the literature analysis in chapters one and two 
were found to be very useful in serving as a foundation for this research. The use of primary 
data in the research study was ideal, for insider and expert insight on the two NGOs examined, 
added an invaluable contribution on the analysis of the study. However, in light of only one 
organisation, Idasa, being able to meet for a face-to-face interview, this may have had a bearing 
on the depth of the interview via correspondence due to the TAC not being available for an in-
depth interview. Nevertheless, the TAC key informant allowed for follow up questions, also via 
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correspondence after the initial questionnaire was mailed. This alleviated the concerns 
regarding the profundity of the interview to a great extent. 
 
During the data analysis, this study focused on identifying themes from the interview data, 
namely the five resources identified in Heywood’s framework. Through identifying themes, this 
study was able to ascertain the information required, and also by using two sources of 
information, this study was able to look for repetition in the data, or supporting evidence or 
differences from the two sources. These two case studies are similar in that one could argue 
they were victims of their success long before the onset of the global financial crisis. Perhaps 
the realisation of its goals meant that these two organisations could no longer hold on to donor 
funding. The global financial crisis may have merely been an intensifying element in an already 
adverse situation. The differences, on the other hand rest on the fact that Idasa is a non-
membership group, while the TAC has membership. Nevertheless, the TAC’s membership is a 
source of mobilisation, not revenue. This inadvertedly, places both organisations in the same 
position in terms of donor income, for they both reply on it for the functioning of the 
organisations. 
 
5.3.1. Answering the research question 
The central question asked in this study was: what are the challenges facing civil society 
organisations in South Africa, with a focus on the global financial crisis? The secondary 
question was: has the global financial crisis influenced democracy in South Africa? Civil society 
groups are an integral part of our democracy, thus, what does the demise of civil society 
organisations, due to a lack of funding, mean for participatory, representative and accountable 
democracy? These questions were answered by examining two CSOs, Idasa and the TAC by 
secondary data analysis. 
In answering the research questions posed, this study learned that civil society groups are faced 
with a number of challenges. A challenge that seemed to be salient, at least in the two CSOs 
examined, was finances in the form of donor funding. In light of the second and narrower 
question this study sought to answer, it became apparent that the global financial crisis has 
indeed influenced CSOs and correspondingly influenced democracy, for the role of CSOs is 
democratic in nature. The fact that some NGOs have been adversely affected by the financial 
crisis, it inadvertently undermines the democratic role that CSOs fulfil. When looking at the third 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
84 
 
and fourth broader question of this study, the invaluable role that civil society has played 
historically and in present-day in South Africa is highlighted. The political pressure that civil 
society was able to exert through mass mobilisation put pressure on the apartheid state to adopt 
measures of political liberalisation and to consider negotiations as a possibility to bringing an 
end to the pervasive political strife. In addition, civil society contributed to the development of 
the rudimentary, yet crucial prerequisites for democratic pluralism. In the democratic system that 
South Africa has since 1994 adopted, elected officials are meant to represent the interests of 
their constituents in government, so elections are needed, though not sufficient for a well-
functioning democracy. A vibrant civil society provides another avenue for popular will and 
demands to be articulated, particularly between elections and outside of political parties. 
 
Essentially, this study maintains that civil society is a distinguishing feature of democratic 
regimes. Democratic governments are expected to be responsive to the wishes of the people, 
and civil society is one way in which people can make their wishes known. CSOs facilitate 
participation and are therefore a second link between citizens and government in democratic 
states. Civil society not only strengthens representation and broadens the scope of political 
participation; it also checks government power and promotes debate and discussion. With the 
possible demise of such important advocates and protectors of South Africa’s democracy, it 
could mean that democracy becomes a system in theory and not in practice. It could also mean 
that democracy is merely what happens at elections every five years and more ominously, this 
scenario could translate into a ‘democracy without the people’. Therefore, in the absence of a 
strong opposition party (as is the case in South Africa), a robust civil society is not only 
necessary, but mandatory. 
 
Challenges for CSOs in South Africa 
From the two case studies and from supporting secondary data, it was found that that the key 
challenges faced by civil society in South Africa are as follows:  
 Funding shortages due to an increasing scarcity of donor funding, resulting from the 
global financial crisis, as well as allocation of funding away from middle income 
developing countries, like South Africa, towards low income developing countries.  
 Human resource challenges as people move from CSOs into more secure incomes in 
business and government.  
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 In addition, owing to the limited understanding of the continued role of CSOs in a 
democracy, this has resulted in a decrease in public sympathy for the work that these 
two organisations perform. 
It is to be noted that although this study is making general conclusions, it recognises the 
limitations of case-studies. Generalisations cannot always be made. However, these case 
studies were used to complement secondary data that was already available. 
5.3.2. Implications and recommendations for future research  
The significance and implications of this study are extensive. This study has contributed to the 
discussions on the role of civil society and wider analyses of the distribution of power and the 
nature of the state. A discussion on group politics with reference to pluralist and corporatist 
theories was important for it brought to light civil society’s wide variations in form and character. 
In addition, it is important in that it underscored the various roles of CSOs in their relationship to 
the state.  
The CSO’s available and utilised resources for the exertion of their influence by CSOs in 
democratic regimes has far reaching consequences for not only South Africa’s civil society, but 
African states as a whole, and  other states that have dominant party systems and fledgling 
democracies. 
While this research focused on resources, predominantly financial resources, other resources 
that CSOs have at their disposal could be examined for future studies, for instance, access to 
an independent media, links with international CSOs, and the utilisation of social media and 
technology. Therefore, the possibility of incorporating these factors into a more comprehensive 
framework could be explored. In addition, fundraising efforts for CSOs is another possible future 
research area. Many CSOs are fully dependent on donations and grants, thus, it would be 
appropriate to explore means to ensure self-sufficiency of CSOs, especially in light of the 
economic climate that society is under. In addition, this study interviewed the receivers of the 
donor funding, possible future studies could include the donor funders’ expressed grounds for 
decreasing, delaying or halting donations to certain CSOs. This could potentially open a new 
dimension on the topic of donor funding, democracy aid, development aid and so forth. 
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5.4. Conclusion 
To return to the opening considerations about the influence of the global financial crisis: the 
present-day world is one of difficult compromises as a result of shrinking budgets. The 
economic environment is becoming progressively stark and the question or rather the concerns 
that this study has pointed to are warranted. 
Civil society has the power to shape and inform the norms, discourse, debates and most 
importantly laws and policies in South Africa. Government is required to carry out public 
consultations on new laws and policies before they are adopted.  Additionally, while adopting 
good laws and policies is important, this in itself is not sufficient. An active civil society is 
necessary in ensuring that these policies are implemented. The TAC and Idasa have 
demonstrated that civil society can and ought to and play an active role in ensuring that the 
government responds to the needs of the citizens. With the reduction, delay and or halt in 
financial backing for such important advocates and protectors of South Africa’s democracy and 
Constitution, it would mean that democracy is a system whereby citizens are passive 
bystanders in their own lives.  
Active citizenship and participation, as displayed by the two case studies’ actions, fortifies and 
deepens the quality of democratic governance. It is because of the role that CSOs have in 
deepening democracy, that this study highlights the problem of donor funding, because the work 
of civil society is indispensable and moreover stifled without sufficient financial backing, even in 
the presence of a myriad of other resources mentioned in this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
87 
 
Bibliography 
 
Primary sources: Interviews 
Tomlinson, C. (catherine.tomlinson@tac.org.za), 16 September 2012. Re: Interview questions 
for MA thesis. Email to N. Masiko (miss.masiko@gmail.com). 
Verwey, L. 2012. Personal Interview. 20 August 2012, Cape Town. 
Secondary sources: 
Adam, H. and Moodley, K. 1993. The negotiated revolution: Society and politics in post- 
apartheid South Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Aitkinson, D., Goetz, G. Rapoo, T, Reitzes, M and Shubane, K. 1996. 'Changing models of civil 
society in South Africa', Mimeo, Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies. 
 
Aitchison, J. 2000. ‘NGOs, the anti-apartheid struggle and PACSA’, Innovation Number 20, 
June 2000. 
Alexander, T. 1999. Coal, Control and Class Experience in South Africa's Rand Revolt of 1922. 
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 19(1):31-45. 
 
Almond, G. and Verba, S. 1963. The Civic culture. Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 
Armony, A. 2004. The Dubious Link: Civic Engagement and Democratization. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press.  
Babbie, E. and Mouton, J. 2005. The practice of social research. Cape Town: Oxford 
University Press Southern Africa. 
 
Babbie, E., Mouton, J., Vorster, P., and Prozesky, B. (eds). 2008. The practice of social 
research. Cape Town: Oxford University Press Southern Africa. 
 
Baker, G. 2002. ‘Civil society and democratic theory: Alternative voices’. Routledge series on 
Innovations on Political Theory. London: Routledge. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
88 
 
Ballard, R., Habib A., Ngcobo, D. Valodia I. 2005. ‘Globalisation, marginalisation , and the 
contemporary social movements in South Africa’. Journal of African Affairs 104(417): 615-634. 
 
Barkan, J. 1994. 'Can established democracies nurture democracy abroad? Lessons from 
Africa', Michigan State University Working Paper on Political Reform in Africa No 10. 
 
Beckman, B. 1993. 'The liberation of civil society: neo-liberal ideology and political theory'. 
Review of African Political Economy, 58: 20-33. 
 
Bodibe, K. 2012. ‘How lack of funding affects Aids programmes living with AIDS’ [Online]. 
Available: http://www.health-e.org.za/news/article.php?uid=20033680 Accessed: 11 September 
2012 
Boraine, A. 1994. ‘A democratic alternative: a brief history of Idasa’. In I. Liebenberg, F. Lortan, 
B. Nel, G. van der Westhuizen (eds). The long march: the story of the struggle of liberation in 
South Africa.  Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council. 
 
Breytenbach, W.  2006. ‘The presidencies of Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki compared: 
implications for democracy in South Africa’, Africa Insight, 36 (3):173-185. 
 
Carothers, T. 1997. 'Democracy assistance: the question of strategy', Democratization, 
4(3):109-32. 
 
Carothers, T. 1999. Aiding democracy abroad: The learning curve. Washington, DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace. 
 
Carothers,T. 2009. Democracy Assistance vs. Developmental? Journal of Democracy, 20 (1):5-
19. 
 
Cohen, J. and Arato, A. 1992. Civil Society and Political Theory. Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
89 
 
Cooper, D. 1996. ‘War of Position and Movement: Reactions on Central Europe 1917-1921 and 
the South African Trade Union Movement 1973-1994’, South African Journal of Sociology, 
27(2): 55-72. 
Coppedge, M. and Reinicke, W. 1990. ‘Measuring polyarchy’. Studies in Comparative 
International Development, 25(1), 51-72. 
Dahl, R. (1956. A preface to democratic theory. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Dahl, R. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Dahl, R. and Lindblom, C. 1953. Politics, economics and welfare. D. George (ed). New York: 
Harper and Brothers. 
 
Deghaye, N., and Whitehead, A. 2012. ‘HIV budgets come under pressure’. [Online] Available: 
http://mg.co.za/article/2012-09-21-00-hiv-budgets-come-under-pressure Accessed: 12 October 
2012. 
 
De Jager, N. 2006. ‘The South Africa government and the application of co-optive power’. 
Politikon, South Africa Journal of Political Studies, 33(1): 101–112. 
De Jager, 2013. ‘South Africa: A democracy in the balance’, In N. De Jager, and P.du Toit 
(eds.). Friend or foe? Dominant party systems in southern Africa. Cape Town: UCT Press. 
Desai, A. 2004. ‘Mandela's Legacy’. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.isreview.org/issues/35/mandelaslegacy.shtml Accessed: 28 October 2012 
 
Diamond, L. 1992. ‘Introduction: Civil society and the struggle for democracy’. In L. Diamond 
(ed.). The Democratic revolution: Struggles for freedom and democracy in the developing world. 
New York: Freedom House. 
Diamond, L. 1995. ‘Promoting democracy in Africa: US. and international policies in transition’. 
In J. Harbeson, D. Rothchild (eds.). Africa in World Politics. Post-Cold War Challenges. Boulder: 
Westview Press. 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
90 
 
Diamond, L. 1996. Promoting democracy in the 1990s: Actors and instruments, Issues and 
Imperatives. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. 
 
Diamond, L. 1999. Developing democracy: Toward consolidation. Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
University Press.  
Dryzek, J. and Dunleavy, P. 2009. Theories of the democratic state. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan Ltd. 
Etzioni, A. 1995. The spirit of community: Rights, responsibilities, and the communitarian 
agenda, New edition. London: Fontana Press.  
Fakir, E. 2004. 'Institutional Restructuring, State-Civil Society Relationships and Social 
Movements', Development Update 5(1):1-28.  
 
Fine, R. 1992. ‘Civil society theory and the politics of transition in South Africa', Review of 
African Political Economy, 55:71-83. 
 
Forde, F. 2011. An Inconvenient Youth: Julius Malema and the new ANC. Johannesburg: 
Picador Africa. 
Fox, J. 2000. ‘Assessing binational civil society coalitions: Lessons from the Mexico-US 
experience’. Presented to Latin American Studies Association, Miami, March, 2000, Miami, FL. 
Friedman, S. 1987. Building Tomorrow Today: African Workers in Trade Unions, 1970-84. 
Johannesburg: Ravan. 
 
Friedman, S. 2002. ‘Equity in the age of informality: Labour markets and redistributive politics in 
South Africa’ , Working Paper 160 (July). University of Sussex, Institute for Development 
Studies. 
Friedman, S. and Mottiar, S. 2004. ‘A Moral to the Tale: The Treatment Action Campaign and 
the Politics of HIV/AIDS’. [Online]. Available: 
http://ccs.ukzn.ac.za/files/Friedman%20Mottier%20TAC%20Research%20Report%20Short.pdf 
Accessed: 18 October 2012. 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
91 
 
Friedman, S. and Mottiar, S. 2005. ‘A rewarding engagement? The Treatment Action Campaign 
and the politics of HIV/Aids’. Politics and Society, 33 (4), 511-565. 
Gallie, W. 1956. ‘Essentially contested concepts’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian society, 
56:167-198. 
Garrett, L. 2007. ‘The Challenge of Global Health’. Foreign Affairs. no. January. [Online]. 
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/62268/laurie-garrett/the-challenge-of-global-
health Accessed: 28 September 2012. 
Gibson, S. 1999. 'Aid and politics in Malawi and Kenya: political conditionality and donor support 
to the ‘‘human rights, democracy and governance’’ sector'. In L. Wohlgemuth et al (eds). 
Common Security and Civil Society in Africa. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. 
 
Gillespie, C. 1990. ‘Models of Democratic Transition in South America: Negotiated Reform 
versus Democratic Rupture’. In D. Ethier, (ed). Democratic Transition and Consolidation in 
Southern Europe, Latin America and South East Asia. London: Macmillan. 
 
Greenberg, S. and Ndlovu, N. 2004. ‘Civil society relationships’. in: Development Update. 
Mobilising for Change. The rise of the new social movements in South Africa, INTERFUND, (2) 
23-48. 
 
Greenstein, R. 2003. ‘Civil society, social movements and power in South Africa’ [Online] 
Available: http://general.uj.ac.za/sociology/Greenstein.pdf Accessed: 24 March 2012. 
Guise, D. 1993. Freedom for All. Auckland: David Guise. 
 
Habib, A. 2003. ‘State-civil society relations in post-Apartheid South Africa’, in State of the 
Nation: South Africa 2003-2004. Daniel, J., Habib, A. and Southall, R. (eds), Cape Town: HSRC 
Press.  
 
Habib, A. 2005. ‘State-civil society relations in post-apartheid South Africa’, Social Research, 72 
(3): 671-689. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
92 
 
Hague, R. and Harrop, M. 2004. Comparative government and politics: An introduction. London: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Havel, V., Klaus, V. and Pithart, P. 1996. ‘Rival Visions’, Journal of Democracy, 7 (1):12-23 
Friedman, S. 2006. ‘Participatory governance and citizen action in post-apartheid South Africa’. 
Geneva, International Institute of Labour Studies, Discussion Paper /164/2006 
Hearn, J. 1998. 'Foreign political aid, democratization, and civil society in South Africa since 
1994', mimeo. 
 
Hearn, J. 2000. Aiding Democracy? Donors and Civil Society in South Africa, Third World 
Quarterly, 21 (5): 815-830. 
 
Heinrich, V. 2001. ‘The role of NGOs in strengthening the foundations of South African 
democracy’, International Journal of Non-profit Organisations, 12 (1): 1-15. 
Henriks, C. 2002. ‘The ambiguous role of civil society in deliberative democracy’. Social and 
Political Theory Program Research School of Social Sciences Australian National University. 
Refereed paper presented to the Jubilee conference of the Australasian Political Studies 
Association Australian National University, Canberra, October 2002. 
Heywood, M. 2003. ‘Preventing mother to child HIV transmission in South Africa: Background, 
strategy and outcomes of the Treatment Action Campaign’s case against the Minister of Health’, 
South African Journal of Human Rights, 19(2): 278: 315. 
 
Heywood, M. 2005. ‘Shaping, Making and Breaking the Law in TAC’s Campaign for a 
National Treatment Plan: Democratizing Development: The Politics of Socioeconomic 
 
Heywood, A. 2007. Politics. Third Edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Howell, J. and Pearce, J. 2001. Civil Society and Development: A Critical Exploration. Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers.. 
 
Huntington, S .1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the late Twentieth Century 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
93 
 
Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press. 
Huntington, S. 1996. Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven: Yale University Press 
 
Innes, D. 1992. ‘Labour Relations in the 1990's’. In D. Innes, M. Kentridge, and K. Perold, (eds). 
Power and Profit: Politics, Labour, and Business in South Africa. Cape Town: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Institute for Democracy, 1989, Annual Report. 
 
Institute for Democracy, 1990. ‘Democracy in action’, Cape Town: Idasa. 
 
Institute for Democracy, Annual Report, 1994. Cape Town: Idasa. 
 
Institute for Democracy, Annual Report, 1995. Cape Town: Idasa. 
 
Institute for Democracy, 2012. [Online]. Available: http://www.idasa.org/about_us/ Accessed: 13 
March 2012. 
Inyathelo, 2011. ‘Civil society support for the seedy under yhreat’. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ngopulse.org/press-release/civil-society-support-needy-under-threat Accessed: 23 
March 2012.  
Jacobs, S and Johnson, K. 2007. ‘Media, Social Movements and the State: Competing Images 
of HIV/AIDS in South Africa’, African Studies Quarterly, 9(4): 127-152. 
 
Jakobsen, G. 1996. ‘Denmark-South Africa: The Decades from Resistance to reconstruction’. 
Johannesburg: Ibis/INTERFUND. 
John, P. Liu, H. and Fieldhouse, E. 2010. ‘The civic culture in Britain and America fifty years on’. 
Institute for Social Change Working Papers, (IPEG Paper 2010-06): 1-35.  
Jones, P. 2005. ‘A test of governance: Rights-Based Struggles and the Politics of HIV/Aids 
Policy in South Africa’, Political Geography, 24: 419-447. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
94 
 
Kabemba, C. and Friedman, S. 2001. Partnership and its problems: the Institute for Democracy 
in South Africa, democratisation strategy, and foreign donor aid. Johannesburg, Centre for 
Policy Studies. 
 
Karis, T and Gerhart, G. 1997. From Protest to Challenge, Volume: Nadir and Resurgence, 
1964-1979. Pretoria: Unisa Press. 
Keane, J. 2008. Civil society, definitions and approaches. International Encyclopaedia of Civil 
Society, New York: Springer books. 
Kihato, C, Rapoo, T, 1999. ‘An independent Voice? A survey of civil society organisations in 
South Africa, their funding, and their influence over the policy process’, Research Report no 67, 
Centre for Policy Studies, 1-23. 
 
Landell-Mills, P. 1992. 'Governance, cultural change, and empowerment', The Journal of 
Modern African Studies, 30(4): 543-567. 
 
Landsberg, C. 1994. 'Directing from the stalls? The international community and the South 
African negotiation forum', In S. Friedman and D. Atkinson (eds), The Small Miracle: South 
Africa's Negotiated Settlement. Randburg: Ravan Press. 
 
Lawrence, R. 1994. ‘Introduction: From Soweto to Codesa’. In S. Friedman, and  D. Atkinson, 
(eds). The Small miracle. South Africa's Negotiated Settlement. South African Review 7, 
Johannesburg: Ravan Press. 
 
Lehmbruch, G. 1979. ‘Consociational Democracy, Class Conflict, and New Corporatism’. In P. 
Schmitter and G. Lehmbruch (eds). Trends towards corporatism intermediation. California: 
Sage. 
Levy, M. 2007. From Dakar to democracy: a history of Idasa. Cape Town: Idasa 
Lincoln, A. 1863. Speech delivered for Gettysburg Address, Boston, Massachusetts, November 
19. 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
95 
 
Linz, J. and Stepan, A. 1996. Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University 
Press. 
Louw, E. 2004. The Rise, Fall, and Legacy of Apartheid. Westport CT: Praeger Publishers. 
 
Macun, I. 1983. ‘South African Unions: Still Growing’? South African Labour Bulletin, 17(4):48-
53. 
 
Marx, A. 1992. Lessons of Struggle: South African Internal Opposition 1960-1990. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Mbali, M. 2005. ‘The Treatment Action Campaign and the History of Rights-Based, Patient-
Driven HIV/AIDS Activism in South Africa’, In P. Jones and K. Stokke (eds). Democratising 
Development: The Politics of Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa. Leiden and Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff. 
 
Michie, J. and Padayachee, V. (eds). 1997. The Political Economy of South Africa's Transition. 
London: Harcourt Brace. 
Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others. Constitutional court 
Case: (No 1) (CCT9/02) [2002] ZACC 16; 2002 (5) SA 703; 2002 (10) BCLR 1075 (5 July 2002) 
Thom, A. 2012. ‘Global Fund crisis: SA projects face closure’. [Online] Available: 
http://www.health-e.org.za/news/article.php?uid=20033421 Accessed: 1 October 2012 
Mouton, J. 2004. How to succeed in your Master’s and Doctoral studies: A South African guide 
and resource book. Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers. 
Muchie, M, 2004. ‘Africa integration in and for civil society: Bulletin 3’. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ccs/default.asp?5,50,5,321  Accessed: 4 March 2012.  
Nattrass, N. 2007. ‘Modelling the relationship between antiretroviral treatment and HIV 
prevention: Limitations of the Spectrum AIDS Impact Model in a changing policy environment’, 
African Journal of AIDS Research, 6 (2): 129-137. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
96 
 
Nattrass, N. and Gonsalves, G. 2009. ‘Economics and the Backlash against AIDS-Specific 
Funding’. [Online]. Available: 
http://photos.pih.org/inforesources/IHSJ_Stony_Point_Conference_2009/Economics_and_the_
Backlash_Against_AIDS-Specific_Funding_N.Nattrass_&_G.Gonsalves.pdf   
Accessed: 28 September 2012 
 
Naude, W. 2009. ‘The Financial Crisis of 2008 and the Developing Countries’. UNU World 
Institute for Development Economics Research Discussion Paper No. 2009/01. 
Nicholson, Z. 2012. ‘Idasa, Black Sash lose millions in funding’. Cape Times, 12 February. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/idasa-black-sash-lose-millions-in-funding-
1.1225924 Accessed: 19 March 2012. 
Noyoo, N. 2000. ‘From resistance to development: civil society and democracy in post-apartheid 
South Africa’. Scottish Community Development Journal, 6, 35-42. 
 
O’ Donnell, G. and Schmitter, P. 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative  
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Volume 4. Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press. 
 
Olsen, G. 1998. 'Europe and the promotion of democracy in post-cold war Africa: how serious is 
Europe and for what reasons?', African Affairs, 97(388): 343-367. 
 
Oxfam. 2001. Policy Report: South Africa v. the Drug Giants. [Online].  Available:  
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/health/drugcomp_sa.html 
Accessed: 25 September 2012 
 
The Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics. 2009. McLean, I. and McMillan, A. (eds.). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Panitch, L. 1980. Recent theorisations of corporatism: Reflects on a growth industry’, British 
Journal of Sociology, 31(2): 119-146 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
97 
 
Power, S. 2003. ‘The AIDS Rebel’. The New Yorker, 19 May. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2003/05/19/030519fa_fact_power Accessed: 1 October 
2012. 
Plus News, 2012. ‘Global Fund monies finally released’. [Online]. Available:  
http://www.plusnews.org/Report/94927/SOUTH-AFRICA-Global-Fund-monies-finally-released 
Accessed: 30 September 2012. 
 
Putnam, R. 1993. Making Democracy Work : Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Randod, K. 2007. ‘State-Civil Society Relations in South Africa: Some Lessons from 
Engagement’. Centre for Policy Studies South Africa 20(7): 1-26 
 
Rapoo, T. 2010. ‘Funding Crisis for research NGOs in South Africa looming larger than ever’. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.ngopulse.org/article/funding-crisis-research-ngos-south-africa-
looming-larger-ever Accessed: 6 March 2012. 
 
Republic of South Africa. 1997. The Non-profit Organisations Act 71 of 1997.‎Pretoria‎:
Government‎printer. 
 
Richards, J. 2007. ‘Spirit of Africa’. Vanity Fair. July. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/features/2007/07/spirit-of-africa-slideshow-
200707_slideshow_the-agitator--zackie-achmat_15 Accessed: 11 September 2012. 
 
Robins, S. 2004. ‘Long Live Zackie, Long Live: AIDS Activism, Science and Citizenship after 
Apartheid’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 30(3): 651-672. 
 
Robinson, M. and  Friedman, S. 2005. ‘Civil society, democratisation and foreign aid in Africa’, 
IDS Discussion Paper 383. Brighton, United Kingdom: Institute for Development Studies. 
 
Robinson, M. 1996a. 'Strengthening civil society through foreign political aid', ESCOR Research 
Report R6234 , Brighton: IDS 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
98 
 
 
Robinson, M. 1996b. 'The role of aid donors in strengthening civil society', In A. Clayton (ed.) 
NGOs, Civil Society and the State: Building Democracy in Transitional Societies. Oxford: 
INTRAC. 
 
Rubin, H, and Rubin, I. 1995. Qualitative interviewing: The art of hearing data. Thousand Oaks. 
CA: Sage. 
Sadie, Y. 2006. ‘Political parties, interest groups and social movements’, In, A. Venter and, C. 
Landsberg (eds). Govenment and politics in the new South Africa. Pretoria: Van Schaik 
publishers.  
Scalet, S. and Schmidtz, D. 2002. ‘State Civil Society and Classical Liberalism’, In Civil Society 
and Government, N. Rosenblum and R. Post (eds). Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Schmitter, P. 1974. ‘Still the Century of Corporatism?’ Review of Politics 36: 85-131. 
Schmitter, P.and Lehmbruch, G. 1979. Trends toward corporatist intermediation. London: Sage 
Publications. 
Schmitter, P. O'Donnel, G. and Whitehead, L. 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. 
Baltimore: John Hopkins. 
 
Schmitter, P. and Karl, T. 1991 'What democracy is … and is not', Journal of Democracy, 2(3): 
75-88 
 
Schlemmer, L. 2005. ‘Insidious forces that threaten democracy’, Focus, 39:6-10 
 
Seligman, A. 2002. ‘Civil Society as Idea and Ideal’, In C. Chambers and W. Kymlicka 
Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society (eds). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Sisk, T. 2002. ‘Global Networks for Democracy Promotion: Enhancing Local Governance’. 
Denver, CO: United Nations Vision Project on Global Public Policy Networks. 
Smith, A. 1759. The theory of moral sentiments. London: A. Millar. 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
99 
 
Statistics South Africa. 2011. Mid-year population estimates. 31 July. Statistical Release P0302. 
Pretoria: Statistics South Africa. 
 
Smout, J. 2011. Learning From the Treatment Action Campaign. Think Africa Press. [Online]. 
Available: http://thinkafricapress.com/south-africa/learning-treatment-action-campaign 
Accessed: 28 September 2012 
South Africa. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act no. 108 of 1996. 
 
South African Government Information. 2009. Framework for South Africa’s response to the 
international economic crisis. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=96381. Accessed: 27 May 2010. 
South African Reserve Bank. 2010. Financial Stability Review. March 2010.[Online]. Available: 
http://www.reservebank.co.za/internet/Publication.nsf/LADV/69AA9021607E063B42257713004
7AB2F/$File/FSR+March+2010+with+bookmarks.pdf. Accessed: 10 June 2010.  
Sparks, A. 1990. The Mind of South Africa. New York: Ballantine Books 
 
Stacey, S and Aksartova, S. 2001. ‘The Foundations of Democracy: US Foundations 
Support for Civil Society in South Africa, 1988-1996’. Voluntas International Journal of  
Voluntary and Non-profit Organisations, 12 (4): 373-397 
 
Stepan, A. 1990. ‘On the Tasks of a Democratic Opposition’, Journal of Democracy, 1(2): 41-49. 
Swilling, M. 1990. ‘Political Transition, Development and the Role of Civil Society’, 
Africa Insight, 20(3): 151-160. 
 
Swilling, M. and Russell, B. 2002. ‘The Size and Scope of the Non-profit Sector in South Africa’. 
Co-published by the Graduate School of Public and Development Management, University of 
the Witwatersrand and The Centre for Civil Society, University of Natal.  
 
te Velde, D. 2008. ‘The global financial crisis and developing countries’. Overseas Development 
Institute Background Note October 2008.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
100 
 
Thomas, M. and Dorono, T. 2004. ‘The Treatment Action Campaign: Issue-organizing and 
social transformation in South Africa’, Social Policy, 35.1. 52(6). 
 
Treatment Action Campaign. 2008. Diary. 
 
Treatment Action Campaign, 2012. [Online]. Available: http://www.tac.org.za/community/about 
Accessed: 25 March 2012. 
USAID/South Africa. 1995. USAID/South Africa Briefing Book, Washington, DC: USAID 
 
Valenzuela, A. 1989. ‘Chile: Origins, Consolidation, and Breakdown of a Democratic Regime’. In 
L. Diamond, J. Linz and S. Lipset, (eds). Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America. 
Volume 4. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Venter, A. and Landsberg, C (eds). 2011. Government and politics in South Africa. Fourth 
Edition. Pretoria: Van Schaik. 
Wanyande, P. (1996) ‘The Media and Civil Society and Its Role in Democratic Transition in 
Kenya’, Africa Media Review. [Online]. Available: 
http://archive.lib.msu.edu/DMC/African%Journals/pdfs/africa%20media%20review/vol10no3/jam
r010003002.pdf Accessed: 24 March 2012. 
Webster, E. 1991. ‘Taking Labour Seriously: Sociology and Labour in South Africa’. South 
African Sociological Review, 4(1): 50-72. 
 
Welsh, D. 1994. ‘A comparative perspective on parties and government. In  South Africa’s crisis 
of constitutional democracy: can the U.S. constitute help?’ Licht, R. and De Villiers, B. (eds). 
Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.  
Widmann, N. 1997. ‘Aspects of the history of IDASA from 1986-1996: from rooting democracy 
via facilitation and negotiation to advocating democracy and multilateralism’. Thesis for an 
honours degree in history University of Cape Town. 
 
Williams D. and Young, T. 1994. 'Governance, the World Bank and liberal theory', Political 
Studies, 42(1): 84-100. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
101 
 
 
World Bank. 2009. ‘Averting a human crisis during the global downturn’. Policy options from the 
World Bank's Human Development Network. World Bank. 
 
Young, I. 2000. Democracy Inclusion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Yin, R. 1994. Case study research: Design and methods (2nd ed.). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 
Publishing. 
 
Zuma. J. 2010. ‘State of the nation address’. 2010. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2010/1002111905.htm. Accessed: 8 June 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
102 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTION: 
INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY 
 
Interviewer: Nomathamsanqa Masiko 
Interviewee: Len Verwey 
Dates: 20 August 2012 
Question 1: 
The first question asked was a general question, to better understand Idasa and the work that 
they do. 
 
Question: Briefly tell me about Idasa. (classification of organisation, what you do, programmes 
you’re involved in, when NGO started, why it started, etc.) 
 
Respondent: Idasa started in the mid-1980s as a means of finding a democratic alternative to 
South Africa. So initially it was a lot of facilitation of democratic dialogue between organisations 
that were quite polarised and the band ANC, and then you know white South Africa. Post 1994 
we are an organisation that in various ways tries to consolidate democracy in South Africa as 
well as in the rest of the continent. We understand democracy as consisting of democratic 
institutions, active citizenship and social justice. So the organisation head office is in Pretoria 
but we actually work across Africa these days in partnerships with African NGO’s as well. You 
know in a sense our roots are still here. So it’s really any kind of work that we feel contributes to 
the democracy. It’s a mix of research and advocacy work really. 
Question 2: 
The second question asked related to Heywood’s second resource, the size of membership or 
activist base. 
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Question: Tell me about the size of your membership/activist base. What is the composition of 
your base of support and has there been a steady growth over the years? 
Respondent: I don’t know that the term ‘base of support’ is so accurate for us. I mean we are an 
NGO. At the moment we are about 50 staff and in a range of partnership agreements with 
NGOs but we’re not a mass movement we never have been, we have always defined ourselves 
as an institute. We used to be an institute for democracy in South Africa, so I think we work at a 
slightly higher level in the sense that we’re not a grass-roots NGO, we tend to work more with 
policy-makers and other stake-holders at that level, and with a mass based movement. 
Question 3 
The third question asked was also a general question, seeking to better understand the 
organisation’s goals and priorities, with the ‘hidden intention’ of finding out if ‘the deepening of 
democracy’ is at all a priority for the organisation. 
Question: What are the key aims and goals of Idasa and would you say that these goals have 
been met? If yes or no, please motivate your answer. 
Respondent: The consolidation of democracy which is citizen empowerment, making the 
institutions more democratic, and also a society which is defined by social justice which for us 
means, if you look at South Africa: it means much less inequality, reducing poverty significantly, 
obviously creating jobs as well. Democracy is always a journey rather than a destination 
(somewhere, where you arrive). South Africa became a formal democracy in 1994, but I mean 
there are a lot of challenges obviously still, and even in countries that have established 
democracies we see in the global North, we see a lot of established democracies under threat in 
various ways these days, so this kind of work will always exist. And we would always like to 
contribute to it as well. 
Question 4 
The fourth question was seeking to understand the challenges facing the organisation, so as to 
see if those challenges have a great bearing in the organisation. Another concealed objective of 
this question was to find out if any of the resources Heywood speaks of creep up, particularly, 
the financial resources.  
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Question: What have been and/or are the key challenges facing Idasa in the attainment of the 
aforementioned goals? 
Respondent: Well, we’ve been around for, and are probably the oldest existing NGO in South 
Africa, I mean, it’s been 20 years now (since 1986). The challenges have probably changed 
over the years. The initial challenges were just trying to contribute to democracy in South Africa. 
Because we had a formal democracy, but there was so much work to do with institutional reform 
in South Africa as well, that initially it was a question for us of finding ways to, there was so 
much work to be done, the entire statute book of apartheid South Africa had to be re-written. So 
in that time we worked quite closely with Parliament. I would say that in last 5 or 6 years, the 
challenge has more been to convince both funders and the South African government of our 
continued relevance. ‘Cause the argument is sometimes made that, well, we don’t really need 
democracy organisations in South Africa, we are a democracy, we have money. So it’s more to 
convince people of our viewpoint, which is that you need a strong civil society presence in any 
society, if citizens are going to be able to make their voices heard. 
At times in our history we’ve been successfully funded, in other words, we’ve been able to make 
the argument that our work is important to be funded. But in the last 3 or 4 years, that has been 
more difficult. 
Like many NGO’s in South Africa, at the moment, I think the primary challenge is one of 
survival. We’re seeing, I think, a changing environment where funding from abroad is scarcer 
and government funding, Lottery funding, all of these mechanisms are not really taking up the 
slack very effectively. We did a study, for example, it was actually for SARS, on civil society in 
South Africa, and it was amazing how many NGO’s were complaining about delays in funding 
coming through to them. From government’s perspective, it’s not a huge sums of money 
necessarily, but a 2 month delay on R500 000 can make a difference between an NGO 
surviving or having to close down. 
Question 5 
The fifth question asked, I would argue encompasses the crux of the interview, for it inquires 
about the focal point of the study, and that is financial resources of the organisation. Question 
five is therefore three-fold. Because the question is so heavy-loaded, there was also a follow up 
and probing question that was unplanned, but crept up during the interview. The follow up 
question asked whether the funding that Idasa received came with any conditionality. 
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Question: a). How important are financial resources in the day-to-day running of the 
organisation/programmes that the organisation has and where do these financial resources 
come from? b). Who are your chief sources of funding, local or international? c). What about the 
Global Financial Crisis? How has it influenced Idasa, if at all? 
Respondent: a). It’s pretty essential really. Even though all of our staff I’d say tend to work in 
this field for ethical reasons, because they regard themselves as activists and they want to 
change the world. You know they still have bills to pay, as well. I don’t think you could ever have 
a successful NGO-culture based on volunteerism. So salaries need to be paid, work needs to 
be done. So, what happens is that a lot of heads of NGOs spend most of the time worrying 
about funding, trying to fund-raise, etc. But I think that’s fine. But what we’re seeing at the 
moment is that too many organisations are struggling too much, and I don’t think it’s good for 
the depth of democracy in South Africa. And we see what happened with, for example what 
happened at Lonmin mine, and these kind of issues. We see that there are so many issues 
actually that are unresolved in our society, so it would be a pity if at this point too many of these 
CSOs do go under. 
b). Idasa has always had a mix of funding. But primarily, we are funded by altruistic foundations, 
so the Ford foundation, the open society foundation these kind of things on the one hand, and 
on the other hand we are funded by ODA (Official Development Assistance) from Northern 
governments for development. Those have been our two main ones. We have often taken 
project funding from, for example the South African government. But we’ve never wanted or had 
it as a main source of funding because we feel our independence is an important part of our 
brand and our credibility as well.  
Follow-up question: Does the funding that you receive come with any conditionality? 
Resondent:  All of it is for specific work (project-based). We write proposals, or we rather 
respond to calls for proposals that are out there in the world. Some of them are successful, 1 in 
5 or 1 in 10 of the proposals we send out are successful in fact. But obviously, we look for the 
proposals that fit our own mission. We do also try to talk to donors about what we think is 
important, and that’s influenced the kind of work that gets funded. 
c). It’s had a huge influence. We’ve seen in the last 2 or 3 years a significant cut in funding 
available to an organisation such as ours to the extent that we retrenched half of our staff last 
year and closed our Cape Town office. I think it’s a combination of things, really. It’s the global 
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financial crisis, which has made less money available and it’s also a change in focus of that 
funding. South Africa becoming a middle-income country, this kind of factor in a time of resource 
scarcity has meant that it’s more difficult for ODA funders to convince their own citizens that 
they should send money to South Africa. So in other words, if you’re sitting with a problem of I 
can either send money to the Sudan or South Africa. It’s hard for them on that side, even if they 
perhaps think there are pressing challenges here. South Africa is a democracy, it’s a middle 
income country, it’s harder to make that argument. 
Question 6 
This question relates to Heywood’s fourth resource, the ability of interest groups to use 
sanctions that in some way inconvenience or disrupt governance. 
 
Question: What strategies does Idasa use (for example lobbying, protesting, boycotts) to 
achieve its goals? A follow-up question came up during the interview regarding the success of 
one strategy that Idasa used a few years ago, specifically litigation. 
Respondent: We use a mix of research and advocacy. So on the one hand, quite a lot of our 
staff are researchers, so they try and understand the situation, so that we can actually lobby 
effectively. I would say it’s a mix as well. We work with Parliament, we make submissions to 
Parliament, for example, we meet with policy-makers, we provide inputs on draft legislation, we 
do a lot of talking to the media, trying to look at the way they regard things as well. And in some 
cases we are actively involved in some campaigns, like the ‘right-to-know campaign’. Once or 
twice in our history, we used litigation. A couple of years ago we took South Africa’s major 
political party to court to try to compel them to reveal the sources of party funding. So basically, 
we use a mix of strategies to be effective. 
Follow-up question (How successful was the court case?): 
Respondent: Well, we lost the case and there still isn’t legislation for party funding, so probably 
not that successful. 
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Question 7 
This question was quite loaded as well. It sought to explore Heywood’s fifth resource in his 
framework; that of personal or institutional links interest groups may have to political parties or 
governance bodies. This question was three-fold:  
Questions:  
a). Can you provide specific examples of where Idasa influenced the government or government 
policy? How did you achieve this? b). Do you have institutional links with political 
parties/government or other civil society organisation? How do these links, if they exist, benefit 
the organisation and that which the organisation does? c). How is your relationship with the 
government? 
 
Respondent: 
a and b). We don’t have any institutional links (formal links) with political parties, I think we’ve in 
a sense avoided that. We certainly have links with government. So I think the successes are 
usually where you make a contribution to legislation. For example that’s one kind of success, 
and I think there’s a lot of those. But on the other hand, probably where we are most effective is 
quite intangible because it’s about getting people to talk across their differences. I mean that’s 
what our history is, that’s where the organisation’s history lies as well. We continue to do that 
kind of facilitation. I think given what’s happened in the last week, etc, there’s probably a more 
urgent role for Idasa again, because we seem to have quite a breakdown in a way, of the ability 
of stakeholders in for example what happened at Lonmin mine. That kind of thing is the kind of 
work we actually do well; trying to bring parties together, trying to find solutions as well. But you 
know it’s not always democracy workers, perhaps not as… It’s impact is not as easy to point to 
as for example building houses in an informal settlement. 
c). It varies, I mean, one of our slogans is: ‘no permanent friends, no permanent enemies’. So I 
think we’ve worked in some cases very successfully in partnership with government in specific 
projects. There’ve also been times when I think some people in government have been annoyed 
with us. Government’s also a very very ‘broad’ concept, so I think we have friends, we have ‘not’ 
enemies, but people who don’t like us in government as well. 
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Question 8 
Question eight is a more general question, seeking to uncover the role and place of civil society 
in society, past and present. 
Question: What does being an NGO in present-day SA mean/entail, and has it changed from 
historical times? 
Respondent: I think if you look at the apartheid era, if you looked at the NGO sector at that 
point, there were really only two things. There were welfare oriented white NGOs that worked 
with needy people in the society ‘arm blankes’, and then you had obviously those NGOs that 
were more all directly or indirectly involved in the struggle against apartheid. So I think what’s 
happened in democratic South Africa, a lot of NGOs have had to redefine themselves and also 
redefine their relationship with government: are they antagonistic, are they going to work closely 
in partnership? If they do that, how do they keep their independence? These are the kind of 
question that a lot of NGOs have had to ask themselves. And of course the other trend is that 
what happened post ‘94 is that a lot of the senior and perhaps most skilled and experienced 
members of the struggle went into government. So a lot of those NGOs lost a lot of their top 
people. And I think that’s also been an interesting challenge. In South Africa now in the 5 or 6 
years as you know we have this kind of, a so called ‘new left’. There’s a strong social 
movement, organised around service delivery protests, etc. So I think for established NGOs, 
there’s also been an interesting challenge; how do we relate to those movements? What can we 
add in these discussions as well? So I think it’s an on-going process of redefining yourself; of 
trying to understand where the most important work is as well. 
Question 9 
Question nine focused its attention to the rationale of this study and that is the role or rather the 
potential role those civil society organisations have in deepening South Africa’s democracy. 
Question: Do you think that civil society organisations have a role to play in deepening South 
Africa’s democracy? If so, how? 
Respondent: I think in a way I’ve answered that; undoubtedly. For us the important thing here is 
that democracy is not something that happens every 5 years, when we vote. It is how citizens 
relate; it is a matter of citizens being empowered. Basically our understanding of democracy is 
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where people are able to influence decisions that affect them on a daily basis and I think that 
kind of work is not something that government can or should do by itself. There’s always a role 
for civil society. Accountability, participation, and transparency are the pillars of good 
governance, so civil society can make democracy more accountable, it can hold decision-
makers to account. And then also with participation, civil society organisations are able to 
provide quite valuable inputs on policy making, in many cases they tend to be closer to the 
people, which is useful obviously if you are making policy that’s supposed to benefit the people 
as well. So I think it is vital that we have a strong civil society. A lot of the problems, funding 
problems as well that civil society organisations face, particularly those that concerned with 
issues of governance and accountability, like Idasa, there’s a few others as well, and I think it 
would be a pity if we lost that voice, especially in the next few years. 
Follow-up question (Do you foresee the current situation looking up at all?):  
Respondent: It will probably only look up substantially if things get substantially worse in South 
Africa. That is not something I would wish for the country, but in a sense, of course when things 
go bad, it’s good for funding in a country. So perhaps it would be best to hope that we could be 
redundant soon. 
To conclude the interview, I asked the interviewee if he had anything further that he wanted to 
add; any closing remarks that is: 
Respondent: An interesting thing, given the topic of your thesis, the financing of NGOs: 
Sometimes people ask us ‘but why don’t you then put more effort on trying to get corporate 
social responsibility funding’? ‘Why don’t you get funding from the big companies’? And the 
answer is actually, we probably would consider that, but South African large companies are not 
willing to fund governance type work in South Africa, because they’re too scared of being 
perceived as being anti-ANC, anti-government. So they are happy to fund building houses, but 
they won’t fund governance type work at this point. So that kind of avenue is also closed to 
organisations such as ours. 
Concluding question relating to closing remarks: (what about raising your own funds, how easy 
is that? [Doing work commercially?]) 
Respondent: Again, there’s probably a small component of what we do, could be charged for. 
There are other NGOS… In the past I worked for an adult education NGO, and there you could 
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charge for it, because it was a skill that you were transferring. I don’t think it’s the same for 
Idasa, ‘cause Idasa is essentially an institute, it comments, it tries to influence policy, it is not 
something you can try to provide commercially, even if you wanted to. So we are fully reliant on 
enough people thinking that this kind of work is important.  
The fourth question of the interview sought to understand the challenges facing the 
organisation, so as to see if those challenges have a great bearing in the organisation. Another 
concealed objective of this question was to find out if any of the resources Heywood speaks of 
creep up, particularly, the financial resources.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
Interview Transcription: 
Treatment Action Campaign 
Interviewer: Nomathamsanqa Masiko 
Interviewee: Catherine Tomlinson 
Dates: 16 September 2012 and 17 October 2012 
Question 1: 
The first question asked was a general question, so as better understand the TAC and the work 
that they do. 
Question: Briefly tell me about the TAC. (classification of organisation, what you do, 
programmes you’re involved in, when NGO started, why it started, etc.) 
Respondent: 
TAC is an activist movement, a non-profit and a civil society organisation. TAC’s historical 
campaigns have focused on securing access to HIV medicines. However, TAC’s work has 
expanded to lobby for access to equitable health care services. TAC does this by carrying out 
campaigns, using a number of strategies including marches, media and legal avenues. TAC 
also provides education and support on HIV and TB in the 6 districts that we work across the 
country. This is carried in communities and health care facilities. 
Question 2: 
The second question asked related to Heywood’s second resource, the size of membership or 
activist base. 
Question: Tell me about the size of your membership/activist base. What is the composition of 
your base of support and has there been a steady growth over the years? 
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Respondent:  TAC has around 10,000. There has been a decline in membership with the wide 
availability of antiretrovirals in the public sector. 
Question 3: 
The third question asked was another general question, seeking to better understand the 
organisation’s goals and priorities, with the ‘hidden intention’ of finding out if ‘the deepening of 
democracy’ is at all a priority for the organisation. 
Question: What are the key aims and goals of the TAC and would you say that these goals have 
been met? If yes or no, please motivate your answer 
Respondent: TAC’s key historical goal was securing access to HIV treatment and prevention. 
This has largely been met. South Africa has the largest public sector antiretroviral programme in 
the world (over 1.5 million people receive ARVs from the public sector) and comprehensive 
prevention services are available through the public sector. 
Yet challenges remain, new evidence is constantly emerging on the best treatment and 
prevention. Therefore TAC continues to lobby for new interventions (such as circumcision or 
better ARVs) as evidence emerges. 
In recent years, TAC expanded its vision and mission beyond HIV: Vision: A unified quality 
health care system which provides equal access to HIV prevention and treatment services for all 
people. Mission: To ensure that every person living with HIV has access to quality 
comprehensive prevention and treatment services to live a healthy life. 
These goals have not been met as numerous challenges (i.e. shortages of staff, medicines and 
problems with expenditure) continue to plague the public health sector in South Africa. 
Question 4: 
The fourth question was seeking to understand the challenges facing the organisation, so as to 
see if those challenges have a great bearing in the organisation. Another concealed objective of 
this question was to find out if any of the resources Heywood speaks of creep up, particularly, 
the financial resources.  
Question: What have been and/or are the key challenges facing the TAC in the attainment of 
the aforementioned goals? 
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Respondent:  
Key challenges that TAC has overcome, include: 
 Lack of knowledge about HIV and treatment 
 Denialism by government 
 High costs of ARV medicines 
On-going challenges that we face, include: 
 Dwindling funding for HIV. 
 Difficulties in bringing about social change to reduce the spread on HIV. 
 Lack of capacity to budget for and manage the delivery of health services at a provincial 
level within the department of health. 
 The number of challenges facing the public sector makes it difficult to have one 
campaign strategy goal. TAC has many on-going campaigns and goals at the same 
time. This makes it difficult for the public, government etc. to understand what TAC does. 
Question 5 
The fifth question asked, encompasses the crux of the interview, for it inquires about the focal 
point of the study, and that is financial resources of the organisation. Question five is therefore 
three-fold.  
Question: a). How important are financial resources in the day-to-day running of the 
organisation/programmes that the organisation has and where do these financial resources 
come from? b). Who are your chief sources of funding, local or international? c). What about the 
Global Financial Crisis? How has it influenced the TAC, if at all? 
Respondent: 
a). Financial resources are necessary to run any organisation. The scale of TAC’s campaign 
also requires financial resources. TAC almost had to shut down last year because of the delays 
in receiving money from the global fund. We have now received this funding and able to pay for 
staff and programmes. 
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b). TAC’s funding is largely and historically received from international funders. Given the 
insecurity of continuing to rely on these funders, TAC has begun to seek more funding 
nationally. A national fundraising office is now active, and they have set up a number of 
initiatives including using Given-Gain.  
c). ? 
Question 6 
This question relates to Heywood’s fourth resource, the ability of interest groups to use 
sanctions that in some way inconvenience or disrupt governance. 
Question: What strategies does the TAC use (for example lobbying, protesting, boycotts) to 
achieve its goals?  
Respondent: TAC has used a number of strategies to achieve its goals, including: lobbying, 
picketing marching, legal action and civil disobedience. 
Read more at: http://www.tac.org.za/community/files/10yearbook/index.html and 
http://www.tac.org.za/community/files/file/TreatmentLit/2009/OrganisingInOurLivesEng.pdf 
Question 7 
This question was quite loaded as well. It sought to explore Heywood’s fifth resource in his 
framework; that of personal or institutional links interest groups may have to political parties or 
governance bodies. This question was three-fold: a). Can you provide specific examples of 
where Idasa influenced the government or government policy? How did you achieve this? b). Do 
you have institutional links with political parties/government or other civil society organisation? 
How do these links, if they exist, benefit the organisation and that which the organisation does? 
c). How is your relationship with the government? 
a). TAC’s campaigns have forced government to provide antiretrovirals to pregnant mothers to 
reduce their risk of transmitting HIV to their infants. This was done through campaigning and a 
constitutional court case. Through civil disobedience, TAC forced government to provide ARVs 
to HIV positive people and adopt targets for scaling up access to treatment. The work of TAC 
and partners has also resulted in the adoption of a comprehensive policy to respond to HIV in 
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South Africa. This was done through working with government and SANAC (South African 
National Aids Council). 
b and c). In the past, while South Africa had a denialist government, TAC’s relationship with 
government was extremely conflictual. However today we have improved relationships with 
government and often work to support their initiatives. This has occurred because today 
leadership of the DoH (Department of Health) has demonstrated the political will to tackling HIV, 
and basing interventions on scientific evidence. However TAC has retained its independence 
and continues to challenge government. This year for instance, TAC lodged a complaint with the 
public protector for its use of the Tara Klamp (an unsafe circumcision device). 
 
 
Question 8 
Question eight is a more general question, seeking to uncover the role and place of civil society 
in society, past and present. 
Question: What does being an NGO in present-day SA mean/entail, and has it changed from 
historical times? 
Respondent: Today there is far more room for NGOs to exist and demonstrate than in previous 
years. The right to strike and demonstrate is now upheld in our laws.  
It would be far more difficult to carry out TAC’s campaigns in previous years. Partner 
organisations in other African countries continue to face violence, harassment and arrest for 
lobby for the same goals as TAC does. 
Question 9 
Question nine focused its attention to the rationale of this study and that is the role or rather the 
potential role those civil society organisations have in deepening South Africa’s democracy. 
Question: Do you think that civil society organisations have a role to play in deepening South 
Africa’s democracy? If so, how? 
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Respondent: Civil society has a vital role to ensure that our democratic rights are upheld. Civil 
society and communities have the power to shape and inform these laws and policies in South 
Africa. Government is required to carry out public consultations on new laws and policies before 
they are adopted.  Additionally, while adopting good laws and policies is important, this in itself 
is not enough. An active civil society is necessary to ensuring that they are properly 
implemented. TAC demonstrated with our constitutional court case the role that civil society 
must and can play in ensuring government upholds the legal rights of its citizens. 
Follow-up questions: 
Question 10: 
Question: What has come out of the TAC's complaint with the public protector for its use of the 
Tara Klamp?  
Respondent: We have received a receipt of acknowledgement and have been asked to submit 
additional evidence which we have done. No decision has been made by the Public Protector to 
date. 
Question 11 
Question: How reliant is the TAC on donor funding? Can you do without it? What are the 
Implications of decrease/stop in funding? 
Respondent: TAC provides all of its services for free, the organisation is entirely reliant on donor 
funding. The implication of a stop in funding is that TAC would have to shut down. 
 
Question 12 
Question: Is there anything that you feel you need to add, given the topic of my thesis ''The 
influence of the global financial crisis and other challenges to SA's NGO's and the prospects for 
deepening democracy''? 
Respondent: Civil society organisations are necessary for upholding and strengthening 
democracy given that they play a watchdog role in holding government to account. The financial 
crisis puts this work at risk. Therefore it is essential that new and sustainable mechanisms for 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
117 
 
funding civil society are found. One mechanism that has been proposed is implementing a 
financial transaction tax (Robin Hood Tax). TAC and partners have lobbied for the adoption of a 
small tax to fund development work and civil society. 
Question 13 
Question: What strategies does the TAC use to achieve its goals? (eg. lobbying, protesting, 
boycotts) Please expand on the matter. 
Respondent: This is detailed in the TAC 10 year history and organising in our lives. You can 
quote from these books as TAC. 
http://www.tac.org.za/community/files/10yearbook/index.html 
http://www.tac.org.za/community/files/file/TreatmentLit/2009/OrganisingInOurLivesEng.pdf 
Question 14 
Question: Has the global financial crisis influenced the TAC at all? Please expand. 
Respondent: Yes. TAC has gone through numerous rounds of retrenchments when funding has 
not come through, or we have not received adequate funding for programmes (this is discussed 
in the annual reports from the last few years). Many programmes have restarted once funding 
has become available but this has been very difficult for staff and moral. Additionally the 
production of TAC’s magazine Equal Treatment has been interrupted because of funding 
challenges. In coming years, it is expected that funding will decline and this will impact on what 
services and programmes TAC is able to provide. 
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